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Abstract 
 
 The objective of this work is evaluating the desirability of immortality. By immortality 
I mean physical immortality: living as long as one wishes in our current world without 
senescence. This means the possibility of living to 10 000 years or more with at least the same 
physical and intellectual capacity as if one is always 25 years old. By desirability I mean a 
stance regarding actualizing immortality. If immortality is desirable, then that means we ought 
to actualize it. I evaluate a total of ten arguments against immortality, often employed in the 
literature, and conclude they all fail. I also evaluate three arguments pro immortality and 
conclude they work, albeit with some caveats. Overall, I conclude that immortality is desirable. 
This view is contrary to the view held by the majority of the population. Then I identify two 
problems with the conclusion that <immortality is desirable>, one regarding opportunity costs 
and another regarding the burden of proof. To solve those problems I present an original 
argument in support of immortality that I call the ultimate argument for immortality (UAI). 
The UAI starts from a skeptical meta-ethical position and concludes that actualizing 
immortality is one of the few moral behaviours for the time being. This strengthens my 
previously conclusion: immortality is not just <desirable>, it is one of the few desirable goals 
for the time being. The consequences of the UAI are in stark contrast with commonly held 
ethical positions, both at a normative level and at a meta-ethical level. Because the UAI has a 
character of urgency I encourage everyone to consider it seriously and follow what results from 
it: actualizing immortality over almost everything else. 
 
Keywords: Immortality, Ageing, Aging, Applied Ethics, Transhumanism. 
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Section 1 – Introduction and Preliminary Considerations 
1.1 – What is This About? 
 The aim of this project is to collect, within the literature, arguments for and against the 
desirability of immortality and assess each one for its merits and weaknesses. Not every 
argument related to this theme will be evaluated. I do not think such a task is possible in the 
timeframe allotted to this project, and the benefits would be subject to diminish marginal 
returns with each additional argument1. Nevertheless, I do intend for this project to be 
representative of what is discussed in the literature. I will consider the most common 
arguments, for a total of 13 arguments, plus one that I believe to be original. 
I decided to write about this subject because I believe it to be fundamental to all of 
ethics and as such has a bearing on what ought to be. I will argue for this claim in 4.3 – Two 
Birds, One Stone. 
 I divided this work in six sections. In the remaining of this section I will present the 
necessary clarifications and context for what will follow. Because I divided the arguments into 
two categories, the next two sections will present arguments regarding the desirability of 
immortality: the second section will discuss intrinsic arguments (about immortality itself); and 
the third section will discuss consequential arguments (about the consequences of immortality). 
Next, in the fourth section I will present a conclusion of the analysis, advance it further by 
bringing in pragmatic obstacles, and present what I believe to be a novel argument on the 
subject of this project: the desirability of immortality. The fifth section contains a reference 
list, and the sixth and last section contains visual aids to improve the reading experience. 
 
1.2 – What is Immortality? 
I am sure that if one goes outside and asks passers-by what the meaning of immortality 
is, one would inevitably obtain a plethora of different answers. The same happens within the 
literature. Zaleski (2004) went as far as identifying seven definitions of immortality which do 
not exhaust those I will offer here. Immortality as a word seems like a buffet of concepts.  
Right of the bat we can put aside two types of immortality that I will not be discussing 
because they are immaterialist concepts. First, there is the metaphysical immortality usually 
present in spiritual and religious traditions such as reincarnation, or life in paradise (or hell). 
                                                 
1 Less common arguments are harder to find. 
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Secondly there is the biographical concept where one leaves some sort of heritage in the 
material world to be remembered by others, be it through work, reproduction or other means. 
The sort of immortality this work is about is immortality in the material world, in the 
here and now. Unlike the two concepts above, the type of immortality I have in mind happens 
before the event society calls death, and thus I believe fits the word better. For the sake of 
argument let us assume an information-theoretical concept of death – death is when one ceases 
to be, and it becomes impossible to reconstitute/repair/rebuild the relevant physical structures 
that constitute the individual. Immortality must mean something related to the avoidance of 
that concept death. With that said I have identified four concepts that make use of the word 
immortality and fit the description I have just put forward. For clarity’s sake there is a need to 
narrow down the relevant one. I will present them in an order such that the next concept 
encompasses the previous one and adds something extra: 
• Level I – The negation of an increase in mortality rates as a function of age. This 
definition is used by Rose (2004a, 2004b). Rose goes on to defend, using his definition, 
that organisms are either born immortal (if their mortality rates do not increase with 
time), or they age (increase in mortality rates as a function of time) and then become 
immortal, thus immortality always obtains. According to this definition we become 
immortal when we become old because our rates of mortality do not increase past a 
certain point. Because we become immortal when we are more likely to die, this seems 
a perversion of the word “immortal”. To his credit, Rose uses the qualifier <biological>, 
which can become a shield by arguing that this is a technical/scientific concept and 
therefore allowed to be counterintuitive to the layman. Nonetheless I believe the choice 
of words to describe Rose’s concept could have been such that no confusion would 
remain, leaving the word immortality for more serious matters. In essence, achieving 
this concept of immortality requires no change to the current state of affairs since elders 
are already immortal and, ceteris paribus, we will be one of them. Death will occur just 
the same. It will not do for the kind of immortality I have in mind. 
• Level II – The elimination of aging. Causes of death not related to aging would still 
happen, such as murders, natural disasters, infectious diseases, etc. This definition is 
used by Overall (2003, 131) and Harris (2013), called superlongevity by More (2004), 
and called virtual immortality by Binstock (2004a) and Dekkers (2013). This concept 
is still not what I am looking for since I do not think we should call someone immortal 
if we can easily kill them by running them over with a car. This definition fulfils the 
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Level I criterion because if there is no aging, the rate of mortality in relation to age (in 
the sense of time lived) should be constant – non-age-related causes of death should 
affect every generation equally. 
• Level III – Dying is only possible voluntarily. This definition is used by the Immortality 
Institute (2004, 7), now called Longecity. This concept of immortality, unlike the 
previous two, is not based on a biological framework – it uses agency instead as its 
foundation. Here we get everything that we had with the Level II concept plus the 
elimination of every cause of death not already contemplated by the elimination of 
aging (murders, infections, etc), except for suicide. The exception of suicide is allowed 
because of what I call the agency allowance. Since the concept is rooted in an agency 
framework it does not eliminate voluntary causes of death. This concept of immortality 
is not the same as living forever, it merely requires the option to do so (see 2.4.1 – 
Optionality Argument).2 
• Level IV – Dying is not possible. Zaleski (2004) calls it alpha immortality and Harris 
(2013) calls it invulnerability. The previous level included an elimination of every 
involuntary cause of death. This level adds to it by eliminating the voluntary ones 
making it impossible to die. 
Economic soundness will show that either no level is preferred, which, best case 
scenario, results in an instant death once mortality rates stop increasing with age; or Level IV 
is preferred, because every level up represents a Pareto improvement.3 This is so because every 
level can emulate lower levels without any phenomenological difference to the subject.4 The 
subject loses nothing by moving up a level. By that logic, to narrow down the relevant concept 
I need not point to a specific level, I just need to define a floor and accept every level above it. 
In other words, I need to define the minimum acceptable to be able to employ the word 
immortality. I put that line at Level III. Immortality, as discussed here, must only allow for 
voluntary death (or eternal sleep if we are emulating it from Level IV). Immortality is bringing 
death inside the scope of things one controls. As such this work can be read as using a Level 
III concept of immortality. Henceforth the word immortality will mean Level III immortality 
unless stated otherwise. 
                                                 
2 Rest assured that the heat death of the universe is not ignored. It is discussed in P36A4A2A1A1. 
3 A Pareto improvement can be described as an improvement of position without trade-offs. For example, take the 
use of a fast food discount. From the consumer perspective, the shift from paying full price to paying a discounted 
price is a Pareto improvement: the consumer did not have to give something in exchange for the use of the 
discount. 
4 With the use of a venom or substance that kills instantaneously - or puts the subject to eternal sleep - released 
according to certain triggering conditions mimicking the emulated level. 
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1.3 – Illness and Frailty 
 One can argue that Level II is not necessary to a Level III conception of immortality. 
In this case, we would imagine someone aging forever but not dying, getting weaker each year.  
 The problem is that, for someone to be in that state, technology must have been 
developed in order to avoid death, but not to repair all the maladies of senescence. Say that 
someone has a problem with an organ that will result in certain death if nothing is done. We 
need be able to deal with that problem without improving the state the individual is in if we are 
to argue for the strange conception of immortality put forward in the previous paragraph. This 
means avoiding death, while leaving the individual in the same poor conditions regarding its 
organ so that senescence could continue to operate without causing an involuntary death. This 
is clearly not the case when one goes to the hospital to receive treatment for certain maladies, 
even those age related. Sometimes the opposite happens – treating the symptoms and not the 
cause instead of treating the cause and leaving the symptoms in place as this concept of 
immortality suggests. The knowledge and technology that allows for the intervention to solve 
the death threat also solves its contribution to senescence – same source, same knowledge 
required. The only way to make a scenario of immortality of Level III without Level II is if we 
also conceive of evil masterminds which purposely want to maintain humanity in a permanent 
state of frailty, denying us the complete treatment, or, alternatively, evil masterminds that after 
each treatment make just enough damage to replenish the correct amount of senesce the patient 
had before the treatment. Let us call this concept level 2.5 immortality. 
 Level 2.5 immortality is not to be taken seriously since no one is arguing for it. Not 
only that, but Level II immortality is conceived in a way where one’s life is not lived in illness, 
frailty, or weakness. Christine Overall (2003, 41, 65, 130) put it better: 
There is no reason to assume, a priori, that a long life must necessarily be a life of physical 
pain, illness, and disability. 
Hardwig (1997a, 35) writes, “If further medical advances wipe out many of today’s ‘killer 
diseases’—cancers, heart attacks, strokes, ALS, AIDS, and the rest—then one day most of 
us will survive long enough to become demented or debilitated. These developments could 
generate a fairly widespread duty to die.” (…) Prolongevists could perhaps try to dodge 
Hardwig’s claims by pointing out that prolongevitism advocates the extension of life only 
if it can be lived in a healthy, functional state. They advocate the extension of life only if it 
will not involve the severe illness, unrelieved pain, or disablement that undermine an 
individual’s capacity to pursue his or her life projects. Hence, the prolongevist might argue 
that the problems Hardwig hypothesizes as arising from progressive mental and physical 
deterioration, and their alleged moral significance with respect to the prolongation of human 
life, do not have any force against prolongevitism.  
Individuals who chose immortality would be reasonably healthy and energetic. For them, 
the elimination of death would also mean the elimination of aging. Any objection to 
immortality on the grounds that one would still be subject to the worst effects of extreme 
old age would be obviated.  
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 Sethe & de Magalhães (2013) also state that immortality of Level II implies a healthy 
living: “What can rather be excluded as a possibility is that significant life extension will simply 
prolong the period of old age”. And de Magalhães (2011) expands:  
One of the most pervasive public misconceptions about biogerontology is the idea that the 
goal of anti-ageing medicine is to make old people live longer by merely extending life and 
consequently extending age-related debilitation and suffering. This is known as the Tithonus 
error. In Greek mythology, Tithonus was a mortal to whom Zeus conceded immortality but 
not eternal youth, rendering Tithonus increasingly debilitated and demented as he aged. 
Contrary to the immortality granted to Tithonus, the goal of biogerontology is to extend 
healthy lifespan by postponing disease and extending the healthy period of life. Rather than 
focus on specific age-related diseases or changes, the goal of biogerontology is also to delay 
the process of ageing as a whole and not just its individual manifestations.  
Life is supposed to be lived in a healthy state, and that is the scenario under analysis. 
Immortality 2.5 is a straw man mounted by those wishing to attack the side that says 
<immortality is desirable>. For example (Overall, 2003, 44): 
Peter Singer argues that extending human life significantly—for example, by seventy or 
eighty years—will inevitably lead to a lower average quality of life because “individuals 
will enjoy the freshness of youth for a comparatively small portion” of their total life span 
and because their average level of health will be not quite as good as the average level of 
health of those leading shorter lives.  
This work can be read with the assumption that immortals will live at least at the peak 
of their physical and mental capacity (say at age 25), or at any other preferred stage (the agency 
allowance gives individuals the option to live with as much senescence as they wish). 
 
1.4 – Desirability vs Feasibility 
Another clarification I wish to present is about the word <desirability>. It is not to be 
interpreted as the possibility of immortality being an object of desire. There is no doubt that 
people can desire to be immortal. Instead, desirability has an ethical connotation. Asking if 
immortality is desirable means asking if it should be actualized. Note, however, that asking if 
it should be actualized is not the same as asking if it can be actualized. There is a distinction 
between what is feasible and what is desirable. I am not concerned with the feasibility of 
immortality for that is an empirical matter, a subject of science and engineering. Regardless of 
the answer about its feasibility, the question of its desirability still stands and must be addressed 
separately (e.g. see Capron, 2004; Overall, 2003, 127). Desirability and feasibility are 
independent – all four combinations between the two can obtain. 
There are, however, several interactions between the feasibility and the desirability, that 
are shared not only by the technology of immortality but by any other technological endeavour. 
For example, how much something is desired can influence the efforts to achieve it and thus 
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change the prospects of its feasibility. And the closer we are to achieve a new technology the 
more important is the debate about its desirability. 
A good method of assessing each question independently is to assume the other to be 
already answered positively. If we want to assess the feasibility of something we should assume 
that it is desirable. And if we want to assess the desirability of something we should assume 
that it is feasible. That way we avoid the mistake of confounding both question and answering 
none, or circularity. As such, this work can be read with the assumption that immortality is 
feasible. 
This means that reasonings such as the following <it is inevitable that we die so it is 
better to accept our fate>, will not be considered as arguments for the debate. They not only (i) 
suffer from the possibility of falling into a self-fulfilling prophecy but also (ii) fail to adequately 
separate both questions.  
(i) People believe X cannot be actualized. Because people do not believe X can be 
actualized they do not try to actualize it. The end result is that X will not be actualized not 
because of some physical impediment but because people tricked themselves into it. The belief 
that X cannot be actualized caused itself to be true. One would think that professionals would 
know better, but here is an example from Dekkers (2013) 5: 
The idea of arrested aging which would bring about ‘virtual immortality’ is simply 
inconceivable to me. (…) I agree with anti-posthumanist thinkers that we can better focus 
on the acceptance of aging rather than on its scientific modification. Although it might be 
possible that in the future we could live a few years longer, we cannot escape the aging 
process. Aging just happens. Old age will catch up with us and finally we will die. This fact 
will continue to stimulate the search for a meaning-giving process and, ideally, for an 
acceptance of the fact (emphasis mine) that we are all going to die. 
(ii) Examples when authors outright mix <what is> with <what ought to> also exist in 
the literature. It often happens when, presented with the desirability (feasibility) question, the 
author answers instead to a different question, that of feasibility (desirability). As Overall 
(2003, 156) shows: 
John Macquarrie writes, “People usually want to postpone death, but death and temporal 
finitude are so much a constitutive part of humanity that an unending human life would be 
a monstrosity” (Macquarrie 1972, 197) 
[Note 1] - In the 1994 Miss USA contest, Miss Alabama replied to the question “If you could 
live forever, would you and why?” as follows: “I would not live forever, because we should 
not live forever, because if we were supposed to live forever, then we would live forever, 
but we cannot live forever, which is why I would not live forever.” Miss Alabama could be 
interpreted as arguing that the empirical evidence that human beings do not live forever 
supports the normative claim that, as human beings, we ought not to live forever. This claim 
is not so very different from Macquarrie’s. 
                                                 
5 It is interesting to note that in the very same article the author seems to contradict himself: “in recent decades 
science and technology have begun to suggest that what once was just utopian thinking might become a practical 
possibility”. 
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1.5 – Proxys for Discussion 
 Literature discussions about normative ethical implications of immortality are new, 
scarce and do not have a well-defined place, as Overall (2003, 15) explains: 
Relatively little contemporary philosophical work takes as its specific focus the exploration 
of normative aspects of human longevity. Thus, for example, a computer search of The 
Philosopher’s Index (1940– 2001) reveals that only a handful of articles exploring questions 
about the possible value of human longevity were published during the period covered by 
the Index. Indeed, Gerald Gruman (1977, 6) is not exaggerating when he remarks that the 
subject of prolonging human life has been “relegated to a limbo reserved for impractical 
projects or eccentric whims not quite worthy of serious scientific or philosophical 
consideration.”  
And Binstock (2004a) provides the same analyses on the scientific side of things: 
Published over 20 years ago, political scientist Betty Lockett observed: "Those who would 
study aging in order to retard or halt the process have been considered on the fringe of 
biomedical research, looking for the fountain of youth ... . a marginal area . . . with so little 
backing from the scientific community" (Lockett, 1983, p. 5). 
 With this in mind, to procure the arguments that form the basis of this project, I decided 
to look at proxy discussions. These are discussions that can entail immortality (of any level) 
and thus produce arguments that can be applied to the concept of immortality proper. 
 One way of discovering such discussions is by trying to foresee which technologies 
will enable immortality and look at the current debate of such endeavours, if possible. I can 
think of three ways to achieve immortality: 
a) Mind uploading; 
b) Timeconsciousness scaling; 
c) Curing aging. 
a) Discussions about mind uploading usually focus on its feasibility (e.g. Chalmers, 
2014; Bainbridge, 2004), involving two main concerns: the nature of consciousness, and 
personal identity. If we are to discuss the desirability of mind uploading as a proxy for 
immortality, we would need to have strong assumptions about consciousness and personal 
identity. I certainly do not think it is impossible that mind uploading could work, but I also do 
not take it for granted, mainly because of questions regarding personal identity (see Perry, 
1978). Mind uploading does not seem to be an ideal proxy for discussion since its strength 
would be correlated to the strength of its assumptions regarding consciousness and personal 
identity. The problem here is not one of assuming positive feasibility (see 1.4 – Desirability vs 
Feasibility). One could clearly assume that an upload, with assumptions so and so about 
consciousness and so and so about personal identity would be feasible, and then tackle its 
desirability. The problem is that the scenario under consideration is going to be specific to 
those assumptions and consequently too narrow a proxy for what I have in mind. On the other 
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hand, considering every possible interaction between consciousness and personal identity, i.e. 
all scenarios, does not seem feasible for this project, and is not a good methodological choice 
if better proxies are available. Take, for example, the problem of personal identity – if upload 
produces something that is not matched by the concept of personal identity we use today in our 
day to day lives, how should we go about analysing it? The focus will clearly shift from the 
desirability of immortality to the desirability of a certain conception of personal identity. And 
if I assume that it does produce the same personal identity we use in our daily lives, then it 
becomes very hard to find desirability arguments within mind uploading literature compared 
to alternatives down the list. In any case, my search for proxies is not exclusive, i.e. if I happen 
to find a discussion about uploading with relevant arguments I will use it, no doubt. Rejecting 
uploading as a proxy only means I will focus my attention on some other discussion. 
b) Next in line is timeconsciousness scaling. This idea has been around for at least some 
decades (see Dyson, 1979). Timeconsciousness is to be understood as the speed at which we 
perceive time. In the words of Clynes (2004): “On a different galaxy, say, a living being could 
exist to whom night and day would be a flicker”. Since “there is nothing absolute about our 
timeconsciousness” (ibid.), there is, in theory, freedom to redesign our timeconsciousness rate. 
That would mean that our current life expectancy of 80 years (give or take) could be 
experienced as 80 000 years, just by scaling our timeconsciousness by a factor of 1000. One 
second for us is more than 15 minutes for the timeconsciousness scaled individual. And there 
is no reason to stop at a factor of 1000. There is, however, one problem in using this proxy for 
discussions about the desirability of immortality and that is the lack of relevant discussions. 
c) Lastly, let us scavenge discussions about curing aging. By curing aging I mean not 
only the end result but also a specific way of achieving it. Off course that curing aging by mind 
uploading and/or timeconsciousness scaling are excluded. What I have in mind is biological 
tweaking, with the goal of taking full control of the aging process and then either turn it off or 
make it negligible. Unlike mind uploading, curing aging will not bring attached (at least not 
immediately) the nature of consciousness and/or personal identity, and unlike 
timeconsciousness scaling there is an abundant amount of discussions. However, there is one 
problem with this proxy – it amounts only to Level II immortality. I think this is not a problem 
since Level II is a necessary condition for Level III and at the same time discussions about its 
possibility/feasibility are more settled than the other two alternatives (we know more about 
aging than we know about consciousness or timeconsciousness). I believe this to be the best 
proxy for this project. I will expand on the relation between immortality and curing aging in 
1.6 – Curing Aging vs Immortality. 
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Apart from these 3 technologies that can enable immortality directly, there are some 
indirect ways to achieve it. By indirect I mean something that will enable the attainment of at 
least one direct technology. I can think of 4 indirect endeavours/discussions: 
d) Cryonics; 
e) Transhumanism; 
f) Religion; 
g) Artificial (Super)Intelligence. 
d) Cryonics6 is considered the plan B for immortality. If one does not happen to survive 
until a), b) or c) is actualized, there is the option of going under the cryonic process and 
conserve the body in the hope of future reanimation (when at least one of the direct technologies 
is operational). There is a strong connection between wanting to go under the cryonic procedure 
and wanting to be immortal, since the former is usually caused by the latter. If the preserved 
body is used as a source for an uploading, for example through a brain scan, then this proxy 
discussion has the same downsides as uploading. Those obstacles seem to be eliminated if, on 
the other hand, the preserved body is reanimated, which merits serious consideration. 
According to Wowk (2004): 
Anesthetic drugs, such as barbiturates, can flatten EEG (brain electrical activity) readings 
for many hours while still permitting later recovery. This prolonged drug-induced 
elimination of brain activity is sometimes used as a treatment for head injuries. Patients do 
not emerge from these comas as blank slates. Evidently human beings do not require 
continuous operation like computer chips. Brains store long-term memories in physical 
structures, not fleeting electrical patterns. 
 Regardless the outcome of reanimating the person using the original body, this proxy 
offers no new arguments over discussion about curing aging, since it is a means to it. 
Furthermore, one would need to assume reanimation would be chosen over mind uploading to 
avoid the assumption problems regarding consciousness and personal identity.  
 e) By transhumanism (or posthumanism) I mean “a way of thinking about the future 
that is based on the premise that the human species in its current form does not represent the 
end of our development but rather a comparatively early phase” (Transhumanist FAQ Version 
3, 2016). The connection with immortality is clear since immortality is an upgrade over the 
status quo. The debate between bioconservatives and transhumanists should render some 
arguments to the analysis of the desirability of immortality. In fact, any value system that 
includes immortality can, in principle, produce arguments useful for this project. The drawback 
                                                 
6 Cryonics means the process of conserving the human body in low temperatures with expectations of future 
reanimation. For more see Urban (2016). Not to be confused with cryogenics – the study of things at extremely 
low temperatures.  
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is that immortality is but one of many enhancements included in the transhumanist movement 
(e.g. of another enhancement: superintelligence). It seems that while curing aging is less than 
ideal for our analysis (since immortality requires more), transhumanism encompasses too much 
(since immortality does not require it fully). Curing aging is necessary, while transhumanism 
is sufficient, so while one can be pro immortality and not a transhumanist, it is impossible to 
be pro immortality and not wanting to cure aging. Given that, I decided to put more emphasis 
on analysing discussions about curing aging. Let it be said, again, that this is not a black or 
white matter, but an overlapping one. By focusing on discussions about curing aging I will 
eventually come across transhumanist arguments. Curing aging also has a more short-term 
importance given the current state of technology (see 1.8 – Delving Deeper into Aging), than 
the foresighted transhumanist dream.  
 f) By religion I mean the afterlife – the metaphysical place where one goes after dying 
in this material world. This comes in plenty of flavours such as heaven, hell, or reincarnation. 
Although I have already clarified that this is not the sort of immortality I will be focusing on, 
that does not mean the literature lacks interesting arguments about its desirability that can be 
proxied to a discussion about immortality proper. However, the afterlife has the same problems 
as mind uploading – nature of consciousness and personal identity – since going to heaven is 
an effective upload: one ditches one’s body and transfers one’s mind to another vessel in 
another place. But the drawbacks do not end there. The afterlife also involves some 
questionable metaphysical assumptions about the destination where the mind is uploaded to, 
which subtract to the value of using this discussion as a proxy. Lastly, the question about its 
desirability seems largely undebated – people desire to go to wherever their faith say they will 
go in the afterlife and many make it their whole point in life in this material world. 
 g) Lastly, there is artificial superintelligence (ASI). ASI can enable us to 
discover/invent the missing scientific and technological steps to achieve immortality. However, 
given the incredibly powerful and unknown consequences of an ASI the discussion usually 
focuses on the risk of losing control and mitigation strategies. That is clear in the work of 
philosopher Nick Bostrom (e.g. 2014) and on more public shows of concern such as the open 
letter (The Future of Life Institute, 2015) signed by dozens of artificial intelligence researchers 
and important public figures such as Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and others, calling for the 
ban of autonomous weapons systems. Discussions that merge ASI and immortality are usually 
about the question of feasibility (what specific technical task can we delegate to the ASI?), not 
about the question of desirability. 
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1.6 – Curing Aging vs Immortality 
 As stated previously, there is not a specific place where discussions about the 
desirability of immortality are. They are scattered across the literature. I decided to identify the 
best proxy discussions in order to proceed with this work. This is my first reason to delve into 
discussions about curing aging. 
 My second reason is that it offers advantages relative to other discussions, also 
mentioned in the previous section and that I will recap here: does not require shaky assumptions 
(uploading, religion, cryonics), it is not lacking in the number of discussants 
(timeconsciousness), or has a radically different focus (ASI), or is too broad (transhumanism). 
 My third reason is that, by being a necessary condition for immortality, it will rally 
arguments found on almost all of the alternatives. 
 My fourth reason is that the question of feasibility is somewhat settled compared to the 
alternatives. In principle aging is not necessary (see 1.8 – Delving Deeper into Aging). 
 My fifth reason is time constraints. Perhaps in the future there will be an opportunity to 
scourge all the different areas of the literature and collect all the arguments put forward, but 
for this project this is not an option. Diminishing marginal returns are very real. 
 Lastly, my sixth reason is that other philosophers also think that this is a good proxy 
discussion. “Debates about the possibility and, more relevantly still, the value of immortality 
are closely connected to debates about human longevity.”  (Overall 2003, 125) 
 So, the next step is to say a few words about the relation of immortality with curing 
aging, besides noting that the latter is necessary for the former. 
 If we start with (the goal of) immortality, we can arrive at curing aging, by noting that 
aging brings forth states of affairs that provoke involuntary death: heart failure, stroke, etc. that 
need to be solved. On the other hand, if we cure ageing we can, in principle, live forever, we 
just need to avoid infectious diseases, murder, being hit by dangerous moving masses, and 
other non-age-related deaths. Capron (2004) writes: “If longevity is altered by X years now, 
why not by X + Y years tomorrow, and so forth? There is no limit inherent in the process of 
lengthening life, so the end point would be virtual immortality.” Curing aging without 
appealing to some cause of involuntary death means endorsing immortality.  But what is aging 
after all? 
 
  24/201 
1.7 – What is Aging? 
 The word aging usually means two different things that so far in history have been 
bundled together. But by not clearly separating them, one runs the risk of committing a false 
equivocation. To age, to be old or young, can be understood as simply as to have lived a certain 
amount of years – let us call this the chronological meaning of aging (to use the same 
expression as Caplan, 2004). I am old if I have lived 70 years, I am of age after 20ish, I am x 
years old, etc. But age can also mean the state of frailty of the elder, the accumulated senescence 
the forbids the old of competing in marathons or having children – let us call this the capability 
meaning of aging. It just happens that, in the current state of affairs, ageing, or to age, or to be 
old, involve simultaneously the chronological, and the capability meanings of aging. It is by 
ageing (chronological meaning) that one gets old (capability meaning). However, when 
considering the concept of immortality, we have to clear the waters. The two meanings will no 
longer be tied together (see section 1.3 – Illness and Frailty). To be old in a context of 
immortality, can only mean to have lived a certain amount of years, not something capability 
related. Picture one 25y old of today (capability meaning) and then add in the information that 
he is 4000 years old (chronological meaning). The English language is ambiguous. I have to 
tell you that a person is 25 and 4000 years old at the same time, if I want to desynchronize the 
meanings of ageing. 
Discussions about curing ageing mean getting rid of the problems associated with the 
capability meaning of the word. One would still age in the chronological sense, but the ability 
to run a marathon will no longer be affected by the passage of time. Let us take a look at some 
definitions of aging (capability meaning) used by specialists: 
1 – Rose (2004a): “The most objective definition of aging is that which occurs when rates of survival 
or reproduction inexorably decline, even when organisms are kept in excellent environments, in which contagious 
disease has been virtually eliminated, with abundant food and no prospect of being eaten.”  
2 – de Magalhães (2004): “Human aging is a universal process of loss of viability and increase in 
vulnerability (…) Aging is a sexually transmitted terminal disease” 
3 – Masoro (1995, 3) as quoted in de Grey (2004b): “Deteriorative changes with time during 
postmaturational life that underlie an increasing vulnerability to challenges, thereby decreasing the ability of the 
organism to survive.” 
4 – de Grey (2002) as quoted in de Grey (2004b): “A collection of early-onset, slowly 
progressive, mutually synergistic degenerative processes, whose later stages are fatal but tend to be given 
"disease" status only if they fairly often kill or severely debilitate people before they reach their society's life 
expectancy.” 
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5 – de Grey (2004b): “A collection of cumulative changes to the molecular and cellular structure of 
the adult organism, which result from essential metabolic processes but which, once they progress far enough, 
increasingly disrupt metabolism, resulting in pathology and death.” 
The common feature seems to be the changes that underlie our loss of physical and 
mental capacity with the passage of time, and that ultimately lead to death. Perhaps the analogy 
that de Grey uses in conferences and interviews (e.g. talk at St. Gallen Symposium in 2014) is 
the easiest to grasp: aging is the damage the body does to itself in the process of its normal 
functioning. Like any machine, the body suffers wear and tear (damage) just by its normal 
operation – and that is aging. If enough damage is accumulated the machine halts, or dies. The 
analogy of aging with a machine (usually a car) is used in formal models (Aaron & Harris, 
2004; Olshansky & Carnes, 2004). 
Although it is very difficult to measure aging (see de Magalhães 2012; Miller, 2004), 
death, or in other words, the amount of life attained, can be used as a proxy. This is so because 
aging refers to changes and processes that ultimately lead to death. That brings us closer to the 
definition of Rose (cited above). It is as if this definition regards the symptoms and not the 
causes of aging, but as such it is enough to measure aging, at least when it comes to populations. 
Perhaps it is useful now to precise some concepts, in order to help us clarify what is at stake: 
a) Lifespan: This is the amount of life that one expects to live in a controlled 
environment (see Rose’s definition of aging above). In essence it takes the best 
possible environment states and evaluates how long an individual can last in such a 
scenario on average. Death will be caused exclusively by ageing. For humans in the 
present, if it exists, this value is hypothesized at around 120 years (110 in Goss, 
2004; 120 in Aaron & Harris, 2004). 
b) Life expectancy: This is the amount of life one expects to live. Unlike life-span it 
accounts for external factors, such as medicine, hygiene, security, nutrition, etc. 
Life expectancy has been rising on average 6 hours per day for the last 160 years 
for humans (Pinxten, 2013) due to changes in our society, most notably decreases 
in child mortality rates (Olshansky & Carnes, 2004). Progress against infectious and 
parasitic diseases (ibid; Pinxten, 2013), availability and quality of food, improved 
infrastructure, and educational levels (ibid.) also played an important role. 
c) Healthspan: This is the amount of life one expects to live in a relative healthy state. 
“For a wide range of physiological parameters derived from published studies of 
humans, it appears that approximately 80% of functional capacity is lost by age 80” 
(Olshansky & Carnes, 2004, citing Harman et al. 2000). 
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Immortality means making the life-span infinite and the other two dependent on the 
agency of the self. Unlike immortality, curing aging only requires making the life-span infinite 
and eliminating the health-span and life expectancy effects of aging.  
 
1.8 – Delving Deeper into Aging 
 But where does aging comes from? Why does it exist? Why do people die in the end? 
There are two answers to this question. A developmental biologist might answer that aging is 
the result of a series of changes such as cell oxidation, accumulation of free radicals, etc. But 
an evolutionary biologist might answer that aging is a by-product of evolution (Rose, 2004b; 
Arking, 2004, and Caplan, 2004 separate the questions into the why and the how). Both answers 
are correct, but they are tailored for why questions of different depth. If we ask the reasons why 
the processes described by the developmental biologist happen, and then apply another why 
question to his answer, and so on, soon or later we will need to come up with the evolutionary 
biologist answer. Allow me another example: why are polar bears white? One answer is that 
they have hollow and clear hair (not white) that scatters light in different wavelengths. Another 
answer is that a random mutation made their hairs that way and at the same time provided an 
advantage – camouflage. The former is the developmental biologist answer, and the latter is 
the evolutionary biologist’s. When we ask why aging exists, the deeper question is not about 
the specific mechanisms that are operating inside the body, but how the aging process has come 
to be in the first place. 
 Evolutionarily, aging serves no purpose and is instead a by-product. Let that sink in for 
a moment. Nature did not come up with aging so we could leave space for new generations 
(Miller, 2004). Likewise, aging is not the result of some god’s tantrum. It is an unintended 
result of other processes. Long story short, genes that express themselves after reproduction 
are not subject to the process of selection. (see Olshansky & Carnes, 2004, for a more detailed 
explanation of what follows; cf. Arking, 2004, and Miller, 2004; for a well written and recent 
overview of theories of aging see de Magalhães, 2011). Suppose a trait that kills before 
reproduction and another that kills after. Natural selection only works for the former. The latter 
will be completely ignored by the selection process because when it kills reproduction has 
already happened. Traits that work on longevity, preservation and repair of the body at late 
stages in life, are not being either selected or rejected by the selection process because they will 
usually express themselves only after reproduction. People age because they lack the relevant 
genes, and there is no selective pressure to have them. 
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But it remains to be explained why then we are sexually active starting X years after 
we were born. Different species, even mammals (and apes if we want a narrow comparison), 
have different maturation cycles and different life spans. In other words, some species require 
several years until they can produce offspring while others only need a few months. The 
weakness of natural selection post-reproduction does not explain why that is so. We need the 
second half of the explanation. Some species live longer than others because nature explores 
different strategies and continuously finds the local optimum for each species. It boils down to 
how adverse the environment is. Perhaps it is better to reproduce quickly, since the survival 
rate of the marginal year is not worth it. For example, if a species has predators, ceteris paribus, 
it will have a shorter period of time until sexual maturity, or else it would run the risk of being 
eaten before leaving offspring – in this case selection favours rapid maturity so reproduction 
can happen quickly after the individual is born. On the other hand, by taking longer to reach 
the age of reproduction the organism will be better prepared to deal with damage and repair in 
its body and possibly have the time for multiple tries at reproduction. This is so due to the 
disposable soma theory (for more on somatic cells see West, 2004, for more on the disposable 
soma theory see Arking, 2004). This theory states that there is a trade-off between allocating 
resources to reproduction or to somatic maintenance and repair. Every species has a budget of 
energy that can be allocated between repair (living longer) or reproduction. If the strategy is to 
reproduce as quickly as it can (because of its adverse environment), that species will neglect 
the repair and preservation of the soma, i.e. age quickly. Conversely, other species can allocate 
resources to somatic repair and reproduce later in life and/or during a longer period, as long as 
the cost of repair does not exceed the cost of reproduction: if it costs too much to repair your 
car, you might as well get a new one, hence the name disposable soma theory.7 Summing up 
in the words of Olshansky & Carnes (2004), and Arking (2004), respectively: 
All modern evolutionary theories of senescence rely on the premise that selection is blind to 
the consequences of gene expression in the postreproductive period of the life span: aging 
and death genes or programs cannot arise from the direct action of natural selection. 
Senescence-related diseases and disorders observed in the postreproductive period are 
unintended by-products of selection acting upon genes participating in biological processes 
important earlier in the life span. 
And so we age, not because of some philosophically satisfying cosmic reason that requires 
our senescence and death, but simply because the body's energy allocations are such that our 
failure to repair ensures that there is no reason not to age. 
                                                 
7 Do not make the mistake of believing that by avoiding sex, someone can trick their body into living longer. The 
reasoning presented here is valid for species not for individuals. In fact, the opposite seems to happen when 
considering individual humans. A positive correlation between the quantity of orgasms and life expectancy has 
been found (Smith et al, 1997). 
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Cancer shows us that somatic cells can be immortal. Perhaps the most famous example 
are HeLa cells8. And recently scientists were able to tweak somatic cells to overcome the 
Hayflick limit9, by artificially introducing telomerase10 (Potts & Schwartz, 2004, West, 2004).  
Furthermore, there seems to be entire organisms that do not age, in the sense that their 
mortality rates do not increase with aging. “Some animals appear not to age at all (…). Various 
studies, in some cases spanning decades, showed that these animals failed to exhibit functional 
or physiological decline, or an increase in mortality with age. ” (de Magalhães, 2015).  
Experiments made with fruit flies doubled their lifespan just by artificially selecting 
only long-lived members (Potts & Schwartz, 2004). The experiment eliminated the blindness 
that natural selection has after reproduction. 
Another way of expanding the life span is through caloric restriction11. Caloric 
restriction seems to drive the body to a state of repair leaving the focus of reproduction. It 
increased life span as much as 40% in mice if started early in life, with the side effect of less 
or no reproduction (Wade, 2004; Miller 2004). Modern procedures involve techniques such as: 
telomerase gene therapy12, NAD+, metformin, resveratrol, etc. (for analysis on the means to 
combat aging, see: de Magalhães et al., 2017; Rejuvenation Roadmap, n.d.; de Magalhães, 
2004; de Grey, 2004b; see also de Magalhães et al., 2012). 
Curiously, scientific research on aging is fairly recent (one ought to imagine if it had 
started earlier). Binstock (2004a), presents an interesting history of the modern scientific 
endeavour on aging in the US. It is a path in which obstacles were more political than scientific 
or technological. Here are some highlights from Binstock’s story: 
Although a National Institute of Health (NIH) Gerontological Study Section for reviewing 
extramural research applications was created in 1946, it was abolished in 1949. Lockett's 
documentary research and interviews reveal that this review panel was perceived by some 
NIH officials as too favourably biased toward applications because there were so few 
researchers in the field of aging that many of them were members of the Study Section and 
were evaluating their own research proposals. Ironically, according to one member of the 
Study Section, the community of gerontological researchers had fought for their own study 
section because they thought that there was a bias against them—"they felt that other study 
sections automatically turned down proposals that had the word 'aging' in them" (quoted in 
                                                 
8 HeLa cells are named after Henrietta Lacks, the human where they came from. She died in 1951 from cancer, 
but ‘her’ cells are immortal (they seem to be able to reproduce forever) and are still used in medical research. 
9 The Hayflick limit is the number of times a population of normal human cells divides before the process stops: 
around 40-60 times. It was discovered in 1951 by Leonard Hayflick. 
10 Telomerase is an enzyme that can extend the telomeres. The telomeres are protective end caps of the 
chromosomes that perform a similar function as the plastic end caps of the shoe strings do. Each time the cell 
undergoes mitosis it loses a bit of their telomeres, and eventually the telomeres become so small the cell reaches 
its Hayflick limit and is incapable of further division. Telomerase is not active in the majority of somatic cells. 
11 Unlike malnutrition, a caloric restricted diet contains all micronutrients of a healthy diet, but contains around 
30% fewer calories. (Wade, 2004) 
12 Such treatment was pursued the first time in humans by Liz Parrish in 2015 (Mole, April 2016). It generated 
controversy regarding the right of self-experimentation. 
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Lockett, 1983, p. 36). In any event, gerontological applications were subsequently reviewed 
by other study sections that, according to one NIH staff member, "downgraded gerontology 
research," and the percentage of approvals "went from one extreme to another" (Lockett, 
1983, p. 37) 
When one version of the bill passed in 1972 [for the creation of a National Institute of 
Aging], a memo from the Office of Management and Budget to President Richard Nixon 
urged him to veto it—which he ultimately did—because an NIA "could raise false 
expectations that the aging process can somehow be controlled and managed through 
biomedical research" (quoted in Lockett, 1983, p. 139). 
During the subsequent political processes that finally led to the establishment of NIA in 
1974, themes suggesting the marginal status of biogerontology persistently emerged. For 
one thing, the key political actor in the successful lobbying effort, Florence Mahoney, was 
an ardent pursuer of anti-aging interventions. Mahoney was a powerful Washington insider 
with politically elite connections, a long-time behind-the-scenes effective advocate for 
expanded government support for biomedical research 
Regarding her National Institute of Child Health and Human Development experience, 
Mahoney observed: “Every time a grant came up about aging, it was turned down... 
Everyone said aging came naturally. I never believed the effects of old age were 
irreversible... I kept telling them not to discourage those grants, or they would have to have 
another institute. (Robinson, 2001, pp. 237-238)”  
Although an NIA was eventually created, disputes within the institution prevail (ibid.): 
The NIA budget, which was only about $20 million in 1976, its first year of operation 
(Lockett, 1983, p. 169), has grown rapidly over the years to reach just under $1 billion by 
fiscal year 2003 (National Institute on Aging, 2002a) To be sure, biogerontologists argue 
that they require a larger share of this budget in order to purse their promising and exciting 
lines of research. They contend that NIA invests a disproportionately large share of its 
resources in disease-oriented research, especially on Alzheimer's disease (Adelman, 1995), 
while marginalizing basic biological research on aging in terms of both strategic planning 
and actual research funding. The consequence, they argue, is that the sector of research that 
has the greatest promise for improving health in old age is being shortchanged, because the 
fundamental mechanisms of aging are the underlying and leading risk factors for virtually 
all age-associated diseases (Hayflick, 2002; Miller, 2002; Martin, 2003). 
Political obstacles (e.g. regulation, lack of funding, bureaucracy), contrary to 
technological or scientific challenges, continue to be the main drawback of aging research. 
Miller (2004) listed reasons why research on aging was not on top of the agenda and more than 
the first half of the list concerns political obstacles, human biases, funding struggles and long-
term blindness.  According to him “the obstacles blocking the development of the hypothetical 
discipline of applied gerontology are at this point about 85% political and 15% scientific, and 
they will not be overcome by biologists alone.”13 de Grey (2004b) agrees with Miller: “he is 
forthright in the view that the scientific obstacles to doing so are much less severe than the 
political ones.” It seems that the obstacles between the present and a cure for aging lend much 
of themselves to bureaucracies instead of physical laws, ontological considerations, or the 
realm of the unknown: 
                                                 
13 This also underscores the importance of a philosophical analysis of this subject. 
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1 – Aaron & Harris, 2004: “Conceivably, biologists and physicians could learn how to stop the 
aging process entirely.”  
2 – Arking, 2004: “The study of biogerontology is today where aeronautical science was in 1900. 
Laboratory data have made some of us sure of attaining a goal that many skeptics once considered impossible. 
(…) We do not have an organismal death program built into our genes. We are not required to age. And if we age 
only because there is no biological reason for us not to age, then this clearly implies that we need not age (or at 
least not age so quickly) if we can supply our bodies with a relevant biological reason not to age”.  
3 – Rose, 2004b: “Despite hysteria on both sides, extending human life now seems about as difficult 
as building an atomic bomb in 1935. But unlike the atomic physicists of that time, who were motivated by the 
threat of Hitler, biologists generally are not inclined to develop the tools appropriate to the problem of extending 
human life. A few biologists have set about developing the tools required for such life extension, and they may 
yet triumph over the hostility of the National Institutes of Health, the medical establishment generally, and many 
of their religiously or politically biased allies.”  
4 – Miller, 2004: “In the past two decades, biogerontologists have established that the pace of aging 
can be decelerated routinely in mammals by dietary or genetic means. These discoveries, still largely 
unappreciated by the lay and scientific public alike, overturn the common assumption that human aging is likely 
to be unalterable and raise the question of whether we can make use of our growing knowledge about aging to 
produce 90-year-old adults who are as healthy and active as today's 50-year-olds.”  
5 – Sethe & de Magalhães, 2013): “Most biogerontologists agree that life extending applications 
of research on aging are plausible (Butler et al. 2004). Contested remains the factor by which life expectancy can 
be increased (Richel 2003). Assuming we ‘cure’ aging and thus eliminate (or at least prevent the age-related 
increase in incidence of) all age-related pathologies (…) a life expectancy of over a thousand years seems 
theoretically feasible (…) Some commentators have boldly suggested have that it may be possible to cure aging 
within the next few decades (de Grey and Rae 2008; Kurzweil and Grossman 2004). Consequently, many are very 
critical of the suggestion that aging can even be cured (Warner et al. 2005) (…) Based on what we know about 
the aging process, there is no scientific reason why a dramatic extension of the mean as well as the highest 
achieved lifespan should not be possible. Precisely because aging is such a multi-facetted issue, it seems entirely 
feasible to solve the problem in a piecemeal fashion using a portfolio of medical and technological alternatives. 
It seems unlikely that a single intervention will suddenly abolish aging. More realistic is a stepwise approach, 
where life-years are added in small instalments. A paradigm shift would arguably come if this progress were to 
occur at such a high rate that it outpaces the rate of aging (de Grey 2004a).”  
6 – de Grey, 2004a: “In a nutshell, I claim it is probable that most of the first generation of 150-year-
olds (defined as those who reach 150 and are aged at most 30 years younger than the first 150-year old) – a group 
who are almost certainly already alive and may well be middle-aged – will not die unless at their own hand.”  
7 – de Magalhães, 2004: “There is no law of nature to prevent us from instructing the cells of an 
adult human being to avoid aging by, for example, changing the genetic program at a DNA or epigenetic level.”  
8 – Ehni, 2013: “Two prominent researchers have stated at various congresses, which united more 
than 20 % of the scientific community, that biological aging is no longer an unresolved problem (Hayflick 2007; 
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Holliday 2006) (…) Gaining knowledge about these biological mechanisms opens up the prospect of biomedical 
interventions that might slow down, prevent or even reverse biological aging.”  
Others (Olshansky & Carnes, 2004) are more conservative in their predictions, even 
claiming the impossibility of immortality: 
Although it is likely that anticipated advances in biomedical technology and lifestyle 
modification will permit life expectancy to continue its slow rise over the short term, a 
repetition of the large, rapid gains in life expectancy observed during the twentieth century 
is extremely unlikely. Such gains would require an ability to slow the rate of aging. (…) 
indefinite survival is not possible.  
But critics (Potts & Schwartz, 2004, and Wade, 2004, respectively) are quick to point 
out that when it comes to cutting edge technologies and their possibility or impact we are 
usually not very good at prediction. 
Forecasters tend to underestimate longterm change. For example, no early designer of 
mainframe computers foresaw that personal computers would replace mainframes for most 
uses.  
Until recently, research on aging was something of a scientific backwater, and there were 
powerful reasons for thinking that no dramatic change in human longevity would ever be 
possible. (…) Longevity increases might be one of those big steps that arrive much sooner 
than expected.  
And even staunch opponents of the idea of curing aging, like Kass (2004) do not deny 
its possibility: 
Should we not regard death as a disease and try to cure it? Although this formulation of the 
question may seem too futuristic or far-fetched, there are several reasons for taking it up and 
treating it seriously. (…) Quite frankly, I find some of the claims and predictions to be 
overblown, but it would be foolhardy to bet against scientific and technical progress along 
these lines.  
Scientists agree that aging is malleable, although there is not a consensus on how much 
it is feasible. So, what are the alternatives? (see Capitaine & Pennings, 2013 for what follows; 
cf. Dekkers, 2013, Post & Binstock, 2004a, Capron, 2004). 
1 – Prolonged Senescence: this alternative increases the life expectancy without 
increasing the healthspan. Increases in the lifespan are not required but can happen. In practical 
terms this means that we are able to extend the period of frailty and disease before death, but 
no changes were made to the period before that. This can be an undesirable state of affairs if 
the only thing prolonged was a life of suffering not worth living.  
2 – Compression of morbidity: on this model the health span increases without an 
increase in the lifespan. The life expectancy can approximate the lifespan, but it is not required. 
This is somewhat opposite to the alternative above. In practical terms we would live a relative 
healthy life before a quick period of decline followed by death. It trades a period of frailty and 
disease for a healthy one, without increasing the duration of one’s life. A more extreme view 
of this alternative takes the increase in the size of the health span relative to life expectancy – 
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I consider this view nonsense since the easiest path to achieve it is to kill everyone before the 
end of their health span (e.g. 40 years). 
3 – Decelerated Aging: on this model lifespan and health span increase. Life expectancy 
is assumed to increase, if no external factors offer resistance enough to keep it in place (wars, 
natural disasters, etc). On this model aging happens more slowly so everything is increased in 
absolute terms and proportionately. 
4 – Arrested Aging: on this model aging is reversed. This means the elimination of the 
life span (or considering it infinite). Life expectancy should increase but how much depends 
on how society deals with the remaining causes of death (murders, virus, etc). The health span 
should converge to life expectancy but how much depends on how society deals with repair 
and replacement of functions lost or damaged to causes other than aging (e.g. permanent injury 
from car crashes). This scenario is immortality of Level II, i.e. curing aging. 
There is no consensus on which alternative is going to be actualized (see Aaron & 
Harris, 2004, for a discussion on this). However it seems we can discard the prolonged 
senescence scenario according to 1.3 – Illness and Frailty. The compression of morbidity 
scenario also seems highly unlikely given our ability to extend the lifespans of several 
animals.14 More likely is the decelerated aging scenario. From there the transition to an arrested 
aging scenario might come from what de Grey (2004a) calls <escape age velocity>. This will 
happen through bootstrapping, i.e. the first package of life extension therapies will extend our 
life enough so that a second package of life extending therapies can be developed, which will 
give us enough time to develop a third package… Once those therapies can extend life 
expectancy at a faster rate than our rate of aging, we will have defeated aging, making the last 
scenario plausible. 
 
1.9 – Conclusion 
 Before summing up, I think it is important to make a disclaimer. If someone wants to 
maximize their life expectancy, before thinking about acquiring state of the art, although not 
dutifully tested, treatments (e.g. telomerase gene therapy) or compounds (e.g. NAD+) the best 
options are to follow up on the wide available and recognized advice: to get a healthy diet, 
exercise regularly, maintain a good sleep hygiene, eliminate drug consumption (namely 
                                                 
14 Arking (2004) referring to extensions of the lifespan in mice through caloric restriction said, “These findings 
have been replicated hundreds of times and are probably the most robust experimental findings in the field.” See 
also de Magalhães et al. (2012). 
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alcohol15 and tobacco) and avoid dangerous activities such as: reckless driving, enrolling the 
army, etc. Consider Pinxten (2013):     
As one researcher stated: “One could say: If it is my objective to help people age healthily, 
then I can stop doing my research in molecular biology. Because there is one thing that 
certainly will enable many more people to age healthily, and that is getting them—from 
middle age on—to have sufficient physical activity and a healthy diet. In fact, we already 
know that.”  
Only if one does not find this advice enough to extend their life expectancy, should they 
adventure into the unknown and try those promising compounds/treatments. Supporting 
research, either by participating directly, donating money, lobbying or creating awareness can 
greatly reduce the time it takes to bring those treatments to the regulated market. If someone is 
unable to wait much longer, the cryonics route is an option.  
 The goal of this section was to present the relevant context for the work proper that 
follows: an analysis on the desirability of immortality. The first big issue was with the word 
immortality. As discussed in 1.2 – What is Immortality? and 1.3 – Illness and Frailty, we need 
to picture people living at the peak of physical and intellectual capacity for as many years as 
they desire. The next big obstacle was to find where in the literature is this discussion, or 
something similar enough, taking place. It was no easy task, and although the several places 
discussed in 1.5 – Proxys for Discussion are not exclusive, I opted to focus my attention on 
discussions about curing aging. As noted in 1.6 – Curing Aging vs Immortality, curing aging is 
not the same as immortality, but its discussions are an input equally useful. Although I am not 
discussing the feasibility of curing aging or immortality (see 1.4 – Desirability vs Feasibility) 
since it is not needed for a theoretical analysis, sections 1.7 – What is Aging? and 1.8 – Delving 
Deeper into Aging, show how far science has come and the role of politics in the current rate 
of progress. As such this analysis is more than a mere exercise of thought – it will, I hope, be 
helpful in guiding policy and ultimately our future. 
  
                                                 
15 No amount of alcohol is healthy (Gakidou et al, 2018): “Our results show that the safest level of drinking is 
none. This level is in conflict with most health guidelines, which espouse health benefits associated with 
consuming up to two drinks per day.” 
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Section 2 – Intrinsic Arguments 
2.1 – Intrinsic Arguments vs Consequential Arguments 
This section will focus on what I decided to call intrinsic arguments. There is nothing 
special about them, but due to the amount of arguments I decided to tackle, the need of some 
sorting system was evident. I decided to box the arguments into 2 categories: intrinsic, and 
consequential. Although the word intrinsic might give some clue about what makes an 
argument fit into this category I ought to offer more detail about what I mean. Intrinsic 
arguments are those which appeal to some feature of immortality, instead of to some 
consequence of it (Geddes, 2004 uses the words practical and philosophical in place of 
consequential and intrinsic, respectively). Take, for example, me punching a random stranger 
in the face. If I argue that this is good/bad due to my arm moving (e.g. good because I am 
exercising, bad because it involves effort) I´ll consider it an intrinsic argument, since it is not 
possible (read, I cannot conceive) to punch someone in the face without moving one’s arm. 
However if I argue that it is good/bad due to the possibility of getting punched back (e.g. good 
because I will get to exercise more, bad because I might get hurt) I will consider it a 
consequential argument, since getting punched back can, but needs not, happen (e.g. perhaps 
the other person is a non-hypocrite Christian and turns the other cheek, or their fight or flight 
response triggers the former option). 
I can try and give a more precise definition. Intrinsic arguments appeal to something 
necessary to immortality, and consequential arguments appeal to something contingent. But 
note, this is not equivalent to the possible worlds’ language. I am only interested in what 
happens in this world. There might be a possible world were the speed of light is not the same, 
or another where Stephen Hawking is still alive. The possible worlds language is a useful tool 
in the context of this work only for a subset of future contrafactuals. Although I do believe that 
a logic driven approach and language might be beneficial to improve the quality of this project 
I will not pursue such endeavour because of some drawbacks that it brings: the amount of time 
to do it increases greatly, and the focus of the reader can deviate from the content of the work 
to this accessory tool. So I will not touch upon the subject of possible worlds again.  
 
2.2 – Notes of Interest 
Just some brief notes for what follows.  
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1. There will be plenty of citations from, and references to, authors exemplifying 
arguments and counter arguments. Do not mistake a citation or reference for the author support 
of what is cited. Sometimes authors present an argument just to follow it by its rejection.  
2. I divided my analysis by what I call objects. An object is denoted by a string of letters 
and numbers and come in two types: Px and Cx. I will use Px to identify each premise of an 
argument, x being a unique identifier. If there are several arguments in support of a premise 
the notation will be Px.z, with z being a unique identifier. The same formula applies to Cx to 
identify conclusions. To denote counters/answers to each object I will suffix the notation of the 
relevant object with Ay, y being a unique identifier. As an example P36A4A1 means the 
<counter 1 of <counter 4 of <premise 36>>>. In other words P36 was argued against by P36A4, 
and in turn P36A4 was argued against by P36A4A1. A thread (of objects) designates a group 
of objects composed of the main object and all objects that share the same notation of the base 
object plus any suffixes. For example, the thread P36A4, includes itself and P36A4A1, 
P36A4A1A1, P36A4A2, P36A4A2A1, and P36A4A2A1A1. The parent of an object is the 
object which shares the notation without the last suffix. There is, at most, one parents for each 
object. For example: P36A4 is the parent of P36A4A1. This design was inspired by online 
discussion forums (e.g. reddit) with minor tweaks, and is, in my opinion, the most adequate for 
discussions of any subject. However this format is extremely hindered by the limitations of 
written text on A4 sheets of paper since its natural habitat is in purely digital formats16. This 
results in text which at times is hard to read. To overcome this problem I created diagrams of 
the discussion that can be found in the last section. My advice is to have those at hand while 
reading the arguments, either by printing them or by displaying them in a second screen. This 
will provide the useful contextualization that is easily lost by the medium of written text on A4 
sheets. Each box on the diagram represents an object and contains at the top the last suffix of 
that object. To find object P36A4A1, one needs to start at the P36 box, then follow the line to 
the box named A4, which represents the object P36A4, and from there follow the line to the 
box A1, which represents the object P36A4A1. 
3. There will be several instances where the content of an object will be just the 
following symbol: ⸸. This symbol will mean, depending on the context, something along these 
lines: <incredulity, disgustingness, the number of supporters/contrarians, is not enough to 
dismiss a claim of value, since other cultures, individuals, or systems of value could 
                                                 
16 I wonder how much time documents like this master’s thesis will take to abandon their extremely limited 
medium of written text in the arbitrary A4 size in the typical text editor and adopt instead a fully digital approach 
with much less constraints. This work would benefit immensely from such change. 
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accommodate what is being argued against.> Furthermore, premises of value and related 
objects will be modified with an asterisk17, like this: P*2. While this procedure might seem to 
come out of the blue, it will be useful to make a point later on in section 4.2.2 – ⸸ and the 
Burden of Proof. I will also clarify the metaethical claim represented by ⸸ in that section. 
4. PCBA – is a Premise patent in each argument that provides the Cost – Benefit Analysis 
to conclude about the desirability of immortality.18 To understand if immortality is desirable, I 
need to consider all arguments, both pro and con (benefits and costs), as a whole. However I 
want first to analyse each argument isolated, in order to understand how much of a cost or 
benefit they provide. Suppose I conclude that an argument does indeed identify a cost regarding 
bringing about immortality. Is that enough to conclude that immortality is not desirable? No. I 
need to consider the other arguments too. It might be the case that there are arguments that 
identify benefits which, despite the already identified cost, tilt the net value of actualizing 
immortality to positive. Only after presenting and analysing all arguments, will I, in section 4.1 
– Dealing with PCBA: Is Immortality Desirable?, conclude about the net value of immortality. 
It could not be otherwise. In the meantime the PCBA premise present in each argument will 
function as a ceteris paribus, that is, it will be as if the argument under consideration is the only 
that exists for the purposes of the cost-benefit analysis. That way I can evaluate singular 
contributions to the discussion (i.e. arguments) and clearly conclude about the value of each.  
 
2.3 – Arguments Against Immortality 
2.3.1 – Death is Normal/Natural Argument 
Before starting the analysis, it is necessary to note the richness of meanings that natural 
and normal have. To add to the problem many authors use the qualifier normal and the qualifier 
natural interchangeably (e.g. Caplan, 2004). I decided to categorize arguments that used these 
words in five versions. First, I allocated the word normal to the argument where normal is 
associated with statistical relevance. Then I decided to use the word natural for the remaining 
                                                 
17 This is purely to make for an easier reading. I do not wish to take a position on the fact-value distinction debate. 
18 Cost-benefit analysis is just a fancy term to denote the common process of listing cons, called costs (cost is to 
be understood in the economic sense, not in the financial sense) and pros, called benefits, of something to arrive 
at a conclusion, called net value. Although this process seems quite ordinary, sometimes people forget about it 
and arrive wrongly at conclusions. Suppose I want to evaluate the net value of smoking weed. I know that it is 
bad for my health, but is that enough to conclude that it has a negative net value? Obviously not. I merely identified 
a cost, but what I need to do is to perform a cost-benefit analysis. I also need to consider benefits such as pleasure 
and social interaction and other costs such as the morality of breaking the law and monetary costs. The cost-
benefit analysis takes all costs and benefits into account and then concludes about the net value. Just merely 
identifying a cost or a benefit and then claiming something about the net value is wrong, hence the expression 
cost-benefit analysis. 
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four versions: natural as human nature, natural as created by god, natural as opposed to 
artificial, and natural as function.  
 
2.3.1.1 – Normal Version 
P1: Death is normal. 
P*2: What is normal is good. 
C3 (P1+P*2): Death is good. 
P4: Immortality eliminates death. 
C5 (C3+P4): Immortality eliminates something good. 
P6: The good that death provides cannot be replaced by something equivalent or better.19 
PCBA: Immortality does not provide goods of equal or greater value than the good of death + 
other incurred costs (lost goods and/or direct costs).20 
C7 (C5+P6+PCBA): Immortality is not desirable. 
P1 – This is a proposition of fact (in contrast to P*2). Here the crux is to clarify the meaning 
normal. By normal, I understand what is standard, usual, ordinary, common. More precisely it 
refers to events of a certain set that comprise the majority of instances. For example: I can say 
that it is normal for rain to occur in winter, that it is normal for humans to have two legs, etc. 
To say that death is normal seems to be, at present, a true statement. As far as we can prove, 
everybody who was born has either died or, ceteris paribus, is expected to21 in a very regular 
pattern. This premise does not imply that death is universal or necessary, it clearly is not (Rose, 
2004a contra Dekkers, 2013). Caplan (2004) seems to agree with this premise: 
The belief that aging is a normal and natural part of human existence is reflected in the 
practice of medicine. For example, no mention is made in most textbooks of medicine and 
pathology of aging as abnormal, unnatural, or indicative of disease. It is true that such texts 
often contain a chapter or two on the related subject of diseases commonly associated with 
aging or found in the elderly. But it is the diseases of the elderly, such as pneumonia, cancer, 
or atherosclerosis, rather than the aging process itself, that serve as the focus of description 
and analysis. (…) aging is a common and normal process. It occurs with a statistical 
frequency of 100%.  
Schemer (2013) also cites an author that joins normality and statistical features: 
What counts as normal functional ability is determined by looking at the typical statistical 
distribution of a biological function among a reference class, which means that normal 
biological functioning must be defined relative to sex and age (Boorse 1977, 1997). (…) In 
social terms aging, growing older, is a normal or natural process, in the sense that is happens 
to everyone (at least in the West). 
                                                 
19 This is not the same as PCBA, although similar. In PCBA we are appealing to other costs and benefits. Here 
we are appealing to something that replaces the cost or benefit under consideration. 
20 Henceforth this description of PCBA will be omitted. It is only here to exemplify how it works in each argument. 
21 I am disregarding technical advances such as those who might enable immortality for the sake of argument. 
  38/201 
P1A1 – Nonetheless normality is contextual. I can say that it is normal for people born in 
Oporto to be of Portuguese nationality, but if some time from now, the concept of Portugal, or 
of nationality, or of Portuguese nationality ceases to exist, or if Oporto becomes sovereign, etc. 
it will not take much time for that statement to become false. In the same way, death is normal 
until no longer is. If we become immortal, then the statement: “death is normal” can cease to 
be true. Death under immortality (UI) is only caused by suicide. UI, for the statement <death 
is normal> to be true, the statement <suicide is normal> also needs to be true. Here is an 
example from the literature, (Capron, 2004): 
If normal is used in a statistical sense, as Daniels suggests (…) as normal causes of death in 
old age become avoidable through routine medical intervention, these conditions would 
change status. (…) the contours of normal species functioning would now be altered to 
encompass many more years. (…) Appeals to (…) normal opportunities simply fall apart as 
life expectancy expands. 
P1A1A1 – UI suicide will be normal. Since it is the only way to die, it will be something not 
uncommon. And if suicide is normal then death will also be. 
P1A1A1A1 – Even if UI suicide is the only means to die, that is not enough to classify it as 
normal. For death/suicide to have the property of normal it needs to be standard, ordinary, 
common, etc. What if no one chooses to die? Then death is no longer normal. 
The truth of P1 hinges on how normal death is UI. But notice that arguing that death is normal 
UI is denying P4, a move discussed in the P4A1 thread. In any case those individuals who want 
to die UI will select themselves out of the population. Thus, equilibrium will be achieved when 
there is a population of people that do not desire to die anymore and where death will no longer 
be normal. As Sethe and de Magalhães (2013) speculate: 
Ultimately, it is intriguing to speculate that far from having reached its endpoint due to 
medical technology, evolution by natural selection would come into its own in these 
futuristic scenarios: Not only will there be strong dispositional selection pressure against 
those who reject such treatments for ideological reasons, it might well be the case that 
humanity will undergo a selection where those who can experience the greatest fulfilment 
from ongoing discovery will choose to live substantially longer, compared to other character 
types. 
P1A2 – Timeframes make the concept of normality weak. What should be the timeframe to 
consider things normal? One week? One year? One century? Humans are not normal given the 
history of the universe. But humans are normal in the past few thousand years. What about 
cars: cars have 120 years only, are they normal? What about a new 100% effective cancer 
treatment that entered the market a week ago and achieved an astonishing adoption rate? What 
if a great deal of people have bought the new Nutella flavour during the past 10 minutes? Is it 
normal? The timeframe chosen to evaluate the normality of something can produce different 
results, and there seems to be no reason to choose one timeframe vs another. 
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P1A2A1 – It is still the case that every timeframe backwards looking has death considered as 
normal. 
P1A3 – Specificity makes the concept of normality weak. Let us say that there are groups of 
10 balls with numbers 1 to 10. Nine balls are grey, and one is blue. I can say of a random ball 
that is normal for it to be grey. However, the same does not apply if I add conjunctive 
descriptors, e.g. to be grey and have the number 4. It seems that as we add more conjunctive 
descriptors normality fades away. Likewise, even if death is normal, death by murder, or death 
by shotgun, or death by impalement, and so on are less so. The argument then is: perhaps there 
is a more general class of phenomena of which death is but a subset – the word death containing 
subsumed various descriptors. If this is the case, then from this point of view death is not 
normal in the same way that a number 4 grey ball is not. 
P*2 – This is a proposition of value (in contrast with P1). The meaning of normal was expanded 
on the commentary about P1.  
P*2A1 – It is highly doubtful that normality offers a criterion for goodness. One can straight 
on accuse this premise of being a form of appeal to popularity. Although this is not the typical: 
because many people think that A therefore A must be true; it is something closely related: 
because A happens frequently A must be good. If it does not hold for matters of fact it should 
not hold for matters of value. 
P*2A1A1 – Matters of value and matters of fact are in different spheres so the comparison 
does not hold. 
P*2A2 – Hindsight makes this premise weird. Slavery, women without a vote, wars with 
swords, death by bacterial infections, were all once considered normal. We also largely do not 
consider these things good at the present. So, to conserve this premise one must hold that these 
things were good in the past but are no longer good in the present (and might be good again in 
the future). That the same exact event is good or bad in different periods is a weird notion. 
Perhaps one ought to say that high infant mortality rates are only bad because we are in the 
XXI century. Were we five centuries before they would have been good. That strikes me as 
something hard to swallow. How can the same behaviour be good at a certain moment but not 
good at another, if the only difference is that there are people in Mars doing it differently? 
P*2A2A1 – ⸸.22  
                                                 
22 Remember this symbol means: personal incredulity, even if widespread does not provide ground to reject the 
premise. Other cultures or value systems might think differently. No more notes will be made henceforth. 
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P*2A2A1A1 – But if it is normal for people to not consider an event good, and if it is normal 
for that event to happen, then is the event good or not? There seems to be a contradiction. 
P*2A2A1A1A1 – The event is normal and therefore good. Saying <the event is bad> is normal 
and therefore also good. But the event and the saying are not the same thing. The event and the 
saying are both good. It is just a coincidence that the saying involves denying the goodness of 
the event. 
P*2A3 – It amounts to too much, i.e. there are things that are not normal that we consider good. 
For example, why is it that having sex during the night good, but not during the day?  
P*2A3A1 – Although the premise states that which is normal is good, nothing is stated 
regarding non-normal things. So, sex during the morning can also be good even when this 
premise is stated. For a counter one needs to find something normal and considered not good, 
as in P*2A2 or P*2A7. 
P*2A4 – It is against common sense. Suppose we start to frequently kill children for no reason. 
According to this premise this behaviour should be catalogued as good. However, this will be 
a hard sell. If something is bad, by definition, we should want less of it. But this premise states 
that if a bad thing gets performed enough times it suddenly becomes good which runs contrary 
to common sense. Take for example this view applied to old age from Schermer (2013): 
Certain functions may decline with aging, but if they decline in most elderly people, it is 
statistically normal for the reference class and therefore not pathological. (Boorse 1977, 
1997) 
And the equivalent to the argument made here (P*2A4) by Hartogh (2013): 
It is sometimes suggested that such disabilities do not belong to the medical domain, because 
they are the result of a statistically normal process of physiological aging. But the diseases 
which cause them may occur at any age, although as a result of the ‘cascade’ process they 
are most characteristic of old age. It makes no sense to count them as medically classified 
diseases at other ages, but not at old age, because at that time they occur more often. 
It is true that my example of killing children and that of dying can be said to have a wedge: 
agency. It seems that killing children requires agency, while dying does not. I do not think this 
is a problem. I assume as argued in 1.4 – Desirability vs Feasibility, that immortality is feasible, 
making dying also a matter of agency. See also 2.4.1 – Optionality Argument. 
P*2A4A1 – If something once considered bad starts to get performed frequently, then it is 
because society’s values changed, and it is no longer bad. Take for example divorce. 
P*2A4A1A1 – The change from bad to good usually causes the normality of the behaviour not 
the other way around.  
P*2A4A2 – ⸸ 
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P*2A5 – Since this premise also appeals to the concept of normality, we can prima facie apply 
P1A1, P1A2 and P1A3. I do not think P1A1 is much of a problem to this premise since as it 
is stated in P*2A2, it only means that good is a time/period/context sensitive property. P1A2 
applies, mutatis mutandis, to P*2. And the first part of P1A3 also applies: every instance of 
something normal can be subject to the addition of enough descriptors until no longer is.  
P*2A6 – The premise is contradictory. If we argue that change is normal,23 then adding P*2 
results in <change is good>. However, by following P*2, change will never happen, because 
the most performed behaviour will be the good one. So, we have two mutually exclusive and 
complementary exhaustive options that are both considered good. Should we perform the same 
behaviour because it is normal and therefore good, or perform a new one because it will drive 
change and therefore also good? Particularly, wanting to postpone death seems to be normal, 
since it has been happening throughout human history. It is a theme present in the most ancient 
literature, the Epic of Gilgamesh, and the after-life is an important feature in most (if not all) 
religions. Post and Binstock (2004) list some attempts at reversing aging through history:  
Perhaps the oldest written record of attempts to reverse aging is in an Egyptian papyrus, 
circa 1600 B.C., which provides instructions for preparing an ointment that transforms an 
old man into a youth of 20 and claims that it has been "found effective myriad times" (quoted 
in Hayflick, 1994, p. 267). Through the centuries, a variety of anti-aging approaches have 
recurred. Among them have been alchemy, the use of precious metals (e.g., as eating 
utensils) that have been transmuted from baser minerals; shunamatism or gerocomy 
(cavorting with young girls); grafts (or injected extracts) from the testicles, ovaries, or glands 
of various animal species; cell injections from the tissues of newborn or fetal animals; 
consumption of elixirs, drugs, hormones, dietary supplements, and specific foods; cryonics; 
and rejuvenation from devices and exposure to various substances such as mineral and 
thermal springs and the classic Fountain of Youth that the governor of Puerto Rico, Juan 
Ponce de Leon, searched for in Florida in the early sixteenth century (Hayflick, 1994; Cohen, 
2000; Gruman, 2003). 
 Curiously, Francis Bacon was also a supporter of immortality, as stated by Post (2004): 
Francis Bacon, a founder of the scientific method, in his millennialist and Utopian essay 
"The New Atlantis" (1627), set in motion a biological mandate for boldness that included 
both the making of new species or chimeras, organ replacement, and the Water of Paradise 
that would allow the possibility to "indeed live very long" (Bacon, 1996) (…) At the end of 
"The New Atlantis," Bacon lists more specifically among the goals of science "the 
prolongation of life, the restitution of youth to some degree, the retardation of age," along 
with "making of new species, transplanting of one species into another" (1996, p. 481). 
P*2A7 – There is at least one normal event that people largely do not consider good. If it exists 
it is sufficient to counter P*2. Overall (2003, 213-214) presents several of them: 
(…) it is at least premature to suppose that what is “normal” now for some statistically 
average old person should constitute the norm for determining the allocation of health-care 
resources. Suppose, for example, as Jecker suggests, that a means could be found that is both 
inexpensive and virtually unlimited to sustain memory functioning in extreme old age. “On 
Daniels’ analysis, such treatment is not important, because normal species functioning in 
                                                 
23 I would guess most historians would agree. The study of history would not make sense if there was no change. 
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extreme old age does not include clear and vivid recall. Moreover, memory loss does not 
diminish the age-relative normal opportunities of someone who is, say, ninety years old, 
since the opportunities a sound memory affords are not normally available to the very old. 
Consequently, government would not be under a strict obligation to make such treatment 
available to the elderly, for example, by reimbursing it under Medicaid and Medicare 
programs. This is so, even if the treatment in question were extremely cheap and abundant. 
(Jecker 1989, 667–668)” As Jecker (1989, 668) points out, such an approach seems 
unjustified “because normal functioning can be sorely inadequate,” and hence altering what 
is currently considered to be normal species functioning could be a requirement of justice. 
Societies already accept this principle when they devote research time and money to 
developing improved hearing aids and eyeglasses, as well as surgical alterations of the eyes 
and ears, all of which mitigate the “normal” age-related decline in hearing and sight. 
P*2A7A1 – ⸸ 
C3 – I do not think that C3 holds. P1 cannot be refused by P1A1 or P1A2. P1A3 poses some 
problems that can perhaps be solved with a more precise definition of normality. When it comes 
to P*2, both P*2A1 and P*2A3 fail. Both P*2A2, P*2A4 and P*2A7 only go as far as to show 
that western culture24 will have a hard time accepting P*2. But even if all the peoples in 
existence (even considering those who existed but no longer are) did not support P*2, that 
would not be grounds, I think, to discard it25. P*2A5 poses some problems but as with P1A3, 
they are perhaps mendable by providing a more precise definition of normality. Lastly P*2A6 
does successfully allow for the refusal of P*2.  
For what follows let us grant C3 for the sake of argument. 
P4 – As discussed in 1.2 – What is Immortality?, UI only involuntary death is eliminated.  
P4A1 – Death is not eliminated UI. It still exists as a possibility through suicide. Therefore, if 
the good of death relies on voluntary death, the goodness of death is preserved. 
P4A1A1 – The parent object lacks charity. What this premise really entails is either: that 
immortality eliminates the part of death that is good, or that it eliminates a part of death that is 
good. The only difference between these claims is the value of the death that is not eliminated 
(the voluntary one): unknown in the former, good in the latter. It suffices to consider which is 
common to both claims: the part of death that is eliminated UI – non-voluntary death – is good. 
P4A1A1A1 – C3 does not state that non-voluntary death is good, it only states that death is 
good. And even if we try to reformulate C3 we hit a roadblock since P*2A5 (P1A3) tells us 
that adding descriptors weakens the normality/goodness. 
                                                 
24 I use the term western culture to denote common values of the present western developed world (e.g. Human 
Rights). Unless something is said explicitly, I do not want this expression to be understood as judging (negatively 
or positively) said values. 
25 I understand that I am assuming a metaethical position here. I will expand on that in 4.2.2 – ⸸ and the Burden 
of Proof. 
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P4A1A1A1A1 – Even if non-voluntary death is a descriptor up from death simpliciter, non-
voluntary death still passes the threshold of normality. Therefore, to correct the argument, P1 
only needs to be changed to <non-voluntary death is normal>.  
C5 – Considering the modification referred to in P4A1A1A1A1, because death is good, and 
UI non-voluntary death is eliminated, then immortality eliminates something good. 
C5A1 – Because the good of non-voluntary death is based on it being normal, if it is eliminated, 
then it no longer is normal and therefore no longer is good based on P*2. UI nothing good was 
eliminated, because by the mere fact of involuntary death ceasing to exist it will no longer have 
the property of normality and thus goodness, i.e. the sentence <something good was 
eliminated> is false. 
C5A1A1 – Although the sentence <something good was eliminated> is false, the sentence 
<something that was good was eliminated> is true.  
C5A1A1A1 – The same objections of P*2A2 apply. For clarification, the issue is not that 
people in the past had a different conception of what is considered good than people of today. 
The issue is that this argument states that the behaviour having the property of goodness is 
context sensitive, not that the value system changes.  
P6 – Tries to evaluate if there is something that can replace the lost good, for something similar, 
or with similar effects. It asserts there is nothing capable of replacing what is lost.26 
P6A1 – Individualistically nothing is lost since one can voluntarily express desire to die like in 
the old days. Installing a device with a lethal substance that triggers based on an algorithm that 
mimics the rates/probabilities of death according to a great number of variables (be it time, 
long-term behaviour, short term behaviour, etc) will result in a death exactly like in the old 
days but voluntarily wanted. Not desiring immortality is the same as a voluntary claim to want 
to die as in the old days as is discussed on 2.4.1 – Optionality Argument. 
P6A1A1 – The good of death does not come from individualistic considerations, but from a 
social standpoint. For the individual person it is not normal to die, we can only tell that it 
happens once. From the point of view of a population death of the non-voluntary kind is indeed 
normal. Therefore, the possibility of individuals choosing to die UI like in the old days is not 
enough to replace the good lost. Only if everyone chooses to die voluntarily is there a 
replacement, but that means immortality would have no pragmatic effect. Besides, as argued 
in P1A1A1A1 equilibrium will be achieved once there are only individuals who do not desire 
to die, so it does not seem likely that UI people would want to continue business as usual. 
                                                 
26 See note 19. 
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P6A2 – Because the good of (non-voluntary death) is based on it being normal, if it turns out 
that it is eliminated, then another thing will fill the void and be the new normal. Therefore, a 
perfect replacement would obtain. This is not the same argument made in C5A1. Here it is 
stated that a new something will inherit the property of normal, while in C5A1 it is stated that 
involuntary death will lose the property of normal. 
PCBA – Since this is the first time this premise appears I will expand a bit. So far C5 grants 
us a cost, but deciding something based only on one cost, or even based solely on costs is a 
mistake. One needs to take into consideration the net effect after all costs and benefits have 
been accounted for. This is in essence answering the question <is immortality desirable?> It 
will make sense to discuss the question only after presenting each argument, so the answer is 
only presented in 4.1 – Dealing with PCBA: Is Immortality Desirable?. As I stated in 2.2 – 
Notes of Interest in each argument this premise, PCBA, will act as if no other arguments 
existed, in other words, it adds a ceteris paribus. The benefits are twofold: it allows us to isolate 
the evaluation of this argument, and serves as a reminder that whatever we conclude about this 
particular argument might be overruled when considering the other arguments. Therefore, C7 
is arrived at within a very restricted framework – it discards, a priori, every other argument. 
Henceforth, no more considerations will be made about PCBA. 
C7 – Although P6A1 fails, C7 does not hold because P6A2 allows for its refusal. 
--  
Verdict: FAIL  
Arguing that something is good if it is normal comes with unescapable traps. C3 does 
not obtain because it seems normal for humans to avoid death (P*2), and that UI death will no 
longer be normal (P1). C5  also fails because UI death is no longer normal. Lastly, C7 fails, 
because a perfect replacement occurs. 
 
2.3.1.2 – Human Nature Version 
P8: Non-voluntary death is natural. 
P*9: What is natural is good.  
C10 (P8+P*9): Non-voluntary death is good (and eliminating it is bad). 
P11: Immortality eliminates non-voluntary death. 
C12 (C10+P11): Immortality eliminates something good (and creates something bad). 
P13: The good that non-voluntary death provides (and the bad that immortality creates) cannot 
be replaced by something equivalent or better. 
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C14 (C12+P13+PCBA): Immortality is not desirable. 
P8 – Here natural means what is according to human nature, some property or properties 
characteristic of what it is to be human. Unlike normality which has no fixed standard – it just 
picks whatever is statistically relevant – naturalness seems to claim a fixed standard 
independent of what is common at the time. Callahan (2003, 136-137) 27 puts it better: 
We will need to know what ought to count as "normal" (…). For those purposes we will 
have to resist the implications of the modernizing view of old age, which would deliberately 
make it an unending frontier, constantly to be pushed back, subject to no fixed standards of 
"normal" at all. (…) We require an understanding of a "normal opportunity range" that is 
not determined by the state-of-the-art of medicine and consequently by fluctuating values 
of what counts as a need. "Need" will have no fixed reference point at all apart from a 
technology-free (or nearly so) definition. Where Daniels uses the term "normal" in a 
statistical sense, it should instead be given a normative meaning; that is, what counts as 
morally and socially adequate and generally acceptable. (…) Such a life can be achieved 
within a certain, roughly specifiable, number of years and can be relatively impervious to 
technological advances. 
The intersection between human nature, and ageing/death is what some call the lifecycle or the 
rhythm of life: the belief that human life has a certain progress to it, from birth to childhood to 
adolescence, then adulthood, followed by the third age and finally death. Schermer (2013) 
referring to Kass writes: 
Growing older is also embedded in our ideas about the human life cycle and about specific 
stages of life. As it is phrased in a report of the President’s Council on Bioethics: “Aging is 
not just about old age. It is a crucial part of the nearly lifelong process by which we reach 
old age ... . its product is... . the life cycle itself: The form and contour of our life experienced 
in time”(President’s Council 2003, p. 208). 
P8A1 – Hindsight makes this concept weird. If the natural life cycle concerns today’s life 
expectancy, then people in the past had to cope with their too short unnatural lifecycles. And 
in the future, if we do not stop, we will have to cope with too long and unnatural ones. But 
were we, at the time of writing, lucky to be born just at the right time, where the lifecycle is 
just perfect? Were those people in the past deluded by believing their lifecycle was the natural 
one? If so, maybe we are deluded too and those in the future will know better. Why should we 
believe that we have the natural lifecycle? The answer seems to be that people adapt their 
concept of the lifecycle as life expectancy grows. So, the lifecycle has its roots on what is 
expected, and not on some fixed natural properties. As Capron (2004) 28, states: 
Callahan thinks that normal “should instead be given a normative meaning; that is, what 
counts as morally and socially adequate and generally acceptable.” Yet the standard of a 
natural life span, which is based on passing through certain important biographical stages 
that together make up a whole life, is itself subject to expansion even within the rationale 
                                                 
27 Note that the author uses the word normal for this argument whereas I use the word natural. See notes 28, 30, 
33, and 34 for examples where, for this same argument, the word natural is used instead. 
28 Cf. footnote 27 – The author uses various times the word natural. 
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Callahan provides. There is no reason to say that a person who was born in 1875 and lived 
to the point of average life expectancy did not live a natural life span in the biographical 
sense employed by Callahan. If a hundred years hence average life expectancy were 150 
years for adults, there is every reason to think that appropriate adjustments would have been 
made in people’s thinking about what constitutes each of the life stages, with a concomitant 
lengthening of the natural life span. (…) appeals to a natural life span or normal 
opportunities simply fall apart as life expectancy expands. The tolerability of death in 
Callahan’s terms is always relative to cultural expectations 
Overall (2004) presents us with a similar approach, expanding it: 
But what is a full life? Callahan claims that it is an existence in which "one's life possibilities 
have on the whole been accomplished" (1987, p. 66). Yet one's life possibilities might well 
mean one thing under the current life expectancy and something else rather different with a 
longer life expectancy and a greater maximum life span (…) if our lives become increasingly 
long, then the concepts of "one's life work" and "one's moral obligations" are likely to 
change and their dimensions to expand. It is an error, the fallacy of begging the question, to 
make use of the limited parameters set by current life expectancies in order to argue against 
increasing human longevity. (…) it is also likely that as lives get longer, the scope of 
individuals' goals will become greater, and people will play a variety of working roles during 
their lifetimes. Generally, our ideas of what we are capable of taking on will evolve and 
develop. As they do today, people will undertake new tasks, projects, and interests at 
different life stages, but if those life stages are longer, then the range of tasks, projects, and 
interests can become broader (…) Responsibilities may last longer; the nature of the 
responsibilities may change; and one may acquire and then discharge responsibilities at 
various points in a longer life. Once again, to assume that current social and moral 
exigencies—defined by Callahan in a limited fashion as responsibility for one's immediate 
biological children (1987, p. 69)—delineate the outward limits of what human beings should 
expect and do is to beg the question. 
P8A2 – The concept of human nature is contested. There is, to my knowledge, no scientific 
experiment where it was consistently observed.  
P8A2A1 – For the purposes of the argument this is not needed, we just collapse P8 and P*9, 
and state directly that the concept of human nature that the authors allude to is the one that is 
good, regardless if there is a fixed human nature in the grand scheme of things. In essence we 
would skip P8 and state directly that the current life cycle is good. 
P8A3 – This can be considered an extension of P8A1, but I thought it deserved special 
attention. I believe it is very revealing when even one of the proponents of the concept of a 
natural lifespan cannot fix its value. Straight from the horse’s mouth (Kass, 2004)29: 
Some, of course, eschew any desire for longer life. They seek not adding years to life, but 
life to years. For them, the ideal life span would be our natural (once thought three-, now 
known to be) fourscore and ten, or if by reason of strength, fivescore, lived with full powers 
right up to death, which could come rather suddenly, painlessly, at the maximal age. 
According to Kass, in the past the natural life span was thought to be ~70 years. We now know, 
because it expanded, that it is ~90y, and perhaps even ~100y, according to the same author. 
But what stops us from reaching the age of 120, 1200, or 12K years and say something 
equivalent at that moment? What is special about ~90/100y? If our hindsight tells us something 
                                                 
29 Note that the author is not referring to lifespan as defined in 1.7 – What is Aging?, but instead to life expectancy. 
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is that we have no foresight whatsoever to what constitutes a natural life span. Had people 
followed on advice that ~70 years was the natural life span to oppose its extension to ~90/100y 
and we would not have known the natural life span according to Kass. The same can happen 
again, so there is no justification to say that ~90/100y is enough. There is absolutely no 
credibility to the claim that a certain life span or lifecycle is the natural one. Just as in P8A2, 
the natural lifespan seems malleable (Ehni, 2013): 
After having reached a certain age people have made all experiences that were useful to a 
certain character. But even if this were true, which is again based on a very doubtful and 
thin empirical basis, new interventions into aging might also change this alleged aspect of 
the human life cycle. 
P*9.1 – This premise states that human nature has grounds for normative value or considering 
P8A2A1, that the current lifecycle is good and changing it is bad. There are plenty of examples 
in the literature of authors supporting this: 
Dekkers (2013) 30: “I sympathize with Callahan’s notions of ‘natural lifespan’ and ‘natural death’ and 
with his argument that “medicine should be used not for the further extension of the life of the aged, but only for 
the full achievement of a natural and fitting lifespan and thereafter for the relief of suffering” (Callahan 1987, p. 
53).” 
Binstock (2004a): U.S. bioethicist Leon Kass, chairman of the President's Council on Bioethics, 
appointed by President George W. Bush in 2001, rejects the goal of arrested aging and virtual immortality—as 
well as the goal of decelerated aging—on philosophical grounds. He believes that "the finitude of human life is a 
blessing for every human individual, whether he knows it or not" (Kass, 2001, p. 20). 
 Capron (2004): The critics perceive a problem, nonetheless, and that is the ambition to achieve a “full 
escape from the grip of our own nature” in the drive to render people “better than well.” (…). In Kass’s view, the 
problem is the very desire to escape what is inescapably human (…). After a person has lived out a natural life 
span, which Callahan suggests occurs by the late seventies or early eighties, medical care should no longer be 
oriented to resisting death but to the relief of suffering. (…) Others argue that life extension is an inappropriate 
goal for medicine and that a lengthening of life violates the natural order and the ethical dictates that derive 
therefrom. (…) These grounds for rejecting increased longevity share a sense that the current life span is 
acceptable and that efforts to lengthen it are wrong because they are, in effect, part of a larger project of seeking 
perfection and, specifically, immortality. 
Caplan (2004): Philosopher/physician Leon Kass (2002), the political theorist Francis Fukuyama 
(Fukuyama, 2002), and the theologian Gilbert Meilander (2002) argue that the extension of life should not be 
pursued because lengthening life is not consistent with human nature. It is "unnatural" to extend human lives 
beyond the proverbial three score and ten that the demographers assure us is what the average citizen of an 
economically developed nation can expect. (…). They maintain that it is unnatural to live much longer than we 
now do. Of course, to make this argument hold, they must show why the extension of life is unnatural. Or to put 
                                                 
30 Cf. footnote 27 – Note the use of the word natural. 
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the point another way, they must be able to show that aging and senescence are both natural processes and, as 
such, intrinsically good things. 
Post (2004): (…) anti-posthumanists caution us to accept the existing contours of human nature as the 
gift of evolutionary or divine wisdom. (…) Kass for the most part accepts biotechnological progress within a 
therapeutic mode; his issue is chiefly with efforts to enhance and improve upon the givenness of human nature. 
(…) Human nature, the gift of millennia of evolutionary selection, should be approached with respect rather than 
with disregard. Our attitude should be one of working with our human nature to get the best out of it, rather than 
one of cavalier dominion in an effort to re-create what is already good. Better to accept natural limits—or so, 
anyway, is the spirit of anti-posthumanism. 
Overall (2003, 30, 38): Apologists believe not only that our current life limits have a basis in biology 
but also, just as important, that they have moral significance. (…) Neither the human species as a whole, nor most 
individuals, need more than the present average life expectancy in the developed countries (the mid-seventies to 
low eighties) for a perfectly satisfactory life. This idea of a steady-state life expectancy at its present level would 
establish, happily, a finite and attainable goal: “Enough, already.” (Callahan 1998, 82, his emphasis). Callahan 
(1996, 442) refers to the late seventies or early eighties as constituting a “natural life span.” He concludes that 
society should not use its common resources to extend life, for “the present average life expectancy in the 
developed countries has proved perfectly adequate for most people to live a full life and for those countries to 
flourish economically and intellectually.” 
P*9.1A1 – P8A1 applies here. Hindsight makes this concept weird. As Overall observes (2003, 
35-36), regarding both the past and the future: 
We are fortunate that medical scientists in the previous two centuries were not persuaded by 
the supposed normative force of earlier human life-span limits.(See P8A3)  What is now 
normal and natural for the human life span does not, of itself, necessarily imply anything 
about the desirability of or justification for prolonging human life, either for individuals or 
as a matter of policy (…) we do not yet fully comprehend what is possible from those who 
are enabled to live healthy longer lives. Nor do we know what human lives would be like if 
they were not inevitably structured by “stages” replete with an ideology of expected decline. 
Both Overall (2003, 47) and Capron (2004), respectively, state that natural is not some fixed 
property but something based on expectations: 
It may well be that human beings have adjusted, and continue to try to adjust, their life 
strategies and goals to fit within the life span that they can reasonably expect. Our lives are 
satisfactory because, of necessity, we circumscribe them to fit the limits set by the current 
average life span. But this fact, if it is a fact, tells us nothing about what human beings might 
aspire to and might legitimately hope to experience, enjoy, and achieve if they were to have 
the opportunity of living longer. 
If Daniel Callahan’s “natural life span” and Norman Daniels’s “normal species functioning” 
do not work as devices to resolve questions of interpersonal equity in a world of greatly 
prolonged lives, then basing the good on that which is “natural” presents an even more 
severe problem when the changes one opposes could alter what is experienced as a natural 
life. Thus a first and easy objection to critiques based on current experience is that they 
amount to nothing more than objections to change as such. Kass dismisses the suggestion 
that his position rests on rejecting all of medicine as unnatural. Yet if medical artifice 
produces a future world populated by millions of people who live as long as Jeanne Calment, 
the French woman who was 122 when she died in 1997, might not the residents of that world 
regard their longevity as being as natural as we regard ours? 
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The answer seems to be a clear yes as Caplan (2004) explains: 
Have we adjusted to changes in the life span in the past in our species such that longer lives 
are viewed as better lives? The answer to that question if one compares life for, say, the 
ancient Hittites, Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans and life for Americans or Italians or 
Japanese today would seem to be yes (…) Few, in other words, would trade their longer life 
span for the much shorter lives lived by their ancestors thousands of years ago. 
To put it more broadly, as Juengst (2004) states:  
Social, technological, and biological dimensions of the typical human life story have been 
rewritten continuously over our species' history without diminishing the moral status of 
those people whose lives have been made possible by that evolution. 
Note that by not denying life expectancy improvements of the past31 there is no reason 
to deny them now, because in the future we might learn that we had not had the perfect lifecycle 
after all. And due to this impasse Capron correctly concludes that this argument is deep down 
an argument against change32: since it is assumed that our lifecycle is perfect any deviation is 
not welcome. That our lifecycle is the perfect one is against all odds. 
P*9.1A1A1 – Callahan answers by pointing out that, even if when we look to the past we see 
that that the standard was not good enough, the same will not happen when we look from the 
future to the present. That is so because we now live longer and are better off than in the past. 
In the words of Overall (2003, 36): 
He writes that it risks two errors: The first is to think that what was appropriate in the past 
remains equally appropriate in the present. Precisely because we made those past advances, 
we can now afford to think about changing our priorities; we are now far better off (Callahan 
1990, 121). 
P*9.1A1A1A1 – I do not see why Callahan’s reasoning cannot still be applied to the future 
when looking to the present.  
P*9.1A1A1A2 - Overall (ibid.) considers Callahan’s answer insufficient: “an adequate case 
must be made for the changing of priorities.”  
P*9.1A1A2 – Callahan has another argument. That it is more difficult for science to advance 
now than in the past. (ibid):  
The second error is to believe that the future must always repeat the past, that because we 
were successful earlier with one group of diseases, we will be equally successful with 
another... We have now, in general... entered the era of chronic disease and illness as well 
as conditions associated with advanced old age, and they are proving far more resistant to 
conquest. (Callahan 1990, 121) 
                                                 
31 Capron (2004): “During the last century, average life expectancy increased by 40–50 percent without provoking 
ethical debate or even after-the-fact ethical handwringing.” 
32 Note a difference between this opposition to change in comparison with the <normal version argument>. People 
two centuries ago if using the normality criterion would oppose change in the lifecycle in relation to their standard. 
But, if using the human nature criterion, change would be accepted in order to attain the present lifecycle standard, 
the one considered good. 
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P*9.1A1A2A1 – Note that Callahan is mixing questions of feasibility with questions of 
desirability that should not be mixed as stated in 1.4 – Desirability vs Feasibility. Besides, as 
seen in 1.8 – Delving Deeper into Aging, scientists are not considering a matter of <if> but one 
of <when> regarding continuous advances to the length of life-expectancy. 
P*9.1A1A2A2 – The answer that Overall provides amounts to a <you do not know>:  
The response to Callahan’s second alleged error is just that we cannot know, now, that the 
scientific future will not be like the past and that researchers will no longer be successful in 
combating chronic diseases and illnesses associated with old age. 
P*9.1A1A3 – Callahan and others make their arguments in relation to resource allocation in 
the healthcare system. Their arguments are being taken out of context. Lange (2013)33: 
Callahan uses “age as a specific criterion for the allocation and limitation of healthcare” by 
denying publicly financed, life-extending healthcare to persons who have lived out a natural 
lifespan. Although no precise chronological age can be set for determining when a natural 
lifespan has been achieved, it will normally be expected “by the late 70s or early 80s” 
(Callahan 1987, p. 171). 
P*9.1A1A3A1 – I explained in 1.5 – Proxys for Discussion that direct discussions about 
immortality are scarce and thus this work will scavenge for arguments from proxy discussion, 
even if they are not directly about immortality, to see how far they go when applied to 
immortality. In any case, following Callahan’s criteria will amount to not achieving 
immortality, so the argument is not taken out of context. 
P*9.1A1A3A2 – The critique is still valid. As we have seen, the problem is not the implications 
to the healthcare system, but the premises that these authors use. As Holm (2013)34 points out: 
Daniel Callahan has for many years argued that aging, and ‘the natural lifespan’ that follows 
from aging has implications for what claims people ought to make of the healthcare system 
(Callahan 1987). Whether or not we agree with the specific implications Callahan draws 
from his ‘natural lifespan’ idea, it is undoubtedly worth noticing that many of his opponents 
do not criticise the specific implications but criticise the basic idea that aging or a natural 
lifespan could have any ethical implications (see for instance Cutas and Harris 2007). 
P*9.1A1A3A3 – In any case arguments about opportunity costs35, as his Callahan’s, are 
described in 4.2.1 – Opportunity Costs: How much desirable? and dealt with in later sections. 
                                                 
33 Cf. footnote 27 – Note the use of the word natural. 
34 Cf. footnote 27 – Note the use of the word natural. 
35 Opportunity costs (OCs) are an important economic concept and are usually unappreciated by the layman. An 
OC is a cost that represents the lost net benefit of the best alternative use of resources. For example the cost of 
opportunity of enrolling in a PhD can be, for example, all the professional experience and income differences that 
one would gain if instead pursued a corporate career. The OC of buying nuclear submarines can be the increase 
of university professors’ salary and the opening of new positions. Whatever the best alternative opportunity not 
chosen is, has its net benefits listed as a cost in the cost-benefit analysis. OCs are useful because they allow us to 
avoid suboptimal decisions. Suppose that I ignore them and conclude that X has a net value of 4, should I pursue 
X? No, because there might be better alternatives. Suppose Y is an alternative with a net value of 7. If we come 
back to our evaluation of X and incorporate OCs the net value of X is now 4-7=-3, a negative value, while the net 
value of Y is now 8-4=4. It is clear that we should pursue Y, even when we conclude that X had a net positive 
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P*9.1A2 – Human nature, if it exists, seems to have a component of death avoidance, as Geddes 
(2004) states: “the preference for life appears to be a universal throughout human culture. It is 
near universal for humans to celebrate birth and lament death”. So, if avoiding death and dying 
are both part of human nature, where does that leave us? Should we take seriously the scientific 
endeavour to tackle death once and for all, or should we stop it and also act contrary to human 
nature? This argument is similar to P*2A6. 
P*9.1A2A1 – But UI suicide is the only way to die, something clearly not natural. 
P*9.1A2A1A1 – UI people are not required to die. Even if suicide is an option they can ignore 
it like they do today’s. 
P*9.1A2A2 – There is a need to drop the concept of human nature and leave only the current 
lifecycle as good to avoid such contradictions, a manoeuvre similar to P8A2A1. 
P*9.1A3 – Aging is a disease and thus something contrary to human nature. Aging being a 
disease is an issue that would merit is own argument. I will be brief with my discussion here. 
It seems that aging meets whatever definition of disease one puts forward. 
Caplan (2004): If one accepts the relevance of the five suggested criteria [for employing the term organic 
disease], aging as a biological process is seen to possess all the key properties of a disease. Unlike astigmatism or 
nervousness, aging possesses a definitive group of clinical manifestations or symptoms; a clear-cut etiology of 
structural changes at both the macroscopic and microscopic levels; a significant measure of impairment, 
discomfort, and suffering; and, if we are willing to grant the same tolerance to current theories of aging as we 
grant to theories in other domains of medicine, an explicit set of precipitating factors. (…) Aging has all the 
relevant markings of a disease process. (…) The explanation of why aging occurs has many of the attributes of a 
stochastic or chance phenomenon. And this makes aging unnatural and in no way an intrinsic part of human nature. 
As such, there is no reason why it is intrinsically wrong to try to reverse or cure aging. 
Freitas (2004): According to the volitional normative model of disease that is most appropriate for 
nanomedicine, if you’re physiologically old and do not want to be, then for you, oldness and aging – and natural 
death – are a disease. 
Schermer (2013): Andrew Twaddle (…) gives the following definition: Disease is a health problem that 
consists of a physiological malfunction that results in an actual or potential reduction in physical capacities and/or 
reduced life expectancy. (…) Gerbrand Izaks and Rudi Westendorp, who are both physicians and biomedical 
researchers, claim that many doctors mistakenly belief that aging is not a disease and that they wrongfully attempt 
to separate pathological aging from normal aging. They state that normal aging cannot be separated from 
pathological aging: Aging is the accumulation of damage to somatic cells, leading to cellular dysfunction, and 
culminates in organ dysfunction and an increased vulnerability to death” (Izaks and Westendorp 2003, p. 6). 
                                                 
value on its own. Afterall Y is worth 7 compared to only to the 4 of X. Thus any cost-benefit analysis should also 
include as a cost the net value of the best alternative use of resources, i.e. OCs.  
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Dekkers (2013): Terms such as ‘pathology’, ‘faults’, ‘defect ‘and ‘damage’ reflect that aging can be considered 
a pathological process which must be approached from a disease model. 
de Magalhães (2004): A disease, any type of disease, is a time-dependent change in the body that leads to 
discomfort, pain, or even death. (…) Aging is a sexually transmitted terminal disease. 
P*9.1A3A1 – One can argue against the concept that aging is a disease by stating that its cure 
is instead an enhancement Chapman (2004), and Schermer (2013), respectively: 
Efforts to engineer longer life cannot be justified as a potential contribution to improving 
health status or relieving suffering. Instead such initiatives would be akin to other types of 
prospective enhancements, that is, non-disease-related interventions intended to improve 
normal human characteristics. 
If aging itself is a disease, it is a legitimate target for medical intervention. If, on the other 
hand, aging is understood as normal and natural, interventions to slow or stop aging will be 
characterized as enhancements, interventions that go beyond therapy. As mentioned, a 
significant part of the public holds the assumption that treatment is always good, whereas 
enhancement is morally suspect. 
It seems that the criteria to classify aging a disease, or its cure as an enhancement is predicated 
on what is expected or considered to be normal/natural as Caplan (2004) states:  
The perception of biological events or processes as natural or unnatural is frequently 
decisive in determining whether physicians treat states or processes as diseases (Socarides, 
1970; Illich, 1974; Goldberg, 1975). One need only think of the controversies that swirl 
around allegations concerning the biological naturalness of homosexuality or schizophrenia 
to see that this is so.(…) What does seem to differentiate aging from other processes or states 
traditionally classified as diseases is the fact that aging is perceived as a natural or normal 
process. 
And Olshansky and Carnes (2004) say that “aging is not an unnatural disease but is instead a 
natural by-product of survival extended into the post-reproductive period of the life span”. The 
problem is that considering something a disease needs to be supported by normative claims. 
By defining something as a disease it is already implicit the desire to change that state. As such 
claiming that aging is a disease is not a good argument against P*9. Disease already carries the 
meaning of being undesirable – employing the label assumes what it is trying to prove, that 
curing aging is desirable. Sethe and de Magalhães sum it perfectly: “Should we consider aging 
a disease?” is essentially asking “Should aging be cured?” 
P*9.1A3A1A1 – Perhaps there is a way around the problem. If even aging is not a disease, it 
is a direct cause of disease (something considered undesirable) and as such it should be targeted 
by medical intervention. Here are some authors supporting this position: 
Juengst (2004): Even those who are most concerned with resisting the medicalization of normal aging readily 
agree that the professional mandate of medicine includes combatting the maladies that plague old age (…) The 
critics appear not to have noticed, however, that allowing the debate to be framed in this way is fatal to their cause. 
As long as decelerated aging and disease prevention are two sides of the same coin, the life-extending effects of 
such interventions will always be eclipsed by the medical obligation to prevent disease, effectively deciding the 
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question of the intervention's medical appropriateness. (…) As long as the underlying aging processes are 
understood as the major risk factors for the morbidities of aging, those processes become rational targets for 
preventive interventions aimed at forestalling the maladies in question. Just as it makes sense for public health 
officials to attempt to prevent the behaviors that put people at risk for human immunodeficiency virus infection 
whether or not they are considered healthy in themselves, it does not matter for medicine whether the underlying 
mechanisms of aging in humans are pathological in themselves. 
Schermer (2013): Even if aging itself is not claimed to be a disease, it is said to be ‘characterized by a broad 
spectrum of disease’ (Gems 2011). 
Miller (2004): Aging, whether it is considered a disease or not, is the root of (nearly) all late-life illnesses. 
Post (2004): While I do not think that aging is a disease, it is a process that creates so much susceptibility to 
disease that it can be approached by researchers with therapeutic intent (Post, 2000). Here therapy and 
enhancement merge and become one and the same thing. 
P*9.1A3A1A1A1 – But even if curing aging solves health problems, there still is room to be 
against such intervention (Juengst, 2004):  
Anti-aging interventions cannot be part of human health care, because aging is constitutive 
of what it is to be human. On this view, anti-aging interventions may well address health 
problems, but they cannot do so without sacrificing patients' identity as authentic human 
beings (Kass, 2001). 
The normative claim is that curing aging is against human nature, so claiming that it is a 
disease, or that it will help cure some, misses the point, since it does not address the claimed 
fact of aging being a part of human nature, whatever that is (see P8A2). Even if curing diseases 
is considered desirable, the critics just point that doing it through curing ageing is not 
acceptable: it is better that people die with diseases they do not want, than to have people not 
age, because they would be stripped of their label of human. 
P*9.1A3A1A1A1A1 – A quick search on the google dictionary for the word human gave back 
the following result. “Relating to or characteristic of people or human beings; of or 
characteristic of people as opposed to God or animals or machines, especially in being 
susceptible to weaknesses. Synonyms: mortal, flesh and blood, fallible, weak, frail, imperfect, 
vulnerable, susceptible, erring, error-prone, physical, bodily, fleshly.” It is conceded that the 
label human would be lost in this sense. However, one has to wonder if losing the label in this 
sense is a matter of concern, as these authors seem to believe. It most likely is not. 
P*9.1A3A1A1A1A1A1 - ⸸ 
P*9.1A4 – A considerable portion of western society does not follow this norm consistently. 
The issue of homosexuality, in the past considered non-natural because of human nature, is not 
an issue anymore and abortion is following the same path. It seems that plenty of change comes 
from directly questioning the presumption that human nature, whatever that may be, carries 
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any form of normative value. If it does not then it seems prudent to ponder if, when authors 
speak of an inherent wisdom in our lifecycle, they mistake that word with the word folly. 
P*9.1A4A1 – ⸸ 
P*9.1A5 – To prove that our current lifespan is the perfect one it is necessary to do adequate 
empirical testing. We have access to shorter lifecycles, but we do not have access to longer 
ones. To have access to them we ought to develop longevity enhancement technologies. Even 
if the hypothesis is that longer life expectancies are not desirable, we need to develop the 
technology for the purposes of proof of concept, and this amounts to no pragmatic difference 
(see also the P36A1 thread). 
P*9.1A5A1 – Not everything needs proof of concept – we could, to the best of our ability, try 
to judge how life would be like and assess from there. 
P*9.1A5A1A1 – Although that is true, in this case that method has failed 100% of the time 
(see P8A1 and P8A3). No one, hundred years before now risked stating that the present 
lifecycle would be the good/natural lifecycle in comparison to the one at the time. And this 
argument is merely repeating that story in regard to the future. Kass, Callahan and others ignore 
past data regarding human convictions about the lifecycle. 
P*9.1A5A2 – If, after conquering death, we have no turning back, then pursuing the proof of 
concept is not an option. As Kass (2004) states: 
We are not talking about some minor new innovation with ethical wrinkles about which we 
may chatter or regulate as usual. Conquering death is not something that we can try for a 
while and then decide whether the results are better or worse—according to, God only 
knows, what standard. 
P*9.1A5A2A1 – I see no reason why we cannot go back to the old ways. In 1.2 – What is 
Immortality? it is argued that every immortality level can simulate the level below. See also 
P6A1. As a side note, observe how Kass can argue for the <blessings of mortality> (see P*9.1) 
based on some standard but then claim that there is no standard when it is time to evaluate the 
alternative: either there is a standard or not. 
P*9.1A6 – Accusations of a naturalistic fallacy can be made. After all, just because the lifecycle 
is, does not mean it ought to be. As Juengst (2004), and Ehni (2013), respectively, point out: 
Arguing that the traditional human life cycle is normative for human beings requires a good 
bit of philosophical work if it is not to be accused of making a virtue of necessity. Just 
because human beings have always lived within a particular pattern of life experiences is 
not necessarily a reason to continue doing so. 
Daniel Callahan has used his concept of a “natural lifespan” (…) obviously, this argument 
is a natural fallacy. Even if a certain length of life is natural, this as such has no normative 
implications. 
P*9.1A6A1 – ⸸ 
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P*9.1A7 – Because people are different, a perfect lifespan would also be relative to each 
person. As Overall (2003, 190) points out: 
As Brennan (2001, 734–735) remarks, it seems unlikely that “one perfect life span . . . would 
work well for everyone. Some people may well have had a full and complete life by age 
ninety, others may have tired of it by forty, and still others might be enjoying life at the ripe 
old age of three hundred... The best of all worlds would be one which involved choice—the 
freedom to continue one’s life or not as one saw fit.” 
P*9.1A7A1 – ⸸ 
P*9.2 – There is an argument to be made for the lifecycle that requires a specific answer, so I 
opted to discuss it separately from the main one. Schermer (2013) 36: 
It is often said that enhancements are wrong because they intervene in nature, or because 
they alter human nature. (…) The famous biogerontologist Hayflick—also a dichotomist—
supports Boorse’s view that we should accept the biological lifecycle as the norm. He says: 
“The goal of arresting the aging process might be viewed in the same light that we view the 
arrest of our physical or mental development in childhood—as a serious pathology” 
(Hayflick 2000, p. 269) 
P*9.2A1 – The first objection comes in the following form (ibid.): 
Eric Juengst has argued that this is not a very convincing argument because arresting 
childhood development cannot be equated with arresting aging; while most people would 
agree that developing into a mature human being is desirable, because it opens up 
possibilities, the same is not true for aging (Juengst 2004). 
P*9.2A1A1 – One can argue that this is only true from the point of view of adulthood. Perhaps 
children do not want to become adults and perhaps old people like it that way. As Juengst 
(2004), and Holm (2013), respectively, point out: 
When my daughter was 12, she once responded to my description of her behavior as 
adolescent with hot denial, saying she was not a teenager and did not want to become a 
teenager, because teenagers were all "gross”. (…) we would not try to manipulate her 
endocrine system to prevent or postpone her adolescence, and most people would accuse 
any parents or physicians who did so with committing a grave moral wrong. (…) Critics of 
anti-aging medicine suggest that a similar argument might be made for the biological 
changes of late adulthood if our society were not so pervasively influenced by the 
perspective of those who have not yet undergone them (Callahan, 1993). 
We might wonder whether it is a coincidence that the life stage we valorise in this way is 
the one that most academics writing on these matters happen to be in. 
P*9.2A1A1A1 – However there is no denying that from a capability standpoint, adulthood is 
superior to both childhood and old age, both in physical and intellectual prowess. So it makes 
sense to want to stop there, not after and not before. This means fixing the standard on a certain 
state of the lifecycle and comparing other stages to that state (Schermer, 2013):  
Interestingly, Izaks and Westendorp reject the Boorsian idea of an age-related reference 
class and take young adults to be the reference for all. They state that “it is not appropriate 
to use old-age-specific normal values. The decision whether a body function of an elderly 
patient is impaired or not must be based on the same normal values that are used in young 
                                                 
36 <Boorse’s view> refers to the idea that each age has its own reference class, instead of considering a fixed 
reference class for all ages (see P1 and P*2A4 citations of Schermer). 
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adults [...] there is no good reason why the normal values for functions in young adults are 
not applied in adults at all ages” (Izaks und Westendorp 2003, p. 5). They point out that for 
elderly people, functional levels below those of young people are often associated with 
higher mortality and should therefore be considered abnormal. 
P*9.2A1A1A2 – It can be argued that adults have seen more of life than teenagers, and thus 
are in a better position to judge immortality: (Juengst, 2004):  
Unlike preadolescents, middle-aged adults have seen enough of life to allow them to project 
themselves and their interests beyond their current age and appreciate the trade-offs involved 
in postponing aging. 
P*9.2A1A1A2A1 – But older people have seen more of life than adults. 
P*9.2A1A1A2A1A1 – P*9.2A1A1A2 if understood under charitable terms means that adults 
have experienced enough life, that preteenagers did not, that allows them to make decisions 
regarding not wanting to continue to age in the capability sense. Alternatively, one could argue 
that pre-teenagers do not have the necessary skills to evaluate risk because their brains have 
not developed them yet. 
C10 – This holds with a very weak foundation. P8 was not dismissed but its scope greatly 
reduced by P8A2. Then P8A1 and P8A3 reduced its credibility to a minimum. P*9.2 does not 
hold since it was, in my opinion, convincingly dealt with. Regarding P*9.1: P*9.1A4, 
P*9.1A6, and P*9.1A7 fail; P*9.1A3 also seems to not be enough since it assumes what it is 
trying to prove. P*9.1A2 reduces its scope from the all-encompassing human nature to a 
narrower view of a particular lifecycle, that according to P*9.1A1 hangs against all odds. 
P*9.1A5 makes this argument moot for practical purposes. 
P11 – This is a true premise as stated in 1.2 – What is Immortality?. 
C12 – Given C10 and P11, C12 obtains. 
P13 – If human nature is non-existent, there is nothing to replace. If it is not something fixed 
it can be altered and thus a perfect substitution can occur. But the argument considered with 
charity concerns the lifecycle of today and that cannot be substituted. 
P13A1 – P6A1 applies here, mutatis mutandis. Nothing is lost UI since the same life cycle can 
be replicated. Immortality can still provide a compression of morbidity scenario. 
PCBA – Ceteris paribus. 
C14 – P13A1 counters P13, and as such C14 does not obtain. 
-- 
Verdict: FAIL 
 C10 hinges on the supposition that our lifecycle is the good one, which is against all 
odds. This weakness starts at P*9.1A1 and propagates to the end of the argument. However, I 
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do not think it is enough for the dismissal of C10. But C14 can be dismissed via P13A1. 
Regardless the argument is made moot by P*9.1A5. 
 
2.3.1.3 – God Version 
P15: Involuntary death is natural. 
P*16: What is natural is good. 
C17 (P15+P*16): Involuntary death is good. 
P18: Immortality eliminates involuntary death. 
C19 (C17+P18): Immortality eliminates something good. 
P20: The good that death provides cannot be replaced by something equivalent or better. 
C21 (C19+P20+PCBA): Immortality is not desirable. 
This is an old debated issue and as such I recommend consulting the relevant literature if there 
is a wish to learn the current state of the discussion. 
P15 – In this version of the argument, natural is equivalent with what god created. I will 
consider the word god to refer to an alleged entity who created the universe and everything 
within. Natural then means according to that entity’s intentions. Death and aging fit the bill as 
Caplan (2004) states in the example of Abrahamic religions: 
God, as a punishment for the sins of our ancestors in the (proverbial) garden of Eden, caused 
humans to age and die. On this view, people age because the Creator saw fit to design them 
that way for retribution or punishment. Aging serves as a reminder of our moral fallibility 
and weakness. 
P15A1 – The first problem is arguing that there is such an entity. I will not discuss this problem 
here. There is plenty of literature throughout history dealing with it. For curiosity’s sake, 
according to Bourget and Chalmers (2013), a survey taken by almost 1000 philosophy faculty 
members and grad students across the world yielded 72.8% support37 for atheism. But the 
survey also found out that differences between philosophers of religion and of other areas, 
regarding the preference between theism and atheism, was the biggest when considering each 
question vs each area of study. The support for atheism from philosophers of religion was 4 
times lower than from non-philosophers of religion. A missing piece of information is to 
evaluate the view of philosophers of religion before they started engaging the discipline:  did 
they choose this area because they did not lean towards atheism (were already believers), or 
                                                 
37 This includes the positions: support, and leaning for. 
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were their views changed/formed by interacting with the literature (know better than non-
specialists)? 
P15A2 – The second evident problem is arguing about what the intentions of such an entity, 
assuming it exists, are. There are plenty of books and stone tablets with several exclusive 
hypotheses. There seems to be no criteria to prefer between them apart from faith38. Even when 
considering a single source, we find that there are plenty of different interpretations and 
conclusions about god’s intentions. The probability that one of them nails it is inversely 
proportional to the number of options, which seem to be never-ending. Besides, one can 
conceive mutually exclusive intentions (of god) that are compatible with the idea of a creator, 
say: wanting us to dress red on Sundays, not wanting us to dress red on Sundays. Lastly it is 
possible that no such intentions exist, or if they exist they do not concern humans, or if they 
did at the moment of creation, they do not anymore. 
P15A3 – Some reject the explanation that God created aging deliberatively, since aging is a 
by-product according to evolutionary theory, or because they feel a theological explanation is 
incomplete. Caplan (2004) says, that “while the theological explanation of aging may carry 
great weight for numerous individuals, it will simply not do as a scientific explanation of why 
aging occurs in humans.” 
P15A3A1 – Evolutionary theory and god’s creation are not necessarily incompatible. God 
could have created evolution intentionally. And he had foresight to know that evolution would 
lead to aging, senescence, and death of individuals. 
P15A3A1A1 – If he had foresight to by-products of evolution he also had foresight to humans 
wanting to cure aging and achieve immortality, therefore he also intended it (it is natural). This 
argument is similar in form to P*9.1A2. 
P15A3A1A1A1 – God does not have foresight to free willed decisions. 
P15A3A1A1A1A1 – If we have free will, P15A3A1A1A1 is incompatible with P15A3A1, 
since individual choice is a part of evolution: e.g. should I risk this behaviour or not? If we do 
not have free will then P15A3A1A1A1 does not apply. 
P15A3A1A1A1A1A1 – If aging and death necessarily emerge from evolution, then it does not 
matter if god has no knowledge about the free willed decisions. 
P15A3A1A1A1A1A1A1 – A similar claim can be made regarding the emergence of wanting 
to postpone death from the process of evolution. 
                                                 
38 Human intuition, sixth senses, or faith are not good predictors of truth (e.g. Kahneman, 2011). 
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P15A4 – In the case of Abrahamic religions, there are interpretations defending that because 
aging resulted from Adam’s agency then it is not natural. A Post (2004) explains: 
Three centuries before Francis Bacon, the English theologian Roger Bacon argued that in 
the future, the 900-year-long lives of the antediluvian patriarchs would be restored 
alchemically. Like many Western religious thinkers, both Bacons saw death as the unnatural 
result of Adam's fall into sin. These Western dreams of embodied near-immortality could 
only emerge against a theological background that more or less endorsed them. There are 
various other cultural and historical influences at work besides religion, but the initial 
conceptual context for a scientific assault on aging itself is a religious one (Barash, 1983). 
The modern goals of anti-aging research and technology, then, are historically emergent 
from a premodern religious drama of hope and salvation (Benecke, 2002) (…) The Russian 
Orthodox existentialist Nicholas Berdyaev wrote, "Death is the evil result of sin. A sinless 
life would be immortal and eternal" (1939, p. 252). Stanley and Harakas likewise note that 
"Theologically, Eastern Christianity viewed death as an enemy, a consequence of Adamic 
sin, and therefore a condition to be struggled against" (1986, p. 157) (…) All Christians 
agree, [Augustine] argued, that aging and death issue not from the "law of nature, by which 
God ordained no death for man, but by His righteous infliction on account of sin; for God, 
taking vengence on sin, said to the man, in whom we all then were, 'Dust thou art, and unto 
dust shall thou return' " (p. 423). Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica I, question 97, article 
1) asked, "Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Immortal?" He 
responded by citing St. Paul (Romans 5:12: "By sin death came into the world") and asserted 
that before sin the body was "incorruptable," that is, immortal. (…) It is true that modern 
theological liberalism has departed from the above orthodoxy. The idea of aging and death 
as natural, of course, makes eminent sense. My only point here is to underscore that for 1800 
years Western culture, insofar as it was dominated by a religious worldview, did not accept 
the naturalistic view. (…) If aging is associated with human failure against the background 
of disobedience, one would expect that, while it might be construed as an unalterable part 
of the divine retributive economy, it might equally well be viewed as a problem to be 
overcome in a process of millennial restoration because it is not really a part of the economy 
of nature. 
Furthermore, the question seems to not be settled in the present (Mellon, 2004): 
We have found support for the Institute’s mission [Immortality Level III] among the ethical 
and theological principles derived from our Judeo-Christian tradition. 
This is a demonstration that P15A2 currently undermines this argument. We have, at present, 
no idea if immortality is or is not part of god’s intentions, and that depends on whether god 
intended man to be sinful, or sinless, assuming this sentence is not nonsense. 
P*16 – This proposition states that whatever god intended is good. As Capron (2004) writes: 
Critics like Leon Kass not only reject the enterprise but are also convinced it is a perversion 
of the true goals of medicine. For these critics, the search for immortality—or at least for a 
very long youth—is at war with our heritage of aging, decay, and death. The critics’ efforts 
to extend life span are but pathetic attempts to rewrite our history: made in God’s image, 
then, as punishment for eating from the tree of knowledge, cast out of the Garden lest we 
eat from the tree of life and become immortal, we long to overturn our God-given lot. 
P*16A1 – Since the concept of natural is used in this premise, P15A1 and P15A2 apply here. 
P15A2 can be considered just an epistemological issue (unlike its effect on P15) – the claim 
that god’s intentions are good does not depend on us having access to those intentions, in the 
same way that the claim that <someone believes in a god> does not depend on my access to 
that knowledge. From P15A1 however there is no escape. 
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P*16A2 – Following someone’s values just because they created us does not seem to be 
enough. It is possible our creator amuses itself with cancer in new-borns. 
P*16A2A1 – That is not intended, it is not natural. 
P*16A2A1A1 – If that is not intended, then aging and death might as well not be. Because 
there seems to be the same amount of justice in a newborn having cancer without having done 
something wrong (or right), or a newborn be condemned to death and frailty in X amount of 
years from then on without having done something wrong (or right). 
P*16A2A1A1A1 – Appealing to a concept of justice through reincarnation can solve the issue, 
although it is another ontological compromise besides P15A1 and P15A2. 
P*16A2A1A1A2 - ⸸ 
P*16A2A2 – God works in mysterious ways. 
P*16A2A2A1 – Then we do not know our creator’s endgame. It’s reaffirming P15A2. 
P*16A2A3 – It is not the case that god intends good, it is the case that good is created by its 
intentions. Put this way, god’s intentions exist before good exists, and thus cannot be judged 
good or bad. 
P*16A2A4 – ⸸ 
P*16A3 – The argument here is that there are some intentions of god that people do not 
consider good. However due to the issue reflected in P15A2, the multitude of faiths makes it 
nearly impossible to find an example in them all. I will provide examples from the Christian 
faith. The obligation of women to cover their heads (1 Corinthians 11:5-6), the immorality of 
divorce (Matthew 5:31-32), or the subjugation of women under man (1 Corinthians 14:34-35, 
1 Timothy 2:11-14), are all behaviours that a large part of the modernized world would not 
agree as good (or in the case of divorce, would not agree on its immorality). At best they are 
neutral (neither good, nor bad) such as the head coverings, but others like the subjugation of 
women under man are outright rejected. Therefore P*16 should be dismissed. 
P*16A3A1 – ⸸ 
P*16A3A2 – All of these cases and others result from misinterpretations of sacred texts.  
P*16A3A2A1 – It seems to me a methodological facade to go that route. If every time we find 
a discrepancy between the sacred text and the general opinions of society, we reinterpret the 
sacred text to conform, then it means that the sacred text is worth nothing – the true standard 
is what society generally accepts. It also shows that we can be wrong and not know it until 
someone in the future comes along and gets a different interpretation, the “correct” one. We 
should be wary that we got god’s intentions right: this reaffirms P*16A1 (P15A2). 
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C17 – Regarding P15, P15A1 weakens its strength but does not outright allow for its refusal. 
I will not pronounce myself over if there is a creator or not but recognize that the matter is not 
currently settled. P15A2 makes P15 insignificant, at least until someone can come up with a 
method to identify what really are the intentions of the creator. This issue not only affects P15, 
but any premise that shares the structure <X is natural>. However, this can be just a technical39 
hiccup and so does not allow for the refusal of P15. The claim that P15A3 has over P15 
depends on both P15A3A1A1A1A1A1 and P15A3A1A1A1A1A1A1, which I did not research 
further. Lastly P15A4 allows for the refusal of P15, at least regarding Abrahamism. Regarding 
P*16, P*16A1 is a drawback. I do believe that P*16A2 is answered by both P*16A2A3 and 
P*16A2A4. P*16A3 is answered by P*16A3A1. I conclude that C17 can be discarded based 
on P15A4. However, it should be noted that I did not research equivalents of P15A4 for 
religions other than the Abrahamic ones. As such, for those religions, C17 although not 
dismissed, walks on very thin ice for since both of its premises, especially P15, are very weak. 
 Let us grant C17 for the sake of argument. 
P18 – This statement is true as explained in 1.2 – What is Immortality?. 
C19 – This conclusion obtains, given C17 and P18. 
P20 – This premise affirms that there is nothing that can replace what is lost, for something 
similar, or with similar effects. 
P20A1 – The same consideration that appears in P*16A3, will push me to use the Abrahamic 
religions for the argument. Mutatis mutandis the argument should be able to function with other 
religions. Take note of the basis of P15: death and aging came as a punishment of not following 
the intentions of god. This punishment, death and aging, administered by god is now considered 
god’s intention and consequently it is considered good. Therefore, trying to overcome 
aging/death is unnatural, against god’s intentions, thus not good. But this reflects a static 
analysis that does not hold under a dynamic one. Suppose we go ahead and achieve 
immortality. If god punishes us again by attaching some other properties to us,40 then those 
will be considered the new intentions of god and thus natural/good. We lost one good: ageing 
and death but gained another – whatever the new punishment is. So, a perfect substitution 
occurred. If god does not punish us, then it may mean that we got its intentions all wrong (cue 
P15A2, e.g. god wanted us to overcome aging and death all along), it could be because god 
                                                 
39 In the sense that the relevant technology or  knowledge to build such a method is not yet available to us. 
40 The first time it was ageing and death, this second time depends on god’s policy on recidivism. 
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changed its mind about its first intentions, it could be because god stopped caring about what 
we do, or it could mean that there is no god. 
P20A1A1 – It could be the case that god does nothing, but still intends death and aging. 
P20A1A1A1 – We do have at least one data point were god intervened and punished us when 
its intentions were not met. And it seems that according to the scriptures when god does really 
want something it intervenes to communicate more or less clearly its intentions (e.g. the change 
of rules that Christians consider from the old to the new testament). By chasing immortality, 
we are learning more about god’s intentions regarding aging and death. In that sense the best 
way to prove P15 is to pursue immortality. If god does a no show, then P15A2 seems to be 
inevitable, because there will be no objective way to check for god’s intentions. Either way 
(punishment or no show), pursuing immortality is the way to go. 
P20A1A2 – It may be said that god has a particular way of doing things and thus we should 
not be “playing god”, by trying to overcome our punishment. Treder (2004), citing Kass: “This 
is hubris,” some tell us. “Death is natural, and we must not play God.” Schermer (2013) repeats 
it without citing Kass but using the exact same adjectives. And Post (2004) also offers another 
take: “theology might affirm that we humans are not the ones to create everlasting life, which 
is already a gift rooted in the saving creativity of God.” 
P20A1A2A1 – It seems to me that those who defend the parent object are the ones playing 
god, by trying themselves to do the judgment and enforce the punishment.  
P20A1A2A2 – Perhaps this is not a generalized sentiment among religious folks. Geddes 
(2004), states: “Yet some of the strongest allies of the quest for immortality may come from 
those of Jewish faith.”41 
PCBA – Ceteris paribus. 
C21 – I do not think C21 holds, since P20 was successfully dismissed. Immortality is not 
undesirable, it is in fact desirable. 
-- 
Verdict: FAIL 
 Considering Abrahamic faiths, the argument fails with two opposite strategies – the 
first is negating  P15 with P15A4; the second, arguing with P20A1.  
Religions other than the Abrahamic faiths are exempted from the strategy originated in 
P15A4 and thus the central premise of the argument (C17) cannot be dismissed. C17 (and C19) 
                                                 
41 Note that Leon Kass, a staunch opponent of immortality and an important political figure, is of Jewish faith, 
and Jewish themes are featured on his work (e.g. Kass, 2004). 
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although not very well supported, are still defensible. But C21 fails to obtain and thus change 
the final verdict. Even if C21 did not fail, the strength of this argument would not be much due 
to the weakness of its first two premises (P15 and P*16).  
 
2.3.1.4 – Artificial Version 
P*22: What is natural is good (and what is artificial is bad). 
P23: Involuntary death is natural. 
C24 (P23+P*22): Death is good (and eliminating it is bad). 
P25: Immortality eliminates death as we know it. 
C26 (C24+P25): Immortality eliminates something good (and creates something bad). 
P27: The good that death provides (and the bad that immortality creates) cannot be replaced 
by something equivalent or better. 
C28 (C26+P27+PCBA): Immortality is not desirable. 
P*22 – Here natural appears in opposition to artificial. Artificial is something created with 
human input, something man made, “lacking in natural or spontaneous quality” (Merriam 
Webster dictionary). It is claimed that changing what is natural to something that is not, is not 
good, because there is a positive value associated with the natural state and a negative value 
associated with the artificial state. Shermer (2013) puts it briefly: “It is often said that 
enhancements are wrong because they intervene in nature.” 
P*22A1 – Society at large rejects this premise. There are plenty of examples of natural things 
which are considered bad and artificial things considered good such as (Treder, 2004):  
Tooth decay is natural – should dentistry be outlawed? Polio is natural – should we ban the 
Sabin vaccine? Cholera is natural – should we allow epidemics to rage unchallenged? Death 
is natural – must it continue to wreak its dreadful havoc? Clearly this is foolishness. 
It seems that our current life expectancy is also not a result of natural processes. Ehni (2013) 
states: “the current average lifespan of humans in industrialized societies is far from being a 
result of natural evolution.” Should we also promote infant death to bring life expectancy to 
more natural levels? As Dekkers (2013) puts it: 
The rather common argument that it is ‘unnatural’ to live much longer than we do now, is 
not convincing. To put it briefly: Natural processes are not intrinsically good things and 
unnatural and artificial procedures are not necessarily bad things (Caplan 2004). 
P*22A1A1 – ⸸ 
P*22A2 – If we rejected everything that is artificial then how should one live? Perhaps one 
ought to live with the same living conditions as the first civilizations. But that is not enough 
since civilization implies man-made things. We need an earlier standard, perhaps pre-historic 
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hunter gatherers. That also does not seem right because they had artificial tools to hunt and 
gather. We will need to go so far back that the standards we find were no longer from our 
species, but from an ancestor one, probably Homo Habilis or earlier. 
P*22A2A1 – ⸸ 
P*22A2A1A1 – If we go that far looking for standards then the problem is: should all evolution 
since then be considered an artificial process (since it had artificial inputs) and thus bad? On 
the other hand, early humans started building tools and other artificial objects because natural 
selection endowed them with intellectual and physical abilities to do so. Their artificial 
endeavours are a direct result of a natural process. Therefore, should not the creation of the 
very first tools be considered a natural process? And if it is then where does one draws the line? 
Every man-made increment is built upon the results of the previously, now natural considered, 
increment. What makes more sense is that the word artificial is but a specific case of a natural 
process, and thus is not opposed to the word natural. Artificial is a type of natural process where 
man intervened and created a type of something which did not exist before42 or that can be 
traced to such a process. As Treder (2004) states: 
But what is natural? And what is unnatural? By the most precise definition, everything that 
occurs in our world – whether synthetic or not – is natural, because humans are a part of 
nature and therefore the products of our hands – or our machines – are also part of nature. 
P*22A2A1A1A1 – This makes the word natural trivial since everything is the result of some 
natural process. 
P*22A2A1A1A1A1 – That a problem has been detected can only strengthen the claim that this 
is an inadequate premise. The problem with the triviality of the word natural exists because 
there is no dichotomy (artificial/natural) and everything is the result of a natural process since 
there is only nature. The problem lies in the meaning of natural as conceived here. 
P*22A2A1A1A1A2 – The word natural can still be used to differentiate non-natural 
phenomena such as the paranormal, fiction, and perhaps references to other universes/worlds43  
P*22A3 – Historically, society sometimes goes through a cycle of rejecting innovations and/or 
societal changes because they are unnatural just to later accept them without a problem. It can 
be the case with immortality. Treder (2004) presents some examples:  
It is interesting to note that numerous other scientific measures to improve the human 
condition have initially been scorned as unnatural and intolerable by many, only to be later 
accepted almost universally. Examples include anesthesia, blood transfusions, vaccinations, 
birth control pills, and organ transplants. Consider what our world might be like without 
these and hundreds of other improvements that may not fit the popular definition of ‘natural’. 
                                                 
42 Only creating something is not enough since it also allows pregnancy to be artificial. 
43 For example, suppose we are in a simulation as described by Bostrom (2003). We can then conceive natural as 
a descriptor applicable to stuff on our own level of reality, or universe. 
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(…) For those who still believe that opposing death is somehow wrong or unnatural, please 
remember that opposition to human slavery was also once considered crazy and dangerous. 
P*22A3A1 – ⸸ 
P23 – Aging being a by-product of natural evolution is certainly not man made. Death is also 
something not man made44. As such this premise seems true. 
P23A1 – P*22A2A1A1 applies here. Can we really think of natural as opposed to artificial? 
C24 – I do not believe that C24 obtains. Although neither P*22A1 or P*22A3 are enough to 
take out P*22, P*22A2 is. And through that thread (P*22A2A1A1) also takes down P23. The 
problem is that it is difficult to maintain the division of natural-artificial.  
Let´s grant C24 for the sake of argument: 
P25 – This is true as stated in 1.2 – What is Immortality?. 
C26 – Granting C24 and with no problem with P25, this seems to be the case. 
P27 – I cannot think of anything that can work as a substitute for what is lost, since it will 
always involve a human made component. The only way I can conceive of this is if we generate 
enough repetitions of universes until we find one where: a) there are humans that do not age 
and do not die, and b) that a) was brought about by non-human action. But per 
P*22A2A1A1A1A2, perhaps the word natural will not apply. 
PCBA – Ceteris paribus 
C28 – Given C26 and P27 I believe C28 obtains. 
-- 
Verdict: FAIL 
 C26 and C28 do obtain given C24. However C24 has a big problem denoted by the 
P*22A2 thread (P*22A2A1A1). It seems that the definition of natural is not opposite to 
artificial. This affects both P23 and P*22. 
 
2.3.1.5 – Function Version 
P29: Involuntary death is natural. 
P*30: Eliminating something natural is bad. 
C31 (P29+P*30): Eliminating involuntary death is bad. 
P32: Immortality eliminates involuntary death. 
C33 (C31+P32): Immortality instantiates something bad. 
                                                 
44 Some faiths believe that death and aging were indeed man made or resulted from man’s agency. Most of the 
time, in those cases <god created> replaces <nature created>, allowing death and aging to maintain the natural 
qualifier. For more on this see 2.3.1.3 – God Version. 
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P34: The badness of eliminating involuntary death cannot be mitigated by direct replacement.45 
C35 (C33+P34+PCBA): Immortality is not desirable. 
P29 – Natural in this version of the argument means to be in accordance to its purpose. Caplan 
(2004) explains it better: 
This sense of naturalness is rooted in the notions of design, purpose, and function. Axes are 
designed to serve as tools for cutting trees. Scalpels are meant to be used in cutting human 
tissue. It would seem most unnatural to use axes for surgery and scalpels for lumberjacking. 
In some sense, although a skilful surgeon might in fact be able to perform surgery with an 
axe, it would be unnatural to do so. Similarly, many bodily organs—the liver, spleen, blood 
vessels, kidneys, and many glands—can perform compensatory functions when certain other 
organic tissues are damaged or removed. But these are not the purposes or functions they 
were designed to perform. While the arteries of many organisms are capable of constricting 
to maintain blood pressure and reduce the flow of blood during haemorrhage induced shock, 
the function of arteries is not to constrict in response to such circumstances. The presence 
of vasoconstriction in arteries is in fact an unnatural state that signals the physician that 
something has gone seriously awry in the body. It would seem that much of our willingness 
to accept aging as a natural process is parasitic upon this sense of natural function. 
If we consider the analogies presented this premise claims, then either: (a) death and aging 
have a purpose and substituting that job with anything else is unnatural, and/or (b) using aging 
and death for goals other than their purpose is unnatural, and/or (c) aging/death have a purpose 
and eliminating them will throw things out of balance, to an unnatural state. Caplan continues:   
The only distinction required for understanding the function of aging is that between the aim 
of explaining the existence of a particular state, organ, or process and that of explaining how 
a state, organ, or process works in a particular system or organism – If we ask what is the 
function, or role, or purpose of the spleen in the human body, the question can be interpreted 
in two ways: How does the spleen work—what does it do in the body? or Why does the 
spleen exist in its present state in the human body— what is the historical story that explains 
why persons have spleens? It is this latter sense of function, the historical sense, that is 
relevant to the determination of the naturalness or unnaturalness of aging as a biological 
process. (…) The determination of the naturalness of aging, if it is to be rooted in biology, 
will depend not on how the process of aging actually operates, but rather on the explanation 
one gives for the existence or presence of aging humans. This is the sense of naturalness that 
Kass, Fukuyama, and others must rely upon to make their case that extending life by 
conquering aging is wrong because it is unnatural. 
Here Caplan is explaining what I already alluded to in 1.8 – Delving Deeper into Aging, where 
I referred to a developmental biologist and an evolutionary biologist. The purpose of aging, if 
it exists, must be explained in evolutionary terms. The missing piece of the puzzle is to build a 
hypothesis about some purpose that aging serves. Caplan suggests the following: 
Particularly widespread in scientific circles, is that the purpose or function of aging is to 
clear away the old to make way for the new for evolutionary reasons. This theory was first 
advanced by the German cytologist and evolutionary biologist August Weisman (1891). 
Weisman argued that aging and debilitation must be viewed as adaptational responses on 
the part of organisms to allow for new mutational and adaptive responses to fluctuating 
environments. Aging benefits the population by removing the superannuated to make room 
for the young. 
                                                 
45 To be interpreted along the lines of equivalent premises. E.g. P6, P13, P20, P27. 
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Aging/death is supposed to make room for new generations. If aging/death ceased to be, 
something might go awry. The (c) interpretation above seems to be the one that fits best here. 
P29A1 – The first and obvious objection to P29 is to argue that it is false that aging has a 
purpose. As noted in 1.8 – Delving Deeper into Aging, aging is a by-product, so it serves no 
purpose. Caplan (2004) states that very clearly: 
The scientific explanation of aging as serving an evolutionary role or purpose is inadequate. 
It is simply not true that aging exists to serve any sort of evolutionary purpose or function. 
The claim that aging exists or occurs in individuals because it has a wider role or function 
in the evolutionary scheme of things rests on a faulty evolutionary analysis. There is nothing 
natural about aging and, contrary to the views of Kass, Fukuyama, and many others, aging 
is not a natural attribute of being human. 
And he goes on explaining the trade-off between reproduction and survival: “senescence has 
no function; it is simply the inadvertent subversion of organic function, later in life, in favor of 
maximizing reproductive advantage early in life.” More specifically he states that: 
Evolutionary selection rarely acts to advance the prospects of an entire species or population. 
Selection acts on individual organisms and their phenotypic traits and properties. Some traits 
or properties confer advantages in certain environments on the organisms that possess them, 
and this fact increases the likelihood that the genes responsible for producing these traits 
will be passed on to future organisms. Given that selective forces act on individuals and their 
genotypes and not on species, it makes no sense to speak of aging as serving an evolutionary 
function or purpose to benefit the species. 
P29A1A1 – Multilevel selection seems to be a controversial topic among evolutionary 
biologists, and although in the minority46 it seems hard to dismiss outright.  
P29A1A1A1 – Selfish gene theories seem sufficient to explain aging. Deep down there is a 
difference in the direction of causality. Does aging cause benefits, or do benefits cause aging? 
The former is supported with purposeful interpretations of aging – people die to leave room for 
young folks, i.e. not competing for resources. The latter states that because organisms traded 
off reproduction earlier on in their life for repair of their soma, aging occurs – they got a benefit, 
earlier reproduction, that caused aging. I will not advance this discussion here.47 
P*30 – Eliminating something natural is bad because it throws the system, which is part of, out 
of balance. This happens because natural is defined as having a purpose or function. 
P*30A1 – Eliminating something natural seems to be bad (or good) due to the possibility of 
certain consequences. It does not seem to be bad (or good) in itself. Eliminating the natural 
thing without throwing the system out of balance is not bad (or good). As such P*30 can be 
dismissed. What is bad (or good) are the consequences and those will be dealt with in their own 
arguments. If we consider that the purpose of aging here is to free resources for new 
                                                 
46 de Magalhães, 2011 states that “(…) group selection, which today is dismissed by most authorities (…)” 
47 To avoid confusion, the theory presented in 1.8 – Delving Deeper into Aging, is the classical evolutionary theory 
of ageing. 
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generations, then the 3.1.1 – Overpopulation Argument might be the appropriate route, if on 
the other hand we think it is for renewal, perhaps the 3.1.3 – Stagnation Argument is the way 
to go, and so on. The argument is not so much that eliminating aging is bad because aging had 
a purpose or is natural, it is that eliminating aging is bad because without it X will happen. 
P*30A2 – The value of eliminating something natural does not depend on something being 
eliminated, but on the overall value of the functioning system. Here, unlike in P*30A1, the 
system is disrupted, but it is argued that the moral judgement comes from how much people 
valued the system in the first place. For the same system, eliminating some natural mechanism 
that is a part of it can be either bad (good) or not bad (not good). An example is abortion, the 
disruption of pregnancy. Disrupting aging can be bad, but it can also be good. The mere 
disruption is not enough to conclude about its value. 
P*30A2A1 – ⸸.  
P*30A3 – Frame of reference makes this claim contradictory. Take for example contraception: 
using it is unnatural because it destroys the function of reproduction, but it is also unnatural to 
damage the contraception method to the point of failure (e.g. condom rupture), because it 
destroys the function of contraception.  
P*30A3A1 – One should look at the order of events. Continuing the example, the only way 
one can disrupt the function of contraception is if one is using it, which means that reproduction 
was already disrupted. In this case disruption of reproduction trumps the alternative. 
P*30A3A1A1 – If one goes down that route, then perhaps the whole human existence is a 
disruption to the ecosystems that already inhabited our planet. Perhaps we ought to remove 
ourselves from existence. 
P*30A4 – This claim is self-contradictory. Suppose that the elimination of something natural 
allows for the survival of other systems (abortion in the case of a lethal pregnancy). Then 
should one destroy the initial system and thus promoting evil, or should one let the other system 
fail, thus promoting evil? 
P*30A4A1 – This is not a fair assessment. The only two options in the parent object are: this 
bad thing will happen, or this bad thing will happen. No claim about the criteria of choosing 
between two bad things is made, just that the things are bad. Suppose the claim is: killing is 
bad. Having a situation where if you kill John, Mary survives, or if you do not kill John, Mary 
dies, is clearly not enough to attack the claim that killing is bad. Note the difference between 
P*30A4 and P*2A6. I accepted the latter but rejected this one. They both present exhaustive 
exclusive options (do normal/do change vs kill John/not kill John), but in P*2A6 the 
contradiction was directly in the options, whereas here the contradiction is between one option 
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and the consequence of the other. Since said consequence, Mary dying, is just a specific 
instance of not killing John, or in other words, not necessary, this is just an unfortunate 
coincidence. If on the other hand this consequence was necessarily tied with not killing John, 
then this argument would obtain. As it stands it amounts to cherry picking cases. 
C31 – I do not think that C31 holds. Although P29 should not be refused outright, since it is 
contested by a minority of specialists, it should not be considered a strong premise, since it is 
only contested by a minority of specialists. Regarding P*30 I believe P*30A4 fails without a 
doubt. I also think that P*30A2 is not enough. P*30A3 poses problems that might be solvable 
by a more precise definition of natural. P*30A1, in my opinion, does allow for the refusal of 
P*30, not because P*30 has something wrong with it, but rather because it has nothing wrong 
(or right) with it. I mean that it does not carry a criterion of value, it is instead parasitic upon 
other arguments. 
Let us grant C31 for the sake of argument. 
P32 – This is a true statement as explained in 1.2 – What is Immortality?. 
C33 – Given C31 and P32, C33 obtains. 
P34 – This claim states that there is nothing capable of replacing involuntary death. 
P34A1 – This obviously does not work if there are redundancies. Curiously, redundancies exist 
because eliminating some natural thing is bad. Once they are in place that is no longer the case. 
Adding to that is the fact that if there is the capacity to create redundancies, then P*30 goes out 
of the window. I will not discuss redundancies of aging/death here because, as stated above, 
they are specific to and dependent on the disruption considered (P*30A1). 
P34A2 – If less people age/die then there will be more people to solve wherever issues might 
arise. This argument will be explored in the 3.1.1 – Overpopulation Argument. 
PCBA – Ceteris paribus. 
C35 – It is difficult to judge C35 because both counters to P34A1 rely on other arguments. The 
objection P*30A1 still carries weight. 
-- 
Verdict: FAIL 
This argument fails not because there is a premise that is refused, but because it is an 
empty claim that relies on other arguments to base its value (P*30A1). As such it should be 
dismissed. The arguments that it is parasitic upon, should be considered on their own. 
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2.3.2 – Boredoom Argument 
P36: Boredom will inevitable set in at some point in a long enough life. 
P*37: Boredom is bad. 
C38 (P36+P*37): A long enough life will inevitably be bad. 
P39: Immortality implies a long enough life for boredom to set in. 
C40 (C38+P39): Immortality is bad. 
P41: The bad that boredom provides cannot be mitigated by replacement by direct 
replacement.48 
C42 (C40+P41+PCBA): Immortality is not desirable. 
P36: This premise states that an immortal person will wind up bored, simple because there will 
be nothing left to do. After doing everything that there is to do there will be nothing left. I think 
the word boredoom is a nice fit here, meaning: the doom of boredom. Here are some examples 
from the literature: 
Harris (2013): Three main sorts of philosophical or ethical objections have been leveled at life extension: (…) 
It would be pointless and ultimately unwanted because of the inevitable boredom of indefinite life. 
Hermerén (2013): Those who are optimistic in describing the future possibilities of science and play down the 
possibility of adverse side effects—including the boring prospects of living together for ever (…). 
Geddes (2004): The most common philosophical objection to radical life extension is that really long life would 
simply get too boring. (…) Perhaps we will simply run out of interesting things to do? Would we end up in a static 
world where there is nothing new under the sun? 
Here are instances of specific philosophers arguing the boredom argument: 
Overall (2003, 37): Human beings will run out of worthwhile things to do. (…)  Lucretius says, quite 
explicitly, “We are continually engaged and fixed in the same occupations; nor, by the prolongation of life, is any 
new pleasure discovered” (1997, 143) (…) According to this view, life’s enjoyments and gratifications are fixed 
and limited; if we live too long, we will have no choice but to simply repeat what we have already done, and such 
repetition would be boring and futile. 
Overall (2003, 38): Some people might want to “have eternal youth, to see the clock of the life cycle stopped 
at a particular point.” But the gratification of such a wish would not be good for us as individuals, says Callahan 
(1998), for “a life perpetually stuck at one stage” would “soon come to boredom and ennui, with the possibility 
of significant change arrested and frozen.” He adds that if, as is possible, one’s life did not go well at the particular 
stage at which one had chosen to arrest it, then the supposed benefit “would soon turn into a straitjacket. 
                                                 
48 To be interpreted along the lines of equivalent premises. See footnote 45. 
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Overall (2003, 144): John Donnelly (1994, 304) suggests that one of the main challenges of living forever 
would be that “our desires, wants, needs, interests, etc., are inherently exhaustible, and life in heaven would prove 
intolerable in the long run.” 
Overall (2003, 144): The result is boredom: “a boredom connected with the fact that everything that could 
happen and make sense to one particular human being . . . ha[s] already happened” (Williams 1975, 418) 
Post (2004): Kass, (…) asserts that in such a new world we will grow bored and tired of life, having "been 
there" and "done that”. 
Mellon (2004): Callahan cannot accept the idea that extending life could offer a guarantee of indefinite freedom 
from boredom and other problems associated with the aging process. 
Overall (2004): Daniel Callahan, who for 25 years has argued against increasing either the human life span or 
human life expectancy, states that there is no good case to show that a longer life would be better, for, he says, 
"More of the same is not, by itself, a very good argument" (Callahan, 1977, p. 37)  
Kass (2004): After a while, no matter how healthy we are, no matter how respected and well placed we are 
socially, most of us cease to look upon the world with fresh eyes. Little surprises us, nothing shocks us, righteous 
indignation at injustice dies out. We have seen it all already, seen it all. 
Blackford (2004) - Most of us fear death, to a greater or lesser extent, though some philosophers believe that 
we would do well to accept it and to fear any prospect of immortality. Bernard Williams, in particular, has argued 
that we would eventually suffer unbearable boredom, and come to welcome death. 
P36A1 – The first obvious counter to the argument is to argue that this premise is an empirical 
claim, that needs to be tested. In other words, to prove that is true that we will get bored we 
need to develop immortality anyways. This argument is similar with P*9.1A5. 
P36A1A1 – If we have good reasons to believe that something will happen then trying to prove 
it by making happen might not be a good idea. Suppose that the claim was: nuclear weapons 
have the power to wipe-out humanity. Going out to prove this with empirical data might not 
end up good for us since the first observation could well be the last one. As such using the data 
available to infer for the future is the reasonable thing to do. And data shows that old people, 
those who are more likely to become bored, according to this argument, do indeed get bored 
of life. It will be a matter of time until it gets to us all. As Hartogh (2013) states: 
We are talking about explicit and permanent death wishes of old people who do not have 
any life-threatening illness and do not suffer severely from pain, breathlessness or other 
physical symptoms. (…) In the Netherlands such death wishes are by now commonly 
referred to as cases of a completed life. I do not like that euphemism. (…) Because I need a 
name for the class of cases I will discuss, I will normally refer to them as tired-of-life cases. 
(…) How often do old people long for death? Research in several European countries 
consistently gives us percentages of 15–20 % of the older population. 
P36A1A1A1 – This amounts to a fallacy of equivocation. Remember the distinction made in 
1.7 – What is Aging?, regarding the two meanings of aging. People get tired of life because 
they age in the capability meaning of aging, not because they age in the chronological sense. 
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Because UI aging in the capability sense will not happen, it follows that the observed cases of 
supposed boredoom will no longer obtain. Here is Hartogh again: 
According to recent insight aging is a process of accumulated random damage to a complex 
system which as a result gradually loses its reserve capacity, hence its ability to 
compensation and to recovery from stress. As a result there is an increase and accumulation 
of diseases and ailments, and an acceleration of both the increase and the accumulation. 
These afflictions include arthritis, Parkinson’s disease, glaucoma, macula degeneration, 
diabetes, stomach problems, heart attack, stroke, hypertension, flu, broken hip, broken 
bones, infections of the urinary tract, dementia, angina, incontinence, impotence, problems 
with teeth and feet, with vision and hearing, as well as depressive symptoms. The process 
results in an increase of functional disabilities which has the same ‘cascade’ characteristics 
of accelerated increase and accumulation. These include difficulties with eating, dressing, 
walking around, climbing stairs, getting in and out of bed, bathing, toileting, using the 
telephone, going out, shopping, cooking, doing light house work, reading, looking 
television, taking medicine and managing money, but also sleeplessness, daytime 
drowsiness, fatigue, loss of energy, loss of appetite, anxiety, anhedony and other negative 
affective states (…) This process of aging is the causal background of the emergence of 
the characteristic death wishes of the elderly (emphasis mine). The most prominent 
factors seem to be declined eyesight, hearing and mobility, as well as depressive symptoms. 
The effect of these factors is reinforced by other losses, of energy, memory and 
concentration etc. It is true that often biographical factors are also relevant, the loss of a 
partner, of a job or of other meaningful occupations, of peers, all of which may result in a 
sense of emptiness and loneliness, often made worse by disappointment about the perceived 
lack of attention. and care from significant others (Rurup et al. 2011). But the effect of such 
factors is often dependent on functional disabilities. When you lose your comrades when 
you are 30, you may be able to build a new social network, but probably not when you are 
90. 
P36A2 – This premise says more about its bearer than about immortality. Arguing that 
immortality will lead to boredom is really just saying <immortality will be boring for me>. The 
claim is something similar to <I do not like cinema therefore movies should not exist>. Harris 
(2013) states: 
Suffice it to say that only the terminally boring are in danger of being terminally bored, and 
perhaps they do not deserve indefinite life. (…) But those of us who do not have terminal 
failure of the imagination should be left to create new ways of enjoying life and doing good. 
And Minsky (2004) seems to have detected a pattern: 
When I decided to write this article, I tried these ideas out on several groups and had them 
respond to informal polls. I was amazed to find that at least three quarters of the audience 
seemed to feel that our life spans were already too long. Why would anyone want to live for 
five hundred years? Would not it be boring?(…) I find it rather worrisome that so many 
people are resigned to die. (…) My scientist friends showed few such concerns. “There are 
countless things that I want to find out, and so many problems I want to solve, that I could 
use many centuries,” they said. 
P36A2A1 – ⸸. 
P36A3 – Even if immortality would amount to more of the same, that does not mean people 
would not enjoy it. There seems to be some activities that are always pleasurable, as Overall 
(2003, 146) explains: 
Boredom is not a necessary and inevitable result of the repetition of experiences. Williams 
appears to acknowledge this point, indirectly, when he comments that the sole condition 
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under which an immortal might conceivably be able to avoid impending boredom would be 
if he were to have an “impoverishment” of consciousness, for, Williams claims, “not being 
bored can be a sign of not noticing, or not reflecting, enough.” (…) This description of the 
absence of boredom certainly makes sense when applied to nonhuman animals. A dog, for 
example, wakes up each morning with apparent eagerness and enthusiasm. As on every other 
day, he is excited about the prospect of having breakfast and going for a walk, two of the 
most pleasurable activities in his life. (…) Might a human being enjoy the same sort of 
immunity from boredom in the repetition of certain experiences that nonhuman animals 
possess? Momeyer (1988, 19) suggests, “Consider satisfaction of the basic biological drives: 
so long as appetite remains strong, food and sexual union remain satisfying. It is in the very 
nature of such desires that they are self-renewing, never once and for all satiated and 
abandoned.” So some experiences, at least those related to fundamental biological drives, 
could be repeated indefinitely without boredom’s being the inevitable outcome.  
P36A3A1 – This does not sound very promising. Should we dumb ourselves down and be like 
a dog who never gets bored? Williams seems to be right. The dog does not get bored because 
it is not reflecting about itself. So this argument has a catch: we have to forego intelligence to 
avoid boredoom, taking the old adage <ignorance is bliss> to an extreme. Overall (2003, 143): 
Now it is not clear whether our limitations as human beings and our ability to return to the 
same activities over and over would, in and by themselves, be sufficient to rescue an 
immortal human being of ordinary intelligence and perspicuity from the tedium of eternal 
boredom. Individuals suffering from certain sorts of senility can always be content with 
repeating an activity over and over again. Because of the failure of their memory and 
intellect, the activity continues to retain the original enjoyment it held for them. But such a 
life would likely seem pointless to those without such impairments. (…) So I am not entirely 
convinced that the mere repetition of certain categories of activities, however pleasurable 
they may once have been, would not result in stultifying boredom during a lifetime of 
eternity. 
P36A4 – Those who argue for this premise are correct in that the amount of stuff that there is 
to do is finite. But being a finite amount is irrelevant to judge the claim that we will eventually 
be able do everything there is to do. What is really at stake is a matter of rates, namely the rate 
at which we can do stuff must be greater than the rate of growth of stuff to do. We need to be 
able to catch up – in technical terms, converge. Take this simple model. Assume each person 
has 10 units of time per day and can only read or write. Suppose it spends 1 unit of time writing 
and 9 units of time reading. We only need 9 more persons to break even49. Two more and we 
will be unable to read everything that there is to read. Now imagine the plethora of activities 
that there are. Furthermore, new types of activities continuously pop up, e.g. space exploration 
is a relatively new activity. It is not clear that convergence will be achieved. Overall (2003, 
150-153) proposes some activities where convergence seems difficult to obtain: 
Is it so far-fetched to suppose that a deep understanding of this infinite universe would take 
an eternity? (…) Another example of an unending and boredom-defying activity is the quest 
for wisdom or enlightenment. In many traditions, the fulfillment of that quest is thought to 
require many lifetimes. An immortal life on earth appears to provide the opportunity for 
                                                 
49 Assuming people write at the same speed as they read. This obviously is not the case, but the example can be 
modified to accommodate this fact without changing the overall conclusions. I did not model this feature for 
simplicity’s sake. 
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taking seriously the pursuit of satori. My point here is just that a view like that of Williams 
assumes far too hastily that any immortal individual, of whatever moral caliber, would 
inevitably and easily become bored. Those for whom moral integrity matters would find 
more than adequate challenges. 
P36A4A1 – Even granting that the rate at which stuff grows is greater than the rate at which 
we do stuff, and that there are infinite things to do, in the end it will not matter. The Ross-
Littlewood paradox can be applied here: even if for each 10 new activities one adds, we can 
only do one, in the end we would end up doing every one of them.  
P36A4A1A1 – The paradox is not applicable here because we do not have bounded time 
constrains, i.e. a supertask, in this case there is no end to doing different stuff. Infinity is not a 
place one can be, one is always at a determined point in spacetime. 
P36A4A2– Differing from P36A4A1, here it is claimed that with an infinite amount of time 
the finite amount of things to do will be done. In extremis, the claim is that every permutation 
of particles in space will happen. In the exemplified model, every permutation of words will 
happen and as such everything that there is to read will be read.  
P36A4A2A1 – Current physics does not seem to posit such a possibility due to the heat death 
of the universe. There is not enough time. 
P36A4A2A1A1 – Using the heat death of the universe in an argument defeats the concept of 
immortality. Although science is subject to never ending revision, one should not make reality 
what one would wish it to be, i.e. denying the heat death of the universe. Nevertheless this is 
the prediction further in time that we can possibly make and as such it should carry an 
extremely low confidence. We have not completed physics yet, we do not know what 
technology will be like in a few billion years, and we have not yet fully explored the universe. 
It is possible to conceive of states of affairs where this problem does not obtain or is solvable 
such as: the laws of physics are different in other places of the universe, or there are several 
universes, or time travel is actualized, or we might live inside a simulation, or 
timeconsciousness scaling is implemented as Geddes (2004) suggests below. In any case that 
is not an urgent problem to solve as other causes of death are. 
Even if the universe comes to an end, it may still be possible for life to survive forever. In 
1979, English physicist Freeman Dyson published a paper in which he argued that even in 
a universe with finite energy an intelligent being could still think an infinite number of 
thoughts. He considered the case where the universe kept expanding, but started to ‘die’ as 
useable energy ran out. He found that as the universe grew colder and colder advanced 
beings could still live forever by thinking thoughts at a slower and slower rate. 
P36A5 – Another counter to boredoom is to simply alter ourselves so that it never catches up. 
As Geddes (2004) exclaims: 
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Once technology becomes advanced enough to radically extend human lifespan, it is likely 
that technology will also be advanced enough to radically alter the minds and bodies of those 
who desire it. 
Overall (2003, 166) also seems to consider this argument, completing upon Geddes: 
There is an important objection to this argument that the body’s limitations would eventually 
doom the desirability of immortality. Current and prospective research, as well as some 
science-fiction stories, suggests that perhaps we should not too hastily assume that the 
human body must necessarily have limited capacities, especially in an immortal person. 
Perhaps also we should contemplate the possibility of replacing an individual’s body parts 
not with a succession of qualitatively identical or similar parts but rather with a succession 
of different and possibly superior organs. If we imagine a future in which body technologies 
are far advanced, then the material environments created would allow one to select new 
body parts or additions in order to become the painter or basketball star one always wanted 
to be. Thus the human being would achieve eternal life as a cyborg. 
P36A5A1 – We can only improve humans so much until we have to deal with upgrading or 
substituting the brain (or whatever the physical structures that constitute or instance the 
individual according to the variety of metaphysics one endorses). The problem is that we enter 
into consciousness and personal identity territory, issues that I wish to avoid discussing here. 
P36A6 – We could eliminate the feeling of boredom and thus solve the problem. I am talking 
about eliminating the sensation itself in the same way the numbing shot the doctor gives us 
when performing surgery eliminates pain. 
P36A6A1 – Assuming boredom is not pleasurable/desirable is still not enough for arguing for 
its elimination. Let us look at physical pain as an example. Assuming, in a normal 
circumstance, no one wants to feel pain can still give space to defend that pain is useful or 
desirable. Pain gives us information when something goes awry with our body, so we do not 
wreck more damage and instead tend to its source. It is not pleasurable, but it is useful – it is 
our own warning system. The same can be said about boredoom. 
P36A6A1A1 – Suppose we could build an app to get us more information about the state of 
our body than pain does. This allows us to have the cake and eat it: access to the information 
without the miserable sensation. 
P36A6A1A1A1 – This can work for boredom, but not for boredoom, since the argument is 
claiming that it will set in forever regardless of how we get informed of the matter. It is not the 
symptoms that matter, but their cause. 
P36A7 – A different suggestion is to make pauses to alleviate boredom. Overall (2003, 149): 
[Note 24] Sue Donaldson has suggested that another way around the problem of boredom 
would be to imagine a life of consciousness interspersed with long “timeouts,” during which 
one would rest and recover, and then one would reawake to a world different from the past 
and hence sufficiently stimulating as to obviate boredom. Cf. Heinlein 1973, 106 
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P36A7A1 – Even if this procedure goes into effect it does not cause much damage to the 
boredoom argument. It will only take longer to achieve boredoom.  
P*37 – Boredom, by definition, is something that people should not want. This is a trivial 
premise, and I will grant it easily. 
C38 - P*37 is granted. Regarding P36, P36A6, P36A2 and P36A7 fail. P36A3 either fails or 
has the same fate as P36A5 due to involving consciousness tweaking. And because I prefer to 
err on the side of caution I will consider P36A5 unsuccessful, since it enters into discussions 
about consciousness and personal identity. But if P36 means something like P36A4A2 there is 
still room to evade both of these attacks. I am not comfortable in exploiting P36A4 and prefer 
instead to wait and see. In any case confirming the heat death of the universe or that boredoom 
obtains will lead to consider P36A1, which makes the argument moot.  
P39 – As with the previous arguments this premise brings immortality to the argument. It is 
stated that immortality will bring with it a very long life. 
P39A1 – This premise is simply not true. Immortality can but needs not bring with it a very 
long life. UI individuals can die whenever they please50. The question “do you want to be 
immortal?” should not be interpreted as “do you want to live forever?”. First because 
immortality is having the option of living more, immortality is not choosing the option of living 
more. This is explored in detail 2.4.1 – Optionality Argument. And secondly, this is not a black 
and white matter, and so the choice is not between everything or nothing. The choice is if one 
wants a marginal day (or other unit of time). So the question <do you want to be immortal> 
should instead be read as <do you want the option to live tomorrow?> This is what is meant by 
bringing death inside the scope of things one controls. Being immortal is having the option to 
continue alive each day. If someone decides they are bored and do not want to live anymore, 
they are free to do so. There is nothing in the concept of immortality stopping people of doing 
just that. But until people are bored, immortality has value. Harry (2013) sums it up nicely: 
“those who are bored can, thanks to their vulnerability, opt out at any time”, and Overall (2003, 
130): “Nothing inherent in the concept of immortality entails that one would lack the option to 
end one’s life whenever it became advisable to do so.” 
C40 – P39 is destroyed by P39A1 and as such C40 does not obtain. Immortality cannot be bad 
since it only gives people the option to continue alive, allowing opting out in case of boredoom.  
                                                 
50 Immortality of level 4, or invulnerability, allows for eternal sleep – the equivalent to death in immortality of 
level 3. However instead of eternal sleep I believe contracts that put people to sleep for a limited time, say 5 or 50 
years (see P36A7), with the ability for renewal at each wake-up will be more common, since they allow more 
choice/less risk. And these can also happen in immortality of level 3. In the case boredoom does inevitably obtain 
we will know it wasn’t because of lack of empirical testing. 
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Let us grant C40 for the sake of argument: 
P41 – This premise states that there is nothing UI, capable of replacing the damage of 
immortality. 
P41A1  - Immortality is reversible. See P6A1, P13A1. This in essence restates P39A1. We 
could, for example, reinstate a law to mandate the death of everyone in order to simulate the 
pre-immortality state of affairs 
P41A1A1 – But we would be killing persons. 
P41A1A1A1 – It is no different than disallowing life extension. The point is that either way 
we decided to not allow people to live more than a certain number of years, regardless of what 
we name this decision. This is explored in detail in 3.1.1.7 – Counter 6: Reducing D via P: The 
Death Rate. 
PCBA – Ceteris paribus. 
C42 – P41A1 allows for the dismissal of P41. C42 does not obtain. 
-- 
Verdict: FAIL 
 According to C38 it is not clear if boredoom will set in. In any case, if we want to find 
out we ought to actualize immortality, making the argument moot. In addition to this, P39A1 
annihilates this argument. Even if boredom sets in there is no mandate to endure it and until 
then immortality has value. P41A1 also shows that immortality is reversible. 
 
2.3.3 – Deadline Argument 
P43: Death gives meaning to life. 
P*44: Life without meaning is bad. 
C45 (P43+P*44): Life without death is bad. 
P46: Immortality eliminates involuntary death. 
C47 (C45+C47): Immortality is bad. 
P48: There is no way of replacing the meaning of life UI. 
C49 (C47+P48+PCBA): Immortality is not desirable. 
P43: First things first: allow me to go beyond the obscure meaning of the expression <meaning 
of life> that I used here. I intended it to be a short placeholder. By this expression I mean that 
there is a desire to do something and to act upon it. Lack of meaning in life here does not mean 
that one lacks goals to achieve, only that it will not act upon them. It is only as if one has no 
goals to achieve. But what has death to do with wanting to act upon our goals? The reasoning 
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is an analogy with the typical deadline of a task. The main motivation for someone to end a 
certain task is because there is a deadline. Had the deadline been further in time, the motivation 
to complete the task would have been less, and in the case that no deadline existed, there would 
be no reason to perform the task. Death works as the ultimate deadline51. We do things because 
we have the deadline approaching us. If we had no deadline there was no motivation to do 
anything since we could always postpone whatever we set out to achieve. Furthermore, because 
we have the deadline, we are unable to do everything so choosing our path in life is a 
meaningful decision: we have to leave things out in the process of achieving others. If we had 
no deadline, meaningful decisions would not exist since we could eventually do everything 
there is to do. Here are some examples from the literature: 
Overall (2003, 144) - If we were immortal, we could legitimately postpone every action forever. It would be 
of no consequence whether or not we did a thing now; every act might just as well be done tomorrow or the day 
after or a year from now or ten years hence”. Nuland (1994, 87) says, “The fact that there is [now] a limited right 
time to do the rewarding things in our lives is what creates urgency to do them. Otherwise, we might stagnate in 
procrastination.” Such a person, then, has no good reason to do anything at any particular point; he simply exists 
from day to day. 
Wade (2004) - The ethicist Leon Kass, then of the University of Chicago and now the chairman of the 
President’s Council on Bioethics, says that “to argue that human life is better without death is to argue that human 
life would be better without being human. The finitude of human life, in his view, “is a blessing for every 
individual whether he knows it or not.” Kass’s belief is that death gives meaning to life and that without a clear 
end point we would accomplish nothing—a point familiar enough to journalists, whose productivity depends on 
firm deadlines. Though I do not think Kass would win an election on this prodeath platform, his reservations 
cannot be airily dismissed. 
Geddes (2004) - A philosophical objection to life extension is the worry that the longer we lived, the less we 
would value our time. After all, a basic economic principle is that the value of a resource tends to increase the 
scarcer it is. 
Binstock (2004a) - Jonas, (…), meant to cast significant doubt on the anti-aging enterprise. "Perhaps," he 
wrote, "a nonnegotiable limit to our expected time is necessary for each of us as the incentive to number our days 
and make them count". (…) [Kass asserts] that our numbered days encourage a creative depth in our humanity—
a depth that escaped so many of the immortal Greek gods and goddesses, whose often debauched and purposeless 
behavior made Plato wish to ban them from the ideal Republic. (…) The brevity of life makes it worth living; 
only allotted time makes time precious. We dread death, but as the existentialists write, this forces us to examine 
our lives. Did I achieve meaningful goals? Was my life in some sense justified? 
                                                 
51 Unlike the made-up word boredoom that captures the essence of the previous argument, here deadline, an 
already existing word seems to be a perfect match. 
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Allen (2004) - Many people in fact do not live long enough to become weary of this life; many who do live a 
long life do not feel that this life cannot satisfy their aspirations. But this may well be because our life is in fact of 
limited duration. Because there is only a limited time, what we do have remains sweet, fascinating, and engaging. 
P43A1 – Let us take for granted that the meaning of life comes from having a deadline, as the 
authors suggest. The further into the future we push the deadline (with extensions of the life 
span), the less of the following: value of time, meaningful decisions, and will to be active. The 
meaning of life fades away as we live longer lives, to the point of going to zero if we do not 
have death imposed on us. But if this is all true, then by reducing the amount of life one 
currently has, the more meaningful life becomes. Ending life at 40 will make those 40 years 
much more meaningful than living until 80, or 120. However, none of the authors proposing 
the deadline argument committed suicide at 40 (or at any other age in order to have a reduced 
life span and as such a more meaningful life). What gives? 
P43A1A1 – There is a fundamental difference between having a more or less defined amount 
of life, be it 80, 160, or 1500 years, and having an undefined amount based on agency. 
P43A1A1A1 – As soon as the question of immortality is on the table, every death is the result 
of agency. Suicide is all there is. Wanting to die in the same way as people die today is a 
voluntary expression of wanting to be death in a specific way and no different from an 
individual who wants to kill himself in another specific way. There is no difference between 
the cases written above: the defined amount of life that one has is the result of one’s agency. 
See 2.4.1 – Optionality Argument. 
P43A2 – We remember people not because they died but because of what they achieved. 
Meaning then does not come from death but from completed goals. If we live more, we have 
the possibility of achieving more and thus have a more meaningful life. Such is the argument 
of Overall (2003, 150): 
The belief that death, or at least the prospect of death, is necessary to give meaning to human 
existence elevates personal extinction over personal projects in a way that ignores the real 
significance we attribute to human lives. Certainly, we remember outstanding human beings 
not because they died or even because their dying gave meaning to their life but largely 
because of the projects, relationships, and activities they engaged in while alive. Infinite life 
would seemingly provide the potential for an indefinite number of projects, all of which 
could come to fruition. 
P43A2A1 – This answer misses the point of the argument. Even if there is more time to achieve 
more goals, the argument states that there is no urge to do them exactly because we live longer. 
And if no objective gets completed, in the extreme case of a very long life, then no meaning 
was achieved. Because extending life makes us lazy, so to speak, it will be impossible to 
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generate meaning from accomplishments. The reason we engage in “projects, relationships and 
activities” is because the deadline exists. 
P43A3 – The claim that people are only motivated if they have deadlines is not universal among 
people. The argument is related to P36A2. From my experience, most of the time when people 
set out to achieve something they are not doing it because they have their own deaths in mind. 
In fact, children young enough to have no concept of death, still have motivation to pursue 
whatever is they set out to achieve. 
P43A3A1 – That is because one did not go deep enough in exploring the implicit motivations 
to act. It needs not be conscious. 
P43A3A1A1 – It seems that in order to settle the matter one needs empirical testing. This 
means subscribing to P43A5. 
P43A3A1A2 – But if it does not need to be conscious then what reasons do we have to believe 
that UI this unconscious hardcoded motivator will update and become conscious? The 
motivation to eat high fat, high carb foods did not stop when an abundant supply of food was 
available. In the same way the unconscious motivator to act will still “think” we are dead prone. 
P43A4 – It seems that not every activity needs this type of motivation. As long as there is one 
activity that does not need the deadline then the premise fails, i.e. an activity whose completion 
goes beyond the amount of life one expects to live. Candidates to this are: advancing human 
knowledge, pursuing moral betterment, etc. See the second quote in P36A2. It seems that even 
Kass (2004), one that opposes life extension, recognizes this objection: 
How, then, might our finitude be good for us? I offer four benefits. (…) Second, seriousness 
and aspiration. Could life be serious or meaningful without the limit of mortality? Is not the 
limit on our time the ground of our taking life seriously and living it passionately? To know 
and to feel that one goes around only once, and that the deadline is not out of sight, is for 
many people the necessary spur to the pursuit of something worthwhile. "Teach us to 
number our days," says the Psalmist, "that we may get a heart of wisdom." To number our 
days is the condition for making them count. Homer's immortals— Zeus and Hera, Apollo 
and Athena—for all their eternal beauty and youthfulness, live shallow and rather frivolous 
lives, their passions only transiently engaged, in first this and then that. They live as 
spectators of the mortals, who by comparison have depth, aspiration, genuine feeling, and 
hence a real center in their lives. Mortality makes life matter. There may be some activities, 
especially in some human beings, that do not require finitude as a spur (emphasis mine). 
A powerful desire for understanding can do without external proddings, let alone one related 
to mortality; and as there is never too much time to learn and to understand, longer, more 
vigorous life might be simply a boon. The best sorts of friendship, too, seem capable of 
indefinite growth, especially where growth is somehow tied to learning—though one may 
wonder whether real friendship does not depend in part on the shared perceptions of a 
common fate. But, in any case, I suspect that these are among the rare exceptions. For most 
activities, and for most of us, I think it is crucial that we recognize and feel the force of not 
having world enough and time. 
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This quote has special significance for two reasons: first, Kass undermines his own position by 
recognizing a fatal flaw, and second, the citations mentioning Kass in P43 lack charity since 
they did not give him credit for undermining his own position. 
P43A5 – This premise is an empirical claim and as such needs empirical proof. This argument 
is similar to P36A1. This counter makes the deadline argument irrelevant in pragmatic terms 
since it amounts to the pursuit of immortality. 
P43A6 – This premise misunderstands the origin of opportunity costs. What this premise 
entails is that because we have OCs in our decisions, we attribute value to time, and meaning 
to decisions. OCs are caused by our limited time alive, hence the motivation to act upon on our 
desires to not waste the precious time we have left. If I only have 80 years on this planet, there 
is only so much I can do, and in doing X I am giving up doing Y. The flaw is in thinking that 
eliminating the restriction to the quantity of time we have alive, we also eliminate OCs 
completely. There is at least another cause of OCs, not as pronounced it is clear, that still 
operates UI. The world is constantly changing states with the passage of time. Each unit of 
time is unique in that it corresponds to a world state. So me doing X now will be tied to this 
unique world state and doing it tomorrow will be tied with different world state. If I do X now, 
I am giving up the ability to do Y with this world state.  
P43A6A1 - Why does this matter? Is it that much of difference if I read a book today or 
tomorrow? I will have eternity. 
P43A6A1A1 – Although some activities in some circumstances can do away with this 
consideration, others cannot. That is because they are tied to a particular world state. Here are 
some examples: (i) eating that slice of pizza today or in a week is relevant because it can get 
moldy, (ii) wanting to go to Mars today or when there is an ideal launch window that allows 
our spaceship to slingshot itself on the gravity of celestial objects is relevant, (iii) wanting to 
go ski in the summer or in the winter is relevant, (iv) wanting to enjoy that trail in the forest 
now or after it is destroyed for “development” or because a volcano erupted is relevant, (v) 
wanting to be a part of the Islamic State now or in 2 years from now is relevant, and so on. 
P43A6A1A1A1 – This concern is alleviated because many features of the world are cyclical, 
such as the seasons, the orbit of the earth and surrounding celestial objects, etc. 
P43A6A1A1A1A1 – Alleviated it may be, but it is not eliminated. Some things belong to the 
past. Those, when they were in the present, were unique (not cyclical) opportunities. Examples 
such as extinct species, extinct civilizations/cultures/languages, changes in our landscape, a 
specific relationship constellation, being the first to achieve something, etc. And if we are 
considering conjunctions of activities such as doing X while doing Y, then concerns with these 
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types of OCs are increased. Being the president of European Council and the current Olympic 
weightlifting champion is a feat that must take into account these sorts of OCs UI. 
P43A7 – We could, similarly to what was suggested in P36A5, alter ourselves, so as to change 
our motivation system to not rely on the deadline.  
P43A7A1 - But the same objections to P36A5 apply. If we alter our psychology to forget about 
the deadline, what will happen to personal identity? Perhaps there is an easy case to be made 
that it will not be a problem, people change their mind about stuff all the time. However, I 
prefer not to engage in this discussion and err on the side of caution by considering the parent 
object not a good counter. Perhaps in a future text I will explore this question. 
P43A8 – There is a large number of people that believe in eternal life and still do not suffer the 
effects proposed in this premise. Religious folks are a great example. See 4.1 – Dealing with 
PCBA: Is Immortality Desirable?. 
P*44 – This premise states that it is bad to live without the meaningfulness of having to make 
decisions about what to do, about valuing time and about accomplishing goals. 
P*44A1 – If the decisions are meaningful because they are serious, in the sense that they will 
not have insignificant consequences (e.g. high OCs), then it is doubtful that this is valuable. It 
is a negative thing to experience stress in deciding what to do. This seems precisely what 
happens when we have to allocate our limited time to a number of desired goals. If one wants 
to be very good at playing football, one’s most likely will not be very good at advancing 
theoretical physics, and vice-versa, because there is not enough time for both. A choice is to be 
made between every possible project that a current normal life can accommodate. And this, 
supposedly, gives meaning to our life and as such is a good thing. But one can construct plenty 
of cases where serious decisions have to be made and no one would consider it a good thing to 
have to make the decision: should you save your wife/husband from homicide, or save your 
children from the same fate? No one doubts that it is a serious choice. And the consequences 
are not insignificant, there are high OCs involved. But should we say that this decision will 
give meaning to one’s life and that after the fact we will appreciate more our choices? It seems 
nuts! Clearly, people would, in most cases, not want to choose, they do not want anyone to die. 
The same can be thought of the choices that make our life supposedly meaningful, having to 
choose because our current constraints can be said to be undesirable.  
P*44A1A1 – One can also frame choices as a good thing. A kid that has to choose between 
strawberry ice-cream or a ride in the carousel when wanting both can learn to not take choices 
lightly, correctly valuing one’s time/resources and make the most of what one has. 
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P*44A1A1A1 – But the need to <not take choices lightly, correctly valuing one’s 
time/resources and make the most of what one has> is only important because of the deadline. 
So deep down, there is a disagreement between those who believe that the deadline will teach 
us all to not be spoiled brats, and those who think it is an unwarranted source of stress and 
enclosure. Perhaps both effects operate simultaneously, and the net outcome is unknown. Or 
perhaps the net effect is different for different people (see P43A3). If that is the case, then this 
argument fails because it is only valid for some people. 
P*44A1A2 - ⸸ 
C45 – Regarding P43, P43A2 and P43A7 fail. P43A1 shows that no author has skin in the 
game, making suspiciousness warranted. P43A4 further complicates matters as it even shows 
an opponent of immortality conceding. I do believe that P43A6, allows for the refusal of P43, 
as it shows a fundamental flaw with the argument. Furthermore P43A8 shows empirical 
evidence that supports a falsification. To save the argument from it one needs to endorse P43A5 
and take notice of P43A3. This results in the elimination of pragmatic differences, i.e. 
immortality will be pursued. Summing up, P43 can be rejected both by P43A6, or by the combo 
P43A8-P43A5-P43A3. I do not believe we can discard P*44 based on P*44A1. 
C45A1 – The argument is invalid. If there is another source of meaning besides death, then 
C45 does not obtain.  
C45A1A1 - P43 can be mended to state that death is the only source of meaning. 
C45A1A1A1 - P43A8 offers a good objection to this change. Either the consequences of the 
deadline are false, or there are other sources of meaning apart from death. 
Let us grant C45, for the sake of argument:  
P46 - This is a true statement as explained in 1.2 – What is Immortality?. 
C47 – Since UI death is not eliminated, but a matter of agency, and if death is the source of 
meaning (P43) without which life is bad (P*44), then, given P46, immortality being bad is also 
a matter of agency. More specifically, for immortality to be bad it requires the agent not to plan 
his own death, i.e. to create its own deadline. Immortality being bad unconditionally (C47) 
does not obtain.  
C47A1 – If the only outcome of having immortality is the possibility of not setting a deadline, 
then certainly it is something bad, since it is granted that living without a deadline is bad. 
Although there is the possibility that everyone chooses to set their own deadline, even if one 
person does not do it, then it is sufficient to consider immortality bad. In a world of several 
billion agents, it is highly likely that it will happen – there are plenty of cases of people acting 
against their better judgement (e.g. smoking, obesity, etc). 
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C47A1A1 – What this counter misses is that immortality brings the option of setting the 
deadline as far into the future as one wishes. This means that there is no restriction that it be 
our current life expectancy or life span. This can be good if the point is to maximize the 
meaningfulness of life. To do that the deadline must be set in order to achieve a perfect balance 
between motivation and achievements. The further into the future one sets the deadline the 
more achievements one has access to, but less motivation will be available. Without 
immortality this means eliminating a degree of freedom and thus not be as optimal at 
maximizing meaningfulness. 
P48 – This premise states that there is nothing UI, capable of replacing the damage of 
immortality. 
P48A1 – P41A1 applies here without modification. 
P48A2 – P36A7 although unsuccessful in the previous argument can be used here. The 
deadline problem can be avoided if UI, there are several deadlines. Living 100 years, and then 
hibernating for 100 years in succession could provide the sort of benefits of the deadline. This 
makes use of the flaw detected in P43A6 – when one wakes up the world will be significantly 
different, enough to break the continuity to the time at the start of hibernation. 
PCBA – Ceteris paribus. 
C49 – Both P48A1 and P48A2 are opposition enough to make C49 not obtain. 
-- 
Verdict: FAIL 
 This argument is full of holes. P43A6 seems to be the principal culprit of the failure of 
this argument both by directly cutting the path to C45, and by indirectly (through P48A2) 
cutting the path to C49. The triad P43A8-P43A5-P43A3 also shows problems with the 
argument by either pointing to empirical evidence to attempt falsification or by requiring more 
empirical evidence, in which case the argument is moot. C45A1A1A1 also seems to bring 
additional obstacles that the argument cannot overcome (one of them being the already 
mentioned P43A8). Ditto for C47A1A1. And if any doubts remain P48A1 shows that 
immortality is reversible.  
It is no wonder that no author has put skin in the game (P43A1). Being consistent with 
their own written word is too much trouble. Curiously for the advocates of immortality the 
existence of the deadline is effectively the motivation they require to do away with it. It will 
measure the failure or success of their endeavour. One might ask if these people do away with 
the deadline how will they be motivated to do anything else, once they achieved their objective? 
I answer this question in 4.3.4 – The Ultimate Argument for Immortality (and Ethics). 
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2.4 – Arguments in Support of Immortality 
2.4.1 – Optionality Argument 
P50: Immortality increases the range of options. 
P*51: Having more options is good. 
C52 (P50+P*51+PCBA): Immortality is desirable. 
P50 – To fully understand this claim I will need to present some clarifications on what it means 
to be immortal, or what exactly does immortality entail. It is not uncommon to find instances 
of confusion between, wanting to live forever, and wanting to be immortal. Although related 
they are not the same thing. Immortality is having the option (i.e. ability) to live forever, but as 
is with any option (or ability) its use is not necessary. Wanting to live forever requires 
immortality, but the converse is not true. One could want to be immortal but not want to live 
forever. This would be the case for those who would opt out of life at some point. Surely today 
people can opt out of life at any point or decide to continue on living, are they not immortal in 
some sense? The answer is no. While it is true that people have the option of suicide for some 
period of time, there will be a point in their future where the option does no longer obtain: this 
usually happens at around 80 years of age with an event that we call death. At this point in time 
there is no choice, the person just dies, regardless of her own will. This involuntary death is 
contrary to the concept of immortality and thus the person is said to not be immortal. A different 
case would be if the person had the option to continue on living but chose instead not to. This 
voluntary death is not contrary to the concept of immortality and the person can be said to be 
immortal, provided that, contrafactually, the option to remain alive would obtain indefinitely. 
An interesting case then occurs. Once immortality treatments are available to all who want 
them, everyone becomes immortal, regardless if they enrol in the treatment or not. Not 
enrolling in the treatment is opting out of life (i.e. suicide). Those who opt out are said to be 
immortal because the option to go on living existed (indefinitely). One should consider the 
choice of refusing to participate in immortality treatments a suicide no different from any other 
suicide, apart from the fact that people have different preferences to instantiate their own death: 
some would prefer to jump out of a bridge, others shooting a bullet to the head, and others 
would like senescence to gradually chip away their virility until their body is so fragile and in 
a constant state of suffering that they die. Refusing to go on living while having the option to 
do so, by refusing immortality treatments, is identical to wanting to commit suicide by letting 
<senescence gradually chip away their virility until their body is so fragile and in a constant 
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state of suffering that they die>.52 Lange (2013) said: “Even the choice of aging ‘naturally’, 
admitting no medical or technical end-of-life interventions is an intervention, a deliberate 
choice in the creation of one’s own autobiographical myth (Rose 2001, p. 16, cf. McAdams 
1993).” UI people can only kill themselves or go on living, they cannot die against their will. 
Dying in the same way people die now is still possible, but it will not be imposed by nature 
anymore, instead it will be a result of individual agency. Summing up: when death is imposed 
on the individual be it through human activity (murder, war, etc) or nature (aging, virus, etc) 
the individual had no choice and thus it is not immortal. When no death is imposed on the 
individual then he is said to be immortal. Immortal individuals have the option go on living 
forever or opt out. Because these options are being instantiated continuously through time, a 
better way to describe immortality is by having the option to choose if one dies during the next 
hour or goes on living. The choice will be impermeable to external forces (e.g. no chance of 
murder). It becomes clear that immortality does give people a choice that they do not have 
today after a certain age, and as such P50 is true. 
P*51 – Let us suppose that there is an agent with two options: option X and option Y. Is the 
creation of option Z a good thing? Well if option Z is something void of value, with negative 
value, or bad, then the creation of option Z is not good. But it is not bad either, since the agent 
can still access options X and Y that it had before.53 The agent never degrades is position no 
matter how bad Z turns out to be. Worst-case scenario, Z results in the agent maintaining his 
position without improving it, by choosing from the previously available choices. Thus the 
premise that having more choices is good is not always true. What is always true is that having 
more choices, ceteris paribus, is never bad. But, under uncertainty having more choices is likely 
good. That is, if we do not know what Z will bring, there is a chance that it might be better than 
X, and better than Y. The variation of the expected value with a marginal option is always 
positive under uncertainty, however how small. Perhaps an example with different language 
will make things clearer. Suppose we are playing a game where the player draws W balls in 
succession. Upon drawing each ball the player has two options: he can discard it, or keep it and 
discard the previously held ball54. Each ball has a natural number written on it. The game ends 
after W draws and the player then scores points equal to the number written on the ball he 
                                                 
52 It is curious how some authors on the literature strongly support this forced suicide, not only for them but for 
others too. A forced suicide is another expression to designate an homicide. 
53 Note that when considering the addition of option C, it is not known what choice it will represent: a good one 
or a bad one. However at the moment of decision it will be known what choice C represents.  
54 The player will not have a ball at the beginning of the game, so when he chooses to keep his first ball he will 
have none to discard. This is the only exception. After that the player will always have one ball in his possession 
that he can trade for the newly drawn ball on each draw.  
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possesses. The more points the better. The balls represent choice and they start inside a bag to 
represent uncertainty, the numbers written on them represent the value of each option. Now, 
suppose that after W draws, we offer the player an additional draw. The additional draw 
represents the extra option. It is clear that the player should take it: worst case scenario he 
discards it, which represents not choosing the new option, but there is a possibility that the 
additional draw brings out a ball with a number higher than the one he already possesses. This 
represents the possibility of the new choice being better than the previously available choices. 
Now let us translate this to the immortality context. We currently have one choice: we will die 
sooner or later. With immortality we double the amount of options: we can go on living or die. 
However, because the choice that immortality brings is being constantly instantiated, this 
means that if at any moment the additional choice of going on living turns out to be worse than 
the choice we already had we can always change to the other option, that is, opt out of life. The 
only way immortality would be void of value is if everyone would want to opt out of life before 
they die involuntarily, since no one needs to be immortal to have that ability. That does not 
seem to be the case, so immortality as a choice is good. People will be better off with the choice.  
Overall (2003, 190) seems to agree (see quote in P*9.1A7). 
PCBA – Ceteris paribus. 
C52 - P50 obtains without doubt. However P*51 does not obtain in its current form. 
Nevertheless it does obtain within the immortality context, since there are many people who 
still die involuntarily. Remember that for the choice to go on living be devoid of value, all 
people should have to have opted out of life before they die involuntarily. As such C52 also 
obtains. 
-- 
Verdict: OK 
 Because immortality brings a new option without sacrificing existing options, then 
having the extra option comes risk free. Anyone can still opt out at any time, in the manner of 
their choosing.   
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Section 3 – Consequential Arguments 
3.1 – Arguments Against Immortality 
3.1.1 – Overpopulation Argument 
P: Substantially decreasing the death rate will lead to overpopulation. 
P*: Overpopulation is bad. 
C: Substantially decreasing the death rate is bad. 
P: Immortality will substantially decrease the death rate. 
C: Immortality is bad. 
P: There is nothing directly related to immortality that allows for a replacement of what is lost. 
C: Immortality is not desirable. 
 I am sure the lack of numbering on the argument was noticed. That is on purpose. This 
argument is loaded, i.e. includes presuppositions. Analysing it in this form would be extremely 
difficult. So, I am changing my approach here. I am going to provide a framework against 
which we can evaluate this argument and the surrounding discussion. The goal is to bring to 
clarity to what is at stake when someone employs the overpopulation argument. But before I 
do that, here are some examples from the literature: 
Hermerén (2013): Those who are optimistic in describing the future possibilities of science [life extension] 
and play down the possibility of adverse side effects—including (…) the problem of overpopulation that would 
accelerate, as well as how to feed this growing population… 
Harris (2013): Many people addressing the question of life extension have assumed that such a possibility will 
have a disastrous effect on the world’s population. 
Sethe & de Magalhães (2013): The other main issue most frequently considered a social implementation 
objection centres on consequences for population growth (…) most concerns seem to be based on the assumption 
that an ever greater population leads to a world that is ‘not worth living in. 
Chapman (2004): In looking at the implications of these trends, some analysts believe that the cumulative 
impact of human activity is pushing against the limit of the Earth's life-supporting or carrying capacity, perhaps 
even exceeding it (Chapman et al., 2000). Many scientists fear that humanity is threatening not only the web of 
life on Earth but also its own survival. (…) Obviously, prolonging human life would further accelerate these 
problems, especially if it involved significant numbers of people. (…) The above analysis clearly underscores that 
increasing the human life span is not sustainable for the planet. 
Binstock (2004a): Even biogerontologist Leonard Hayflick, regarded by many in the field as having laid the 
groundwork for contemporary research advances in molecular mechanisms of aging (Shay and Wright, 2000), 
sees "no value to society or to the individual in seeking to slow or stop the aging process or to achieve immortality" 
(Hayflick, 1994, p. 341). (…) If they [medicines to stop aging] were universally available, he fears an exacerbation 
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of the consequences of worldwide overpopulation, ranging "from the indiscriminate destruction of the planet to 
mass starvation, wars, economic inequities, and health failures" (Hayflick, 1994, p. 339; also see Hayflick, 2000). 
More (2004): Those hearing the arguments for superlongevity have deployed two or three unchanging, 
unrelenting responses (…) The final predictable response is to conjure up the specter of overpopulation. 
Wade (2004): Some people object on various grounds to extending life span (…). Many fear it would lead to 
an unwelcome and unmanageable increase in population. 
 
3.1.1.1 – Understanding the Claim 
 What are people concerned about when they say that immortality will lead to 
overpopulation? They are concerned, not so much on how many people there are, but on how 
sustainable that amount will be. The objection made clear is <immortality is unsustainable>. 
The link overpopulation-sustainability arises because it is easy to picture an absurd amount of 
people that not only not go away (die) but keep growing (reproduce) with the concept that the 
planet can only provide so much. There will be a breaking point. 
 Let us take another look at the claim that <immortality is unsustainable>. What does 
sustainability mean? Sustainability means the capacity to maintain a system or process 
indefinitely. There is an input rate, an output rate and a low or high bound, beyond which the 
system or process stops. Sustainability then means that the input rate be greater that the output 
rate in the case of a lower bound, or the output rate be greater than the input rate in the case of 
a higher bound. The point is to never reach the bound or, in other words, to let the system halt. 
An example: let us evaluate if John’s consumption is sustainable. He has an input rate: his 
income; an output rate: his spending; and a lower bound: equity equal to zero.55  Now, John 
wants to avoid being deprived of consuming, he has needs such as food, shelter, etc., that he 
wants to meet. That is the reason for us to evaluate the sustainability of his consumption and 
the justification for having a lower bound (vs a higher bound): if his equity ever reaches zero, 
he is unable to consume. Sustainability, in the presence of a lower bound, means that his income 
must be greater than is spending. If his spending is greater than his income, then he is in 
unsustainable territory. This does not mean he is not able to consume – he could be using his 
savings – it only means that he cannot continue in that state indefinitely, because sooner or 
later he will reach his lower bound, i.e. have no equity. Sustainability means that John can 
consume a certain amount forever, given its current income. 
                                                 
55 I am going to assume, to simplify matters, that borrowing is not available since its introduction will increase 
the complexity without changing the conclusion of the example. 
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 But what is the thing that people are worried about when they claim that <immortality 
is not sustainable>? Sustainability of what? It is the sustainability of our planet, in an ecological 
sense and in relation to ourselves as humans or individuals. We want to be able to achieve what 
it is that people want to achieve and that requires having available specific interactions with 
our environment, from the air we breathe to the pollution we make. For simplicity’s sake we 
can frame the problem as follows: our input rate is what nature can provide us, our output rate 
is our demands on nature; and our bound is the destruction of civilization or worse56, making 
us unable to achieve what it is that people want to achieve. It is argued that actualizing 
immortality will be unsustainable because our demands on nature will far exceed those that it 
can provide, due to the sheer number of people – overpopulation. 
 Population is indeed related to our demands on nature (the output rate mentioned 
above). But how?  I suggest, for the purposes of this analysis, that our demands on nature (D) 
are a function of three variables: Technology (T), Consumption (C), and Population (P).57 I am 
not concerned about what mathematical form is the best fit for the equation, neither what 
proxies should we use to measure each variable. My point is to have a simple conceptual 
framework that allows us to think properly about what is at stake. Here is the breakdown: 
• Consumption: This variable captures the demands of the average person (i.e. 
per capita), from their need of resources such as food, land, air, metals, water, 
etc., to their pollution such as biological waste, greenhouse gases, chemical 
waste, etc. The point is to track the average person’s impact/demands on nature. 
The first derivative of this variable is positive. Ceteris paribus, an increase 
(decrease) in C will result in an increase (decrease) in D. Its value is always 
greater than zero since we are constantly in an exchange relation with nature. 
• Population: This variable tracks how many persons we are dealing with. The 
first derivative is positive. Ceteris paribus, an increase (decrease) in P will result 
in an increase (decrease) in D. Its value is always greater than zero otherwise I 
would not have written this, and you would not be reading it. Furthermore, we 
can express variations in population as a function of the difference between the 
birth rate and the death rate. If the former is greater than the latter population 
                                                 
56 I understand that this is an anthropocentric view. But for the purposes of this argument it is stricter than a non-
anthropocentric view, since the latter allows for the elimination of the human species before the bound is met, in 
this case the destruction of our planet’s ecosystem(s). For an example on this view see Linkola (1989) where the 
non-anthropocentric view is taken as the highest value. 
57 The original function is known as I=f(PAT), where ‘I’ stands for human impact and ‘A’ stands for affluence. I 
changed the name of the variables to be consistent with the rest of the text. 
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will increase, and vice-versa. It is therefore false when More (2004) states that 
“the population growth rate is determined by how many children we have, not 
how long we live.” How long one lives determines the death rate. 
• Technology: This variable measures how efficiently we can use what nature 
provides us. For the same amount of < P×C >, more technology means less 
demands on nature, or, for the same amount of demands on nature, more 
technology means more < P×C >. For example: sewage treatment plants allow 
us to increase the amount of sewage for the same impact or decrease the impact 
for the same amount of sewage; new agricultural techniques allow us to increase 
crop yields for the same amount of land, space exploration might allow us to 
gather precious minerals from asteroids and so on. The first derivative is 
negative, ceteris paribus an increase (decrease) in T will result in a decrease 
(increase) in D. 
Note that the product < P×C > gives us the global demand on nature for a given 
technological level. It accounts for all humans. 
Now, with a framework in place we can restate the overpopulation argument more 
clearly. The claim is the following: It is a fact, ceteris paribus, that increasing P, will 
increase D. While that claim is true, to arrive at <immortality is bad> one also needs to assume 
that P will increase (or that there are no options to avoid the tendency to its increase), that a 
ceteris paribus clause is warranted, and that increasing D is bad. I will use the expression 
overpopulation argument advocate (OAA) henceforth for reasons of economy. 
 
3.1.1.2 – Counter 1: Increasing D is Not Bad 
 Perhaps it can be argued that increasing D is not bad. In the context of the argument, 
increasing D is bad if it results in an unsustainable state58, or if it aggravates an already existing 
unsustainable state. Although it can be argued that increases in D within what is sustainable 
can be bad (or good), it does not seem to be what the OAA is claiming. The obvious clue is in 
using the word overpopulation. It expresses the idea of having too much, a quantity above what 
is sustainable. The case would have been different if the argument was that more P is bad, 
regardless of sustainability issues. 
                                                 
58 Exceptions for temporary journeys into the unsustainability realm that can pay off in the future. For example, 
consider the case of using non-renewable energy to build sources of renewable energy.  
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 The reason why having D in an unsustainable state is bad, is because the bound by 
which we measure sustainability is bad. It means as already suggested above <the end of 
civilization or worse, making us unable to achieve what it is that people want to achieve>. 
Allow me to expand on that. The consequences of the unsustainability of D are deleterious for 
various instrumental convergent goals, a concept well known from AI research. Nick Bostrom 
(2014, 132) defines the instrumental convergence thesis as follows: 
Several instrumental values can be identified which are convergent in the sense that their 
attainment would increase the chances of the agent's goal being realized for a wide range of 
final goals and a wide range of situations, implying that these instrumental values are likely 
to be pursued by a broad spectrum of situated intelligent agents. 
 The unsustainability of D is not bad in itself. It is bad because it negatively impacts 
achieving what people value, regardless of what they value. It is detrimental for the following 
instrumental convergent goals: self-preservation, self-improvement and resource acquisition.  
 It is true that tying badness to instrumental value will not encompass all final goals/ 
utility functions59. For example: if I want to destroy humanity, then having D in an 
unsustainable state is not bad. However, the instrumental convergence thesis encompasses a 
wide range of final goals/utility functions, allowing us to go as far as stating that having D in 
an unsustainable state will almost certainly be bad, because it is bad for almost all cases. I 
consider this reasoning convincing and so I will grant that increasing D is bad if it results in an 
unsustainable state, or if it aggravates an already existing unsustainable state. 
The next step is to have an idea of the orders of magnitude of the rates involved (input 
rate and output rate mentioned above). Is it even possible to achieve an unsustainable state? Or 
it can be the case that unsustainability is only an issue in theoretical terms if the rates are too 
far apart that by the time they get close to the bound the issue at hand is a non-issue60. Where 
are we now in terms of sustainability? Using biocapacity as a proxy for what nature can provide 
us, and the ecological footprint as our demands on nature, the case seems bleak. According to 
the Global Footprint Network (n.d.), data shows we are in unsustainable territory since 1970, 
and in 2014 we were demanding 69% more from nature than what it can provide us. One of 
the most well-known consequences is anthropogenic global warming (see Benestad et. all, 
2015), also known as climate change. Carbon emissions, it is main driving force, are constantly 
beating records (Chestney, 2018, Reuters). CO2 is now regularly above 400ppm, when for 
thousands of years never rose up from 300ppm (NASA, n.d.). The Paris Agreements meant to 
tackle climate change are not under a good auspice (Wallace-Wells, 2018, NYMag). The 
                                                 
59 See 4.3.2 – Ethics and Choice for clarifications on the meaning of utility function. 
60 For example, ejection of mass from our planet into space (McDonald, 2012, BBC Article). 
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situation seems so severe that extravagant solutions such as dimming the sun are being studied 
(Doyle, 2018, Reuters). Other signs that we are drawing closer to our bound include, but are 
not exhausted by the following: UN estimates that 5B people could suffer water shortages in 
2050 (Watts, 2018, The Guardian); IPBES (2018a), an intergovernmental panel composed of 
129 members states, estimates that land degradation is currently affecting the well-being of 
3.2B people;  the same organization published four regional reports on biodiversity with 
conclusions such as: 28% of endemic species from Europe and Asia are threatened (2018b, 
12), more than 20% of endemic species from Africa are threatened (2018c, 14), almost 25% of 
species in the Americas are threatened (2018d, 18), almost 25% of endemic species in Asia-
Pacific are threatened (2018e, 12).61 I could go on listing the depressive state of affairs that we 
are into. And it seems that what we have done so far will last us for centuries, as stated in the 
last IPCC report (2014, 13, 16)62 report:  
Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea level rise, which will continue for 
centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized. (…) Surface temperatures will 
remain approximately constant at elevated levels for many centuries after a complete 
cessation of net anthropogenic CO2 emissions. 
Report after report, news after news, the conclusion that I want to make is clear. We 
are currently deep in unsustainable territory. Our demands on nature are above what it can 
provide us.  
-- 
Verdict: HIGH PROBABILITY OF FAILURE   
There is no doubt that we are currently on unsustainable territory, and that that state of 
affairs jeopardizes some convergent instrumental goals, therefore increasing D is bad. 
However, there might be some very specific utility functions, that feature the destruction or 
demise of civilization. On those cases increasing D is not bad. For the rest of the utility 
functions, arguing that D might not be bad has a very high probability of failure. 
 
3.1.1.3 – Counter 2: The Overpopulation Taboo and Rhetoric Manoeuvres 
 What I will present next is a purely rhetorical counter, and although it carefully avoids 
the issue at hand it results in a deep assessment of the overpopulation argument, Socratic 
method style. If the overpopulation argument is based on a claim that too many people will 
                                                 
61 It is no wonder that evermore people speak of a 6th mass extinction event. 
62 I recommend consulting this source for a detailed outlook of what consequences are expected due to our 
unsustainable status. 
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result in an unsustainable state, and if we are currently in an unsustainable state, how come 
now one (at least not the majority of the OAAs) is talking about the overpopulation of today’s?  
a) One answer can be because they are not the same thing. In the case of immortality, 
we are talking about a really big increase in population that results from a 
substantial decrease in the death rate. That is not the case today, or so it is argued. 
But if we observe the evolution of world population as shown in the graph below, 
the growth that led to our current state is vertical in a graph with the short time span 
of 12K years and in a log scale! And decreases in mortality rates were also a driver 
of this surge: child mortality rates63 were reduced from 43% in 1800 down to 4.3% 
in 2015 (Roser, 2018a). Surely this is the kind of growth envisioned by the OAA 
UI. If there is a difference between now, and the state predicted by the OOA, it 
cannot be the evolution of population. 
 
b) Alternatively, one can still argue that both cases (now, and UI) are not the same, 
but without appealing to the evolution of the population. It is argued that while UI 
the unsustainability is caused by overpopulation, the unsustainability we have today 
is caused be excessive consumption. But, as I show in 3.1.1.6 – Counter 5: How to 
Configure Population?, this explanation will not do. Although it is a fact that our 
                                                 
63 Defined here as the percentage of new-borns that died before their 5th birthday. 
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demands on nature are at an unsustainable level, it is not a fact that decreases in D 
must come from a specific parameter. Stating that the problem lies in one of the 
parameters is a claim of value, not a claim of fact, that says something about how 
one pretends to achieve sustainability. After all it can also be argued that the 
problem of unsustainability UI is caused too by overconsumption and not 
overpopulation.64 Claims of overpopulation and/or overconsumption are two ways 
of referring to the same thing: unsustainability. 
The answer is that there is no relevant difference between our case today, and that envisaged 
by the OAA. This will be a common theme in my discussion of the subject and one I feel is not 
given due attention in the literature. People seem to think that the problem we have today is 
not the same thing as the state predicted by the OAA.  But as long as there is room for both P 
and C to fluctuate (they cannot go below zero), a solution to decrease D to a sustainable level 
will work regardless if we are talking about today, or about the hypothetical scenario UI that 
the OAA present us. The equivalence exists because both cases are unsustainable. Yet no one 
is decrying the problems of overpopulation today. What gives? 
Here is my attempt at providing an explanation, based on conversations that I had with 
several people about the subject. There is a taboo when it comes to muttering the word 
overpopulation. It seems that, in general, people shun such suggestions to the same box where 
they put eugenics, genocide, forced sterilization and so forth. They seem to think that from 
arguing about overpopulation, necessarily those things must follow. They do not seem to 
consider that the only way their rationale is correct is if what separates overpopulation from 
the supposed stated consequences is a slope, a very slippery one. There is a difference between 
stating that a problem exists and advocating solutions. It can be the case that no solution is 
better than inaction, but that is not the same thing as denying the existence of the problem. No 
politician speaks of overpopulation, no green activist speaks of overpopulation, the taboo is 
generalized.65  
                                                 
64 Even if we suppose that both T and C remained constant, and only P increased, stating that it is the value of P 
that is too high is still a claim of value. It requires to defend that the initial distribution between T, C and P to not 
have any excessive value (or deficient in the case of T). This will be expanded on 3.1.1.6 – Counter 5: How to 
Configure Population? 
65 Ethics departments are not immune to this phenomenon. During this master’s program I had the opportunity to 
present a work on overpopulation and at the mere suggestion that we might have such a problem today, my 
colleagues reported being “shocked” and “outraged”, but unable to engage in the discussion. A professional 
philosopher, specialized in ethics, that was present in the room quickly instantiated Godwin’s law, thinking that 
the name calling and the inferred guilt by association would substitute for substantiated arguments. If I knew how 
things really were, I absolutely would not had made a presentation on such theme. Questioning the status quo is 
unfavourable for those seeking top grades. I am lucky and thankful to have supervisors that provide me with the 
much-needed freedom to approach sensitive issues. 
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But if overpopulation is taboo, how come people frequently employ the overpopulation 
argument? People who support the overpopulation argument seem to do so through motivated 
reasoning. They already support the idea that immortality is not desirable through another 
argument, and in searching for reasons to further their case they come up with the 
overpopulation argument. And this argument provides them with a big rhetorical advantage. 
First, the inference that we might increase our demands on nature is easy to grasp (ceteris 
paribus, an increase in P results in an increase in D). Secondly, given our current state of affairs, 
avoiding more pressure on D seems to be an easy sell (I granted that increasing D is bad). 
Thirdly, and most importantly, it puts advocates of immortality into a corner. Either they have 
to show that there will be no overpopulation problem, which as I show in 3.1.1.4 – Counter 3: 
P Will Not Increase, and 3.1.1.5 – Counter 4: Ceteris Paribus is not Warranted: T Will 
Compensate is not granted, or, if they are to not concede that immortality is bad, they must deal 
with the taboo and suffer the consequences for the terrible act of suggesting overpopulation.66 
 If I am right in my assessment of the background reasons for the usage of the 
overpopulation argument67, then the best answer is also a rhetoric manoeuvre. The strategy is 
to give back the hot potato of overpopulation, without engaging it directly: no denying it, and 
no accepting it. Instead, merely pointing out that at the moment we have a problem of 
unsustainability and asking those who defend the overpopulation argument how they would 
tackle it is the rhetorical counter I suggest. Then the relevant parallels between the 
unsustainability now and the case UI need to be drawn, and finally the suggestions given for 
tackling the unsustainability problem of today be applied to the case UI. The OAA is now the 
one in a corner: either admits that the proposed solution is insufficient for both cases (now and 
UI), or that it is good enough for both cases. Either it is conceded that there is an overpopulation 
problem today and UI, or that there is an overpopulation problem in neither option. 
I will explore the implications for our current state, of claiming that there will be an 
overpopulation problem UI in 3.1.1.7 – Counter 6: Reducing D via P: The Death Rate. 
-- 
Verdict: Unknown 
Because this counter deals in rhetoric and not in substance I do not think it is suitable 
to offer a classification. It very much depends on the flow of the discussion and where it lands. 
                                                 
66 Luckily for me, I will have no problems in taking the bait and run with it. I have no problems in conceding that 
there is a sustainability problem now, and ceteris paribus, it will be aggravated by immortality. I also have no 
problems in framing the sustainability problem in terms of overpopulation, both today and UI. 
67 If I am not, the strategy I am going to propose is still valuable as a critical thinking tool. It can result in the 
discovery of inadequacies in the overpopulation argument. 
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3.1.1.4 – Counter 3: P Will Not Increase 
 This counter states that human population will stabilize in the future, and as such it will 
not grow indefinitely. If this is the case, then the overpopulation argument might fail to obtain. 
Assuming UI that the death rate will decrease substantially, the fate of the birth rate will decide 
the overall effect of P. This argument tries to show that a similar decrease in the birth rate will 
occur in a way that balances the decrease in the death rate. The result is no (substantial)68 
increase in P. Reasons to support this claim are usually based on using the fertility rate as a 
proxy to the birth rate69:  
1 – Fertility rates have been decreasing around the globe and are expected to continue 
the trend. A UN paper (2017a) titled The End of High Fertility is Near states that “the total 
fertility rate for the world fell from 5 live births per women in 1950-55 to 2.5 births in 2010-
2015”. Another UN report (2017b, 6) titled World Population Prospects states that “in 2010-
2015, 46 per cent of the world’s population lived in countries with a fertility level below 2.1 
births per woman (…) In 2045-2050, it is expected that 69 per cent of the world’s population 
will live in countries where women give birth to fewer than 2.1 children on average.” The value 
of 2.1 is of importance since (UN, 2017a) “at this level of fertility, each generation of parents 
exactly replaces itself with an equivalent number of children who survive to adulthood, 
ensuring a long-term growth rate of zero.”70  
2 – An explanation for the previous point can be because there is a causal relation 
between the decrease in fertility rates and at least some feature of the developed world such as 
education, wealth, life expectancy, women empowerment, etc. (see Roser, 2018b). It follows 
that, as developing countries go down the same path, they will also decrease their fertility rates. 
A correlation from a cross section analysis is clearly shown in the Human Development Report 
                                                 
68 Due to the lag of some effects, population can still increase. As stated in the UN report World Population 
Prospects (2017b,12): “In fact, continued growth of the world’s population is expected at least until 2050, even if 
the decline of fertility would accelerate.” 
69 The fertility rate (average number of births per women) is not the same thing as the birth rate (number of births 
per 1000 persons). However, unless there is a significant change in the relative size of men in the population, 
changes in fertility rates will be reflected in changes in the birth rate. On the other hand, fertility rates, when 
compared with the replacement fertility rate can predict the trend on population. But note that if/when babies 
come into the world not by birth but by “decantation” – the expression appears in Huxley’s Brave New World –  
the fertility rate will lose its meaning since women will no longer be relevant for calculating population 
stabilization. Contrary to fertility rates, birth/decanting rates are not affected by this issue. 
70 This value cannot be below 2 if the sex of the baby is not controllable, since a woman needs to replace herself 
and has a roughly 50% chance of the baby being female. If the sex of the baby is controllable, then the woman 
needs to replace herself plus a share of the men population divided equally among all females. This means the 
replacement fertility rate will be more than 1, but never more than the value when the sex of the babies was not 
under control. For example, if there is 1 male per 10 females the replacement rate is never below 1.1. Fluctuations 
above the minimum stated values occur to compensate for deaths before the reproductive act. 
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(UN, 2017c, 225). Countries were tiered by their ranking on the Human Development Index 
(HDI) into 4 groups. Fertility rates for those groups were the following, starting from the 
countries with the highest HDI, for the period of 2010-2015: 1.7, 1.8, 2.7, and 5.2. 
3 – Longer lives seem to be one of the mentioned features. With longer lives the urgency 
to have a child decreases, and, as such, women will postpone the decision to become mothers 
for later. UI this is taken to an extreme. There will be no pressure to have children at any 
particular point in time.71 The projected increase in the female mean age of childbearing 
constitutes indirect evidence of this claim.  From a value of 27.732 for 2010-2015 to a projected 
value of 29.839 in 2095-210072. 
4 – A reason for childbearing postponement might be related with the desire to leave a 
legacy on earth through offspring. UI, there will not be time pressures for childbearing and the 
legacy that it means as Sethe and de Magalhães (2013) propose:  
The instinct and desire to procreate is strong in many. This may be due to evolutionary 
reasons, but also a conscious decision to defy death by trying to perpetuate something of 
oneself—which indicates that such desires might be less strong in ‘immortals’ (Perry 2000).   
The conclusion is that population will eventually stabilize or even decrease.73 “The end 
of high fertility is in sight and will arrive soon, unless several countries follow unusual 
pathways and maintain higher levels of fertility in future decades compared to what is expected 
based on historical patterns of change” (UN, 2017a). And because there is no expectation that 
trends will change, “later in the century, although a continued increase of the global population 
is considered the most likely outcome, there is roughly a 27 percent chance that the world’s 
population could stabilize or even begin to fall sometime before 2100” (UN, 2017b, 3). Or if it 
does not by then, sometime latter eventually will. More (2004) used this argument citing 
decreases in fertility rates and concluding that “we can expect population growth to continue 
slowing until it reaches a stable size.” 
However, there are some problems with this counter: 
I – Cultural differences can be underestimated. This means not every country will 
follow the same path of the developed countries and show decreases in fertility rates, or at least 
not as much. I do not think this merits much attention. Globalization will pressure such culture, 
                                                 
71 Note the implicit support for the deadline argument, at least when it comes to childbearing. 
72 However the value for 1950-1955 was 29.169 followed by a decrease to 27.500 in 1995-2000. Only after this 
(?local) minimum is a monotonous increase observed and predicted. I did not explore reasons for this recent 
decrease, but one hypothesis may be because there was an increase in the share of the population that reproduces 
early and not because of a decrease of maternal age in individual terms. 
73 If population decreases then the argument is turned upside down, and making people live longer remains 
imperative if we are to avoid extinction. 
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if it exists, into conforming with world trends. From the tier of the highest develop countries, 
most exhibited fertility rates below the replacement rate including countries both from Asian 
background (i.e. Singapore, South Korea, Japan) and Western background (i.e. USA, UK, 
Germany). Those who were above replacement levels showed a decrease in the fertility rate 
from 2000-2005 to 2010-2015, including several Arab countries (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Kuwait) and one from South America (Argentina). The only exception seems to be Israel, that 
maintained an exceptionally high fertility rate (UN, 2017c, 222).74 Even if we concede that it 
is the unique culture of Israel that is maintaining a high fertility rate, it might not hold forever.75 
II – It seems that the stabilization of population comes at the cost of increased 
consumption. The increased consumption is to match the feature of the developed world that 
made fertility rates decrease. Although P may be alleviated, the product < P×C > might not. I 
reckon that this a matter of quantification and is entirely possible that increases in C will not 
compensate the totality of the decreases in P. It is nonetheless a weakness of this counter since 
some increase in C is expected. 
III – Lastly and more importantly. Even if we grant that P stabilizes, that alone does not 
guarantee that it will do so at a sustainable level. As Bergh e Rietveld (2004) state, “even if the 
world population stabilizes in the future, this cannot be taken as a guarantee that the population 
level reached will be environmentally sustainable.” 
-- 
There is a slightly different argument that I want to briefly mention. It consists in the 
claim that even if population were to increase it would take a long time to do so. Sethe and de 
Magalhães (2013):  
Population changes are surprisingly slow in their response even to a dramatic life extension 
(Gavrilov and Gavrilova 2010). Even if a ‘cure’ for aging were developed tomorrow, the 
pressure of population whatever they may be would not amount to a marked increase for 
many decades. Thus, if overpopulation becomes an issue it would be well into the next 
century or beyond. 
 A different version assumes that immortality will not have a great uptake since it will 
only be accessible to developed nations76, thus taking longer great increases in P (More, 2004): 
This points to another flaw in the suggestion that extended longevity will dramatically boost 
population growth. The fact is, superlongevity in the developed nations would have 
practically no global or local population impact. The lack of global impact is a consequence 
                                                 
74 Fertility rates for the mentioned countries for 2010-2015: Singapore-1.2, South Korea-1.3, Japan-1.4, USA-1.9, 
UK-1.9, Germany-1.4. Rates for 2000-2005 and 2010-2015, respectively: Saudi Arabia-3.6-2.9, Qatar-3.0-2.1, 
Kuwait-2.6-2.2, Argentina-2.5-2.3, Israel-2.9-3.1 
75 From personal conversations with Jewish people, including those with a strong religious inclination, they seem 
to claim that their people are being subject to some sort of curse throughout history. If they are correct, then the 
high fertility rates of Israel should be of less concern. 
76 Concerns about inequality will be dealt with more thoroughly in 3.1.2 – Inequality Argument. 
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of the small and falling share of the global population accounted for by the developed 
nations. 
Although this might allow us some extra time to find solutions (see 3.1.1.5 – Counter 
4: Ceteris Paribus is not Warranted: T Will Compensate), this argument, in itself, misses the 
point. The overpopulation argument does not require the changes in demographics to be quick, 
only that when they happen they be bad. Let us draw some parallels. Suppose that I install some 
bombs in critical facilities, but set the timer to some decades in the future. Does the value of 
my action change, if instead the timer was set for the next day?  If the argument is that I should 
not explode stuff up, then that my timer is set for some decades into the future vs for tomorrow, 
is irrelevant. The same applies to the overpopulation argument, regardless if immortality would 
bring forth overpopulation in a week or in a few generations. Furthermore, the argument is 
permeable to the same counter made to the previous version: there is no guarantee of 
sustainability, even if demographic changes are slow. The version of More is even weaker since 
it is also a target to the following attack. Although population in developed countries are a 
relatively small number they are the ones doing most of the consuming, so an increase in their 
size will have a greater impact than an equivalent increase in other countries. For example, the 
UK and the US are one order of magnitude above China or India when it comes to contributions 
to global warming per capita. Even when calculating total contributions, the US has a value 
35% greater than China and India combined, and this does not account for (Matthews et al., 
2014): 
The transfer of emissions associated with the international trade of products and resources. 
There is an emerging body of literature which has shown that a consumption-based 
representation of CO2 emissions leads to a shift in the allocation of current emissions from 
major producer countries such as China towards major consumer countries in North America 
and Western Europe (Davis and Caldeira 2010, Peters et al 2011, 2012). 
-- 
Verdict: FAIL 
All things considered I will not grant this counter a successful status. Point III is 
sufficient to destroy its credibility. It seems irresponsible to assume that population will 
stabilize at a sustainable level in order to dismiss overpopulation concerns, given what is at 
stake. If indeed population stabilizes at a sustainable level, great! But if it does not and we 
counted on it to not do anything else about the issue... Hope for the best, prepare for the worst. 
The overpopulation argument is unscathed. 
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3.1.1.5 – Counter 4: Ceteris Paribus is not Warranted: T Will Compensate 
There seems to be a position adopted by some, which I shall refer to as Cornucopians, 
that believes technology alone will solve the sustainability problem. That is, we do not need to 
worry about overpopulation and/or overconsumption (P and/or C), because T will provide the 
necessary adjustments to D. Here are some justifications for this position: 
1 – Technologies that directly influence D, such as negative carbon emissions 
technologies, can solve sustainability problems, such as the excess of greenhouse gas 
emissions. In fact, the majority of models used in the Paris Agreements to achieve a 2º degree 
global warming limit rely extensively on negative carbon emission technologies (see Anderson 
& Peters, 2016). 
2 – Other technologies rely on space exploration to replace what is scarce on earth. 
Asteroid mining can substitute for scarce materials on earth, such as gold, platinum and other 
metals. Moon mining can restock helium-3. China is surveying the feasibility of such project 
(Connor, 2013, Phys.org). Countries such as the Luxembourg already have codified laws 
regulating this practice (Moon, 2017, Engadget).  
3 – Others not content in bringing resources to earth, want to send people into space. 
This not only will alleviate concerns of overpopulation on our current planet, but also provide 
a redundancy to our species, increasing the probability to escape the great filter hypothesis, if 
there is one and is positioned in our future. The SpaceX project, led by Elon Musk, wants to 
achieve this redundancy by building a 1 million strong civilization on Mars, with the first 
passengers of this one-way trip scheduled to depart during the next decade (Solon, 2018, The 
Guarding, and SpaceX, 2017b). Overall (2003, 140) seems to consider this as the definitive 
option against the overpopulation argument:  
The only possible way around this problem that I can imagine would be the migration of 
immortal human beings to other planets, perhaps planets in other solar systems; the burden 
that they would pose here on earth would thus be relieved. 
4 – Even more extreme is the suggestion of living within virtual reality. This suggestion 
implies a lot of changes compared to our state of affairs. The ones I want to focus here are 
those related to D. If humans were to live in capsules with feeding tubes for air, food, and other 
necessities, and all their senses tricked into believing they were in a virtual world, Matrix style, 
our value of D would most likely be reduced, since, apart from the basic necessities to provide 
for our body, the only extra resource we require is processing power and its accompanying 
hardware and energy. Almost all of C would be fulfilled by information and the bits it is 
composed of, i.e., virtual reality. Perhaps we can make things more economical by ditching the 
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body and preserving just the brain and live as brains in a vat. Or we might even dispose of the 
brain and upload our selves to a digital infrastructure reminiscent of the cloud we have today. 
The 2045 initiative is currently seeking to actualize the upload of selves (n.d.). 
5 – Differently, it can be argued that in the past, authors such as Malthus and Ehrlich, 
predicted the demise of overpopulation and their predictions were not fulfilled. As Conly 
(2016, 9) states: “we have heard at least a few people cry wolf”. This time is no different. We 
are not that good at predicting technological developments. 
6 – Lastly, it can be argued that the more people there are the more chances we have at 
discovering world changing technologies, simply because there are more heads thinking about 
the problem. It is exactly because there is a large amount of people that we will be able to tackle 
sustainability problems. Here it is argued that the problem, overpopulation, will be in fact its 
own solution. 
Do these reasons hold to scrutiny? 
I – The first reason to believe not, is known as the Jevons Paradox. In essence it states 
that increases in T can have an adverse effect on C (i.e. also increasing it). The result on D is 
ambiguous, since the increase in C can be so much that it offsets the benefit gained with the 
increase in T. What happens is that as technology allows for some good to be used more 
efficiently its price drops as a result, and by good ol’ demand law its consumption increases. 
For example, suppose that central heating is made more efficient by using less energy for the 
same heat generated. If the response of the users is to use more of it, because now heating is 
cheaper, then the efficiency gains of T can be cannibalized by C and even offset. The higher 
price elasticity of demand77, the more T will be offset by C. If the effects of C are greater than 
the effects of T, then increases in T will increase the value of D. We can build examples with 
other resources such as water usage, pollution, etc. To be clear, this is not an argument against 
technological progress. It merely states that increases in T might not be enough, on their own, 
to decrease D, and as such need to be coupled with other measures to ensure that C does not 
rise. Therefore, the Jevons paradox destroys this counter by showing that we will need to act 
on other variables, regardless. The drawback is that the Jevons paradox is not applicable 
universally, it is conditioned to certain values of price elasticity of demand. However the longer 
the period under consideration the more elastic the demand is. When considering periods that 
                                                 
77 Price elasticity of demand is a technical economic concept that captures the sensitivity of demand to price 
fluctuations. The more elastic the demand, the more it will react to variations in price, ceteris paribus. For example: 
price elasticity of demand of butter is higher than that of tobacco. 
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involve the development and deployment of technologies and their effects on D, this seems to 
be long enough to make the demand elastic enough to trigger the Jevons paradox. 
II – There is no guarantee that these technologies will arrive soon enough, or even if 
they will arrive at all. Take for example negative carbon emissions technologies, featured in 
the models that underly the Paris Agreement. According to Anderson & Peters (2016) 
bioenergy, combined with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) “is the most prolific negative 
emission technology included in integrated assessment models and is widely used in emission 
scenarios.” Perhaps because “other negative-emission technologies have not moved beyond 
theoretical studies or small-scale demonstrations.” However they note some obstacles with 
BECCS: “two decades of research and pilot plants have struggled to demonstrate the technical 
and economic viability of power generation with CCS.” So the most relied upon technology to 
tackle emissions is still in development while international organisms take it for granted: “many 
scenarios assessed by the IPCC propose its mature and large-scale rollout as soon as 2030.” 
Not only that but 
its land-use impacts could include terrestrial species losses equivalent to, at least, a 2.8°C 
temperature rise, leading to difficult trade-offs between biodiversity loss and temperature 
rise. There is also little robust analysis of the trade-offs between large-scale deployment of 
BECCS (and all negative-emission technologies) and the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs).  
It seems that the technology we take for granted to input in our models might bring 
some major negative side effects to the point that the impact on D is unclear. They conclude: 
If the many reservations increasingly voiced about negative-emission technologies 
(particularly BECCS) turn out to be valid, the weakening of near-term mitigation and the 
failure of future negative-emission technologies will be a prelude to rapid temperature rises 
reminiscent of the 4°C “business as usual” pathway feared before the Paris Agreement. 
Negative-emission technologies are not an insurance policy, but rather an unjust and high-
stakes gamble. There is a real risk they will be unable to deliver on the scale of their promise. 
If the emphasis on equity and risk aversion embodied in the Paris Agreement are to have 
traction, negative-emission technologies should not form the basis of the mitigation agenda. 
This is not to say that they should be abandoned). They could very reasonably be the subject 
of research, development, and potentially deployment. 
 They clearly point out the argument that I want to make here. It is irresponsible to rely 
on technology to solve unsustainability because it is gambling with the future of humanity. At 
best is an extremely irresponsible behaviour aimed at some short-term profit:  
The promise of future and cost-optimal negative-emission technologies is more politically 
appealing than the prospect of developing policies to deliver rapid and deep mitigation now 
and in postponing the need for rapid and immediate mitigation, BECCS licenses the ongoing 
combustion of fossil fuels while ostensibly fulfilling the Paris commitments. 
 This line of reasoning is not only applicable to negative emission technology but to all 
technologies listed above and even those yet to come. Because we are dealing with things that 
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are not invented yet, they are intrinsically uncertain. This means that in relying on technology 
to solve the issue, Cornucopians are relying on uncertainty to solve the issue. If it does not 
deliver on time, we are kaput. The reasonable option is to not gamble with the future of 
humanity but to “proceed on the premise that they [negative emission technologies] will not 
work at scale. The implications of failing to do otherwise are a moral hazard par excellence”.  
III - Lastly, I would like to address the cry wolf approach: a) in the end the wolf does 
appear, gambling away our future can only win so many times; b) hindsight prediction is 100% 
accurate, so for us it is clear to see why doomsters of the past failed to account for technological 
progress. But to ignore the most up to date evidence of the state of affairs just because someone 
had wrong predictions in the past is an invalid inference, which might carry with it disastrous 
consequences. No one is going around saying that we should reject modern astronomy because 
someone once said that the sun orbited the earth or reject modern medicine because someone 
once said that bloodletting was a great treatment for a variety of ailments. It is nonsense and as 
such we should not reject worries about overpopulation just because someone once said 
something that happened to not be true. 
-- 
 Verdict: FAIL 
 More (2004) states that “even if population were to grow far outside today’s highest 
projections, we can expect human intelligence and technology to comfortably handle the 
numbers.” Contra More (and other Cornucopians), who seems to be experiencing a 
survivorship bias, relying on technology alone to achieve sustainability is utterly irresponsible 
given what is at stake. Its answer to the overpopulation argument is merely a <it might not be 
a concern>. This is not so great of an assurance and as such worrying about overpopulation is 
still warranted. If the technology comes on time, great. But if it does not, another mass 
extinction event will probably follow.  
 
3.1.1.6 – Counter 5: How to Configure Population? 
 For a good take on the overpopulation argument we should proceed with the assumption 
that population will not stabilize at sustainable levels by itself, and that technology will not 
arrive soon enough to deal with the problem (we can assume that T is constant to neutralize its 
effect). We still have two variables that we can try to act upon: C and P. And there is an 
advantage here because we can reduce them with certainty (if we so desire), so this option is 
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impermeable to the accusations of uncertainty that plagued the last two counters. This offers 
us a guarantee that the problem of sustainability is solvable. 
 P and C are intrinsically connected. Their product represents our total demands on 
nature, for a given technological level, with C representing demands per capita and P the 
population that there is. But since we are not considering technology to deal with the 
overpopulation argument, as stated above, we can assume that D = P x C. 
 The first thing that we can conclude is that there is a great amount of combinations 
between P and C that achieve the same amount of D. This tells us that it is not so much what 
specific combination we are considering that matters, but the value of D that that combination 
produces. As long as there is room for C and/or P to fluctuate, sustainability can be achieved 
by reducing just C, just P, or both. From the point of view of nature it does not matter who is 
doing the consuming, it only matters that someone is doing it. It is irrelevant if water is used 
for luxury swimming pools, or to satisfy the thirst of poor people because nature does not care. 
Put it this way: we can have 10 persons consuming 100 each, or 100 persons consuming 10 
each, or anything in between, and have the exact same D.78 It is important to note that any 
increase in one variable comes at a cost of a decrease in the other, for a given D. There is an 
inherent trade-off between C and P. There are no free lunches. 
 Now, if it is a fact that a certain combination of C x P is producing a D that is 
unsustainable, how do we know where the problem lies? Is C or P the culprit? Or both? 
The answer is simple: we do not know. The reason is because putting the blame on C 
and/or P is not a claim of fact but a claim of value. For each value of T, achieving a quantity 
of D that is sustainable is met with several combinations of C and P. In order to say that there 
is too much C and/or too much P it is necessary to establish an ideal configuration of the 
population (that is, the desired combination of P and C) to acquire a benchmark to measure the 
current state against. Remember the simple example: 100 people consuming 10 each, or 10 
people consuming 100 each. If we choose the former and our state is the latter, then there is a 
                                                 
78 We can further advance that inequality has nothing to do with sustainability, because it does not matter who is 
doing the consuming. We can rewrite the formula by using summation for the consumption of each individual P:  
D = C1 x P1 + C2 x P2 + … + Cn x Pn 
And because we are considering individual persons Pi=1, therefore: 
D = C1 + C2 + … + Cn 
Increasing or eliminating inequality does not change D: 
D = C1 (-X) + C2 (+X) + … + Cn 
Concerns of inequality when it comes to sustainability are misguided. Besides, I am already working with the 
assumption that inequality does not exist, since every unit of P has attributed to it the same C, hence D = ∑Pi x C. 
We can also advance that the rotation of generations has nothing to with sustainability. It is irrelevant if the persons 
who will be on earth in 500 years’ time are all different from today, or the exact same from today, or something 
in between. For sustainability issues it matters how many persons and what they are doing, not who they are. 
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problem of overconsumption. Reverse the roles (preference and current state) and an 
overpopulation problem arises. How to choose between the several possible configurations of 
the population seems to be an open question of population ethics as Sethe and de Magalhães 
(2013)  state: “it is also not always clear why a larger population is considered morally 
problematic.”  Minsky (2004) also states that: “no popular ethical system yet, be it humanist or 
religion-based, has shown itself able to face the challenges that already confront us: how many 
people should occupy Earth? What sorts of people should they be? How should we share the 
available space?” (for more on population ethics see the SEP entry: The Repugnant Conclusion, 
the famous Derek Parfit problem, listed under Arrhenius et al.). Only when value is attributed 
to combinations of C and P can we clearly state that there is too much of P and/or C. This is 
usually not made explicit. Take for example the common green party, or environmental NGO’s 
and their claims that we need to reduce consumption be it through less reliance on fossil fuels, 
or through water saving, etc., in other words, that we need to reduce C to achieve a sustainable 
value of D. Or for example when Sethe and de Magalhães (2013) claim that “if we are using 
finite resources in a non-sustainable manner, then this problem needs (emphasis mine) to be 
solved independently of how long people live.”79 But reducing C is not a necessary condition 
to reduce D, so it is false that we need to reduce C to achieve sustainability.80 What people 
mean is that we should reduce C to achieve sustainability, and this claim of value has implicit 
a certain preference about the configuration of the population: that people are ok with the value 
of P, but not with the value of C.  Likewise when someone employs the overpopulation 
argument it means that the configuration of the population should not have that much P because 
that results in an unacceptable low amount of C, within the bound of what is sustainable.81 .  
This counter is trying to make explicit what is obfuscated in the overpopulation 
argument. That there will be an overpopulation problem is because a certain configuration of 
the population is valued beforehand. It is this configuration that conditions the employment of 
the concept of overpopulation, i.e. it is in relation to valuable population configurations that 
there are too many people, not in relation to D being unsustainable. I mean, D being 
unsustainable is necessary but not sufficient to employ the concept of overpopulation. The 
                                                 
79 How long people live directly affects the death rate and as such P. 
80 It is extremely deceitful and dishonest when people try to claim overconsumption (or overpopulation) as a fact 
instead of as a claim of value, as for example Pearce (2009, Yale Environment 360) does. His claims are based 
on inequality, something that I proved in footnote 78, as not related to sustainability. He also falsely claims that 
overconsumption is a “simple fact”. I repeat: a change in D can be obtained by changing just C, just P, or both. 
His article is the paradigm of what not to write about sustainability. 
81 Note that questioning why people are generally worried about C, but not P, in our present situation, but the 
inverse UI is the strategy of 3.1.1.3 – Counter 2: The Overpopulation Taboo and Rhetoric Manoeuvres. 
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same applies to overconsumption. However, D being unsustainable is sufficient to apply the 
concept of overpopulation or the concept of overconsumption, since at least one of those must 
obtain. In conclusion, it is not a fact that there will be a problem of overpopulation, what there 
is instead, is a claim of value with an underlying assumption regarding the value of certain 
population configurations. 
What objections can we mount to this exposition? 
I – The first objection is that the configuration of the population is just half of the story. 
The other half concerns the means used to modify our current state (P and/or C). It might be 
the case that altering P (or C) is so costly that it is better to achieve D with a suboptimal 
configuration of the population. The complete model has to consider the value of the several 
configurations of population + the cost of action (or inaction). A configuration that produces 
D above what is sustainable will result in nefarious consequences if inaction is the strategy 
chosen (see 3.1.1.2 – Counter 1: Increasing D is Not Bad). Therefore, it is most likely better 
that some action be taken in order to deal with P and/or C. When considering which action to 
take, the net effect of each action consists in the cost of pursuing said action plus the effect 
achieved, i.e. the configuration of the population achieved. It might be the case that the best 
configuration is only attainable through highly costly actions, making this strategy less 
appealing than alternatives who use less costly actions to achieve not so good configurations. 
An example: suppose a scenario where D is unsustainable, and P is above the ideal 
configuration. Suppose further that the only options to decrease P are genocide, and forced 
sterilization. People might consider these options so undesirable/costly that the they might 
settle in bringing D to sustainable levels through reductions in C, even though that is a less 
valued population configuration. In this scenario people value more not having to go through 
reducing P than having the perfect configuration of the population. The problem is one of 
optimization, balancing outcomes and means to achieve them. 
In our current state of affairs, when people prefer to reduce C instead of acting on P, 
the reason might not be so much because they prefer a certain configuration of population, but 
because all the actions that decrease P are too costly, or those that are not, are not enough to 
decrease D to sustainable levels. Likewise, when people argue that immortality will lead to 
overpopulation, what they mean is that, decreasing the variable P is too costly. The OAA 
suggests that it is better to not pursue immortality now, than to deal with P later because dealing 
with P will bring more costs than rejecting immortality now. The overpopulation argument 
seems to be based on value claims twice over: in addition to how much certain configurations 
are valued, it also takes into account the value of options to decrease P and/or C. 
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I consider that the addition of considerations regarding the importance of the actions 
we take not so much an objection, but something that adds up to the model previously exposed. 
We have to take into account how much are we spending (how costly are the actions) and how 
much are we getting back (what configuration will be arrived at) when deciding how to act. 
II - We can go even further and claim that people do not care about population 
configurations at all. When presented with an unsustainable amount of D, they will just 
evaluate the options they have to bring D down to sustainable levels and choose accordingly. 
This does not seem to require saying anything about preferred configurations of the population. 
I do not think this objection obtains, because C seems to be evaluated primarily by its 
state, i.e. the value that it has, and not by the cost of change. Let us bring examples to the table 
and clearly separate evaluations of population configurations and the evaluation of actions to 
change C and/or P.  
P - When considering P, people seem to care not so much about how many 
people there are since they can go about their lives irrespectively of how many persons 
there are in the other side of the world or in other galaxies. However, people generally 
respond negatively, for example, to genocides as a means to bring P down. Here they 
are not so much concerned that there will be fewer people, but about the way used to 
achieve fewer people. That is, if the world never had those extra people, if they had 
never existed, no one would seem to mind, in the same way that today people do not 
seem to mind about the googolplexes of persons that could have been but were not.82 
The value of P in the configuration of the population seems to not be of much 
importance. But the means used to vary P are. 
C – When considering reductions to C, the opposite seems to happen. People 
are not so much triggered by a law or regulation concerning what people can(not) 
consume, or even direct cuts to income. What they are worried about is their new level 
of consumption. If it is reduced too much, people might find that state undesirable. For 
example if C were to reduce everyone’s income by 50%, or forbid planes, cars, and 
boats from operating, the concern is not because there is a law, or the enforcement of 
such law. That is, people do not seem to care about how that new state of affairs (with 
reduced C) came into being (law, war, natural disaster, etc). They care about what it 
means to be in that state. This is in stark contrast with what happens in P. 
                                                 
82 I am not talking only about abortions, but also about permutations of events that could have resulted in additional 
people. e.g. a couple could have had an additional child if they forgot to use a condom, or the case where a female 
failed to be raped because it was not attractive enough. 
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 Now, if people value C for its state, due to the trade-off between C and P, they will 
automatically need to value a configuration of the population. Because an increase or decrease 
of C means a corresponding inverse movement in P. Perhaps we can phrase the issue directly 
as a trade-off:  
 - How much C is one willing to give up for a marginal increase in P (an extra person)? 
 - How much C is one willing to receive for a marginal decrease in P? 
 - How much P is one willing to decrease to increase C to a certain level? 
 - How much P is one willing to increase to decrease C to a certain level? 
 If one dreams of a future where everyone will live a life of luxury with an extremely 
abundant quantity of goods and services to consume (from top notch education and justice 
systems, to yachts and private planes), then this implies a relatively low value of P. If one 
dreams of a given amount of consumption for every person on the planet, then this necessarily 
implies a certain amount of P, above which D is unsustainable. If people have goals and they 
require C to achieve those goals, then they are implicitly stating an upper limit of P. The 
configuration of the population cannot be ignored, so I will consider this objection as discarded. 
 III – A third strategy tries to negate the claim that for a given value of D that is 
unsustainable we cannot allocate blame to C and/or P. There seems to be an exception. If there 
is one variable that cannot decrease further (neither C or P can be zero nor less) then we can 
certainly attribute blame to the other variable. But these are the extreme cases where there is 
only one person (P=1) or people are consuming the bare minimum that it is possible for them 
to remain alive (C=minimum). This is certainly not the case today since there is plenty of room 
for both P and C to decrease. Is this the case when people talk about the overpopulation 
argument? There might be a version of it, let us call it the extreme version, that postulates a 
state of affairs where there is an absurd amount of people to the point that they are dying of 
hunger, or suffocation, or … while consuming the bare minimum to survive. That is no doubt 
a case of overpopulation as a fact. However, I believe that the overpopulation argument is not 
employed that way. The normal version (in opposition to the extreme version) of the 
overpopulation argument gives some leeway to consumption and is triggered once quality of 
life, or C, dips below a certain level. And because C is considered too low, that can only mean 
that there is too much of P. But C being too low is not the same as being the minimum it can 
be. If we are talking about mere survival, that is, the minimum of C, then we are talking about 
a scenario of hunger, thirst, disease, etc. in quantities that do not kill, but allow for survival, 
where no good or service can be afforded, and the only thing an individual can look forward is 
to be alive the next day. On the other hand, the normal version would obtain for any quantity 
of C above that: picture the same scenario but add in some clothes, perhaps 50 more Kcal a 
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day, and some water for basic hygiene. Now C has room to decrease. I believe the normal 
version of the overpopulation argument would obtain long before we reach such a dire 
situation. Once people believe their lives are miserable, or not worth living, or that they cannot 
achieve what is that they want to achieve, the overpopulation argument is actualized – C is too 
low (but not at the minimum), therefore P is too high. It can also be argued that in reality this 
extreme version would never materialize because humans would lose the ability to reproduce 
long before C reaches its minimum and thus automatically stabilize P.  
-- 
Verdict (Normal Version): WEAK SUCCESS  
Verdict (Extreme Version): FAIL  
 When it comes to the normal version, it seems to be the case that there are implicit 
assumptions about the configuration of the population that must be made explicit, since the 
concept of overpopulation relies on them to be applied. This was the primary goal of the counter 
and it was successful. But this seems to not be enough to overcome the overpopulation 
argument since it just deletes the property of <being an enthymeme>. Once a configuration is 
defined, the argument, although dependent on that configuration, can resume. And each 
configuration can be defended with ⸸83. Furthermore even if it is conceded that a claim of 
overpopulation depends on a certain configuration of the population and not on D (for the same 
D there are several configurations), restating the problem by substituting overpopulation with 
sustainability can make it not conditioned on a specific configuration of the population, but 
only on the value of D (the unsustainability of D is sufficient for overpopulation or 
overconsumption). This requires dropping the claims of overpopulation and adopting a looser 
stance on the configurations of the population by stating that doing something to combat 
unsustainability is likely better than doing nothing, without going into specifics (e.g. claiming 
overpopulation).  
This counter does no good to a sustainability-based argument, but it makes the 
overpopulation argument conditional on configurations of the population. As such, I grant it a 
weak success status. Moreover, it seems that the argument is strongly dependent on which 
options are available to decrease P. If there are low cost options then it might be the case that 
adjustments to D can be made through P instead of C, making the overpopulation argument 
fail. Such options will be explored in the next two counters. 
                                                 
83 Using ⸸ as a line of defence is discussed in 4.2.2 – ⸸ and the Burden of Proof. 
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 When it comes to the extreme version, its scenario seems to be unrealizable (which can 
be sufficient for its dismissal). Unlike with the normal version, the claim that there are implicit 
assumptions about the configuration of the population does not hold. Overpopulation becomes 
a fact, not a claim of value. As such the main objective of this counter fails. We can also see 
that, as with the normal version, this version is also dependent on which options exist to 
decrease P. More likely is that this is not the correct interpretation of the overpopulation 
argument since it assumes an extremely farfetched and specific scenario that is highly 
improbable. 
 
3.1.1.7 – Counter 6: Reducing D via P: The Death Rate 
 This counter tries to present options to reduce P. If these options are available and are 
acceptable then the overpopulation concern is transformed into a solved problem. Note that in 
pursuing this strategy this counter does not deny that P will increase if nothing is done. Instead 
it starts by recognizing the overpopulation argument, and then finding solutions to avoid the 
dire consequences of unsustainability. In this sense the overpopulation argument cannot be 
dismissed, but it also does not accomplish its goal of rejecting immortality, it serves as a 
remainder of problems that need addressing.  
I – If we are creating a problem (increasing P) where it existed none, surely that is 
enough grounds to reject immortality. Better than having to solve a problem, is to not have the 
problem in the first place. 
I.A1 – It is simply not true that immortality creates the problem. With or without 
immortality a problem of unsustainability exists already and has to be dealt with. It is entirely 
possible that the concerns of overpopulation will obtain (if they have not already) even if 
immortality is not achieved. If the sustainability problem is dealt with now (i.e. not UI), there 
is no reason to believe the same solution cannot be still in place UI. However, it can be argued 
that not pursuing immortality is part of the solution. I will expand below on what it means to 
negate immortality as a solution to the sustainability problem. Miller (2004) resumes this point: 
It should be pointed out that the current alarming population crisis and depletion of 
nonrenewable resources has come about without the slightest aid from biogerontologists, 
who have not yet discovered anything that actually improves public health or prevents 
disease. It follows inexorably that placing obstacles in the path of aging research will not 
provide the key to resolving the population crunch. 
I.A2 - The inference is not correct because it fails to adequately compare the state after 
the problem with the state before the problem. It is true that with a ceteris paribus clause, having 
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no problems is better than having problems, but without the clause this is uncertain. More 
(2004) presents an example: 
Opposing extended life because, eventually, it might add to existing problems would be an 
ethically irresponsible response. Suppose you are a doctor faced with a child suffering from 
pneumonia. Would you refuse to cure the child because she would then be well enough to 
run around and step on the toes of others? 
Here is another example: the mandatory use of seatbelt increased the number of injuries per 
accident. That is a true statement. Using seatbelts created problems where there were none 
since there are now more injured people per accident. But everyone regards the use of the 
seatbelt as a good overall measure. What is going on? Simple, the new injured people are those 
who avoided death. Failing to adequately compare the states of affairs, both before and after 
the problem arrived, is a methodological error. I will expand below on how this applies to 
immortality. 
Having the new problem seems to be better than not having it, and no one is advocating 
that the new injured people be dealt with by retiring seatbelt usage. In the same way, advances 
on curing heart diseases caused an increase in Alzheimer’s patients, but no one is advocating 
dealing with Alzheimer’s by outlawing cardiology. But immortality is no more and no less than 
a medicine that allows people to live longer in a healthy state in the same way that seatbelts 
and heart medicine do. Suppose that immortality comes in a pill that must be taken every few 
years84. People take the pill and the capability meaning of aging disappears (no cancer, no 
Parkinson’s, no osteoporosis, etc). There is no difference between going under surgery to treat 
a potentially lethal condition now that allows the subject to live more years in a healthy state 
and taking the immortality pill one time UI. Immortality is all the surgeries, treatments and 
medicines that we take and make us live longer and healthy (the pill is a mere abstraction of 
these)85. Harry (2013) also agrees: “We are then unlikely ever to face the question: Should we 
make people immortal, ‘yes’, or ‘no’? We may rather be called upon to decide whether we 
should treat a particular disease when we know an effective treatment will extend lifespan.” In 
this sense using the rejection of immortality as a way to achieve sustainability is no different 
than rejecting medical treatment today, in the hopes that people die quicker: no antibiotics, no 
vaccines, no surgeries, etc. Allow me to make my point clearer. Suppose that instead of 
                                                 
84 The SENS project is not that far off, since the basic premise is to let aging happen, but constantly repair the 
body to the point that aging becomes negligible. From their own site (SENS, n.d.): “Our mission to 
develop rejuvenation biotechnologies is based on the notion that it may be possible to apply the principles of regenerative 
medicine to the cellular and molecular damage of aging. In short, we think it ought to be possible to engineer solutions to age-
related disease that stave off pathology indefinitely – such that, like the rockfish, lobster, and hydra – we are able to 
get old without becoming sick or frail. “ 
85 Although if the benefits of heart surgery could in the future be reduced to a pill, that is, substitute the need of 
heart treatment with a pill, then the analogy of immortality with a pill will be more than a mere abstraction. 
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immortality we were talking about developing antibiotics for the first time and someone came 
up with the overpopulation argument claiming that <we should not pursue this line of research 
because it will lead to people living longer, decreasing the death rate, and thus aggravate the 
sustainability issue. It will also increase the incidence of new diseases and bring with it a lot of 
new problems.> Conclusion: we should not have pursued antibiotic research, and we should 
stop its use immediately. There is no way to support antibiotic usage (or any other medicine) 
today and at the same time refuse immortality without being incoherent, if the reason is 
overpopulation. However, people can accept antibiotic usage and at the same time recognize 
the new issues that arose and deal with the them without the need to outlaw antibiotics, in the 
same way that people can accept immortality, recognize the issues that will arise and deal with 
them accordingly without the need to refuse immortality. As More (2004) puts it: “The 
superlongevity advocate would want to help find solutions to any population issues. But dying 
is not a responsible or healthy way to solve anything.” 
Let us make clearer what dismissing immortality with the overpopulation argument 
entails. UI the death rate is supposed to go down. This aggravates the sustainability problem 
via increases in P. A solution is to make the death rate go up again. One option is mass murder.86 
It can be achieved directly through engineering diseases and indirectly through war. This seems 
the sort of option that the OAA would find unacceptable and use to defend the undesirability 
of immortality. But is it? Let us frame it another way. Suppose mass murder is committed by 
depriving people of water and/or food and letting them die by starvation. We can draw a parallel 
between that case and one where people are denied available medical treatment which results 
in their death, the common feature being denying something that would result in people’s 
involuntary death. The problem of the death rate going down caused by immortality is solved 
by negating medical treatment, that is, we do not let the problem arise in the first place. But 
negating immortality is the same thing as negating medical treatment and as such refusing 
immortality is the same as intentionally killing people through the denial of medical treatment. 
Such actions are mass murder and is mass murder indeed that is needed to drive death rates 
back up. More (2004) and Sethe and de Magalhães (2013), respectively, agree: 
If we take seriously the idea of limiting life span so as to control population, why not be 
more proactive about it? Why not drastically reduce access to currently commonplace 
medical treatments? Why not execute anyone reaching the age of seventy?”  
“If one decided that the vision of a crowed planet is too terrible to permit, what type of 
intervention should be adopted? Would we decline to invest in medical innovation? 
Withhold its use? Encourage suicide or sanction killings?” 
                                                 
86 Note that this is not genocide, in technical terms. It is irrelevant if we target people of a particular group, or of 
all groups, for the purpose of decreasing P. It is best to assume that individuals are selected at random. 
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This turns the overpopulation argument upside down. If killing people is acceptable, 
then overpopulation is no longer a concern (and immortality is not actualized). If killing people 
is not acceptable then immortality cannot be refused. Some people perhaps would like to claim 
a difference between letting someone die and actively killing them.87 But the only difference 
that exists is that those who claim that there is a difference do not understand the concept of 
opportunity cost when compared to those who do claim that there is no difference. Inaction is 
an option on the same level as the others. It is irrelevant if my choice involves: pulling a gun’s 
trigger, or walking straight while not wetting my clothes by jumping into a lake, or rejecting 
medical treatment when feasible88, if it causes someone to not survive. As Harris (2013) states: 
When we save a life, by whatever means, we simply postpone death. Life saving is just death 
postponement. This is a truth from which it follows that life-extending therapies are, and 
must always be, life-saving therapies and must share whatever priority life saving has in our 
morality and in our social values. (…) To fail to do so when we can would make us 
responsible for the resulting death (this claim is defended in detail in Harris 1987, 1980). 
The OAAs must be ready to understand the full scope of their claims. The implications 
of denying people medical treatment applies to our situation today. Should we do it so that 
people die quicker and alleviate population/sustainability concerns? Our current death rate also 
suffered a sharp decrease mainly due to decreases in child mortality rates (Roser, 2018a). 
Should we bring child mortality rates back up again as a solution to our sustainability problem 
now in the same way that the OAA wants to do UI?  
Some authors do indeed state that people should be left to die after an arbitrary number 
of years. This allows them to accept modern medicine up to a point and refuse everything that 
comes after, including immortality. In Binstock (2004b) and Overall (2003, 38) respectively:  
In his book Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society, Callahan (1987) draws on 
both his philosophical and social analyses to urge that life-extending health care be 
categorically denied in the United States to anyone who has achieved an age of about 80 
(which he posits as a proxy for the end of a natural life span). 
Callahan (1996, 442) refers to the late seventies or early eighties as constituting a “natural 
life span.” He concludes that society should not use its common resources to extend life, for 
“the present average life expectancy in the developed countries has proved perfectly 
adequate for most people to live a full life and for those countries to flourish economically 
and intellectually”. 
                                                 
87 Note that if letting someone die is still unacceptable, then the previous exposition still obtains. We only need to 
substitute the expression “killing” by the expression “letting people die”. What matters for the argument is that 
the expression used be considered something unacceptable. 
88 Sometimes medical treatments are too expensive, so they are not provided. If this is the case the discussion 
moves to research that aims at reducing the cost of treatment. Should we refuse that research if it means people 
will die in the future because of our decision? 
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But the justification cannot be because we have a certain natural lifespan as we have 
seen in 2.3.1.2 – Human Nature Version. Even if we grant ⸸ as a line of defence, an explanation 
to impose such view on others (i.e. not allowing immortality to go through therefore letting 
everyone die at an arbitrary age) is lacking. Let us think for a moment on what that means. A 
person goes to the hospital and the first thing done is to collect information about her age, if 
under a certain value what caused her to go to the hospital gets treated, but if her age is above 
a certain value then she will have to suffer the consequences even if that means death and the 
treatment is cheap and readily available.  
-- 
Verdict: WEAK SUCCESS 
The goal of this counter was to make clear what it means defending the overpopulation 
argument. The overpopulation argument is allowed to reject immortality because it implicitly 
supports letting people to die against their will. It seems to not be the case suggested in 3.1.1.6 
– Counter 5: How to Configure Population? where the overpopulation argument obtains 
because there are no acceptable ways to reduce P. Instead it obtains because there are, and in 
bringing the death rates back up immortality never materializes. It remains to be explained why 
any support for modern medicine, safety policies and even laws against murder, emanate from 
the OAA. Here is Miller (2004) showing the reductio ad absurdum:  
Perhaps there are some who, after sober and deliberate contemplation, feel that our 
Malthusian ills are best addressed by strategies that constrain the productive life span of 
healthy adults rather than by controlling the supply of new people. Were I a member of such 
a group, I'd suggest that it devote its energies to removing seat belts from automobiles, 
insulin and antibiotics from the pharmacies, and anti-smoking campaigns from the schools, 
because compared to these interventions, picking on biogerontologists has at this point a 
pretty low yield. 
I consider this a weak success because, while it will most likely fetch some 
inconsistencies in the world view of the OAA, it does not necessarily destroy the 
overpopulation argument. The OAA can either recognize the inadequacy of their argument, or 
alternatively, double down and reject a lot of things that allows us to live longer and healthy 
(medicine, security laws, safety features, etc). Accepting half of medicine to reject another half 
(immortality) is also in need of explanation, and so the same formula can be applied: they can 
see the inadequacy of their argument or come up with an explanation, yet unknown to me, of 
their view. 
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3.1.1.8 – Counter 7: Reducing D via P (and C): The Birth Rate 
 What are our options regarding the decrease of C and/or P? Perhaps if one lays out 
some it becomes clear that they are not all strongly undesirable. 
 As stated in the previous counter, if we are doing something in relation to C and/or P is 
because we recognize that we might have a problem (and we do) or we expect one to happen 
(we also do). The overpopulation argument reminds us of that: if nothing is done then it will 
obtain. 
 The first thing I want to make clear is that it is not enough to act just on P or just on C, 
because efforts to reduce one parameter can be cannibalized by increases in the other. The 
sustainability problem is only effectively solved when there are defined limits to both P and C. 
If there is a correlation between an increase in C and a decrease in the fertility rate as suggested 
in 3.1.1.4 – Counter 3: P Will Not Increase, then a decrease in C might originate an increase 
in P. On the other hand, a decrease in P can cause a Jevons-Paradox like effect and increase C. 
Acting on both parameters does not mean that both have to decrease necessarily, only that 
limits are imposed. It all depends on the chosen configuration of the population. And a limit 
set does not mean a limit met. I remember when I was younger TELCOs offering SMS’s subject 
to a limit of 1500 per week. It was really hard for the limit to be reached, but nevertheless it 
was there to safeguard the integrity of the network. In the same way limits regarding C and P 
could be seen as safeguards. 
 Let us start by approaching C. When we decrease C what we are doing is quite simply 
making people poorer overall. Off course that when decreasing C, the cuts should start at the 
low hanging fruit, and those are things that do not affect substantially what is that people value. 
For example, when someone says to turn the faucet off when brushing our teeth, the effort 
required is not that much, and the foregone goods (water running from the faucet) are also not 
that impactful on our lives. But the things where it is easy to cut on are limited in scope and 
soon we will be dealing with sensitive matters. That is the case when, for example, people 
advocate not eating as much meat (Pimentel and Pimentel, 2003)89 and instead substituting it 
by eating crickets (UN, 2013). Perhaps someone values eating meat so much that they prefer 
further adjustments to D to be made through P, instead of C. It is quite difficult to state which 
consumption is necessary and which consumption is superfluous. It requires imposing two 
                                                 
89 Curiously at the end of the article the authors claim that “the major threat to future survival and to US natural 
resources is rapid population growth (…) These vital resources will have to be divided among ever greater 
numbers of people.” This constitutes another piece of support for the equivalence between our problem today and 
the problem UI because both can be framed in overpopulation terms. The citation also underlines the trade-off 
between C and P. 
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claims of value on others: the first concerning the value of the good that is to be rationed or 
forbidden, and the second concerning a certain configuration of the population. I was always 
flabbergasted when, during the ethics class of the master’s program that resulted in this project, 
everyone but me advocated fervently that we ought to reduce consumption because it is 
superfluous. And everyone knew exactly what was to be considered superfluous. Talk about 
arrogance. But who is to say what is superfluous and what is not? 
 When it comes to implement decreases in C there are several strategies:  
a) Awareness campaigns and educational efforts seem to be the least intrusive while 
still influencing people’s behaviour. An example is recycling campaigns that incentivize people 
to recycle and thus reduce the amount of pollution made. The drawback is that this might not 
be enough since it depends on the voluntary will of the individual. 
b) Incentives, prizes and other benefits could be given to those who fulfilled certain 
requirements. However, those prizes should be things that do not increase D, otherwise the 
suggestion is moot (e.g. fiscal incentives allow people consume more). Simple things like 
priority when in line to state services are an example of a suitable incentive. The China Social 
Credit System, despite its scariness, offers a good framework for the implementation of this 
measure. 
c) Next down the line are taxes and quotas. They can achieve rationing with a hard 
limit: we are already seeing this, for example, when the EU declares fishing quotas or when 
some products get special taxation (e.g. diesel and gasoline). The drawback is that it 
exacerbates whatever inequality problems might exist, since it makes access to those goods 
even more difficult for low income groups. Licences, marketable rights and pricing 
externalities are also options to reduce consumption, particularly pollution.   
d) Extending the previous item further, there is the option to forbid the consumption of 
certain items. And taking it a step further means destroying production capabilities. 
e) Some measures can be complemented with fines and sanctions, or even criminalized. 
f) There is also the option of cutting on income and/or credit. If people do not have the 
money, they will not use it for consumption. In fact, every measure to limit or decrease C can 
be framed in terms of losing purchasing power (remember that decreasing C is making people 
poorer on average).90 This has the advantage of not imposing value judgements over what kinds 
of consumption are necessary and what kinds are superfluous. Loss of purchasing power 
                                                 
90 I always find it interesting to ask those who strongly advocate reducing consumption if they are ok with a ~59% 
pay cut. This is based on the data presented in 3.1.1.2 – Counter 1: Increasing D, stating that D is 69% above the 
sustainable level. If not, perhaps they ought to consider reductions to P. 
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through nominal income cuts are much more resisted by the layman than through other means 
such as inflation or exchange rates. 
When it comes to C, the issues seem to be not so much on how it is implemented, but 
on what things it is implemented on. Note that something similar was supposed on 3.1.1.6 – 
Counter 5: How to Configure Population?,  that issues arise not so much regarding how C is 
reduced, but how much C is left after the reduction. With this discussion we can further specify 
that not only the quantity matters, but also the quality. 
 Let us turn our focus on P. Unlike C, and as already noted in 3.1.1.6 – Counter 5: How 
to Configure Population?, in general people seem to have no issue with the level that P has in 
a certain configuration of the population (apart from the implications of setting a level for C). 
So, what are some of our options if we want to limit or decrease P? As stated in 3.1.1.2 – 
Counter 1: Increasing D, the variations in P can be further decomposed as the difference 
between the birth rate death rate. In other words any variation in P must come from the death 
rate and/or the birth rate. Controlling P via death rates is explored in 3.1.1.7 – Counter 6: 
Reducing D via P: The Death Rate. Any measure that purports to increase the death rate is 
counter to the idea of immortality91, since UI people die because they want to, not because they 
have to. If we look closer at what are the necessary conditions for P to increase, we see that 
death is not one of them. It is possible to eradicate death and P still not increase. The only 
necessary condition is that new people be brought to life: reproduction. It is impossible to 
increase P without births, even if the death rate went to zero. Therefore controlling reproduction 
seems to be an adequate target. So, what are our options to decrease or limit the birth rate? 
a) One of them is forced sterilization.92 However this measure seems to be one those 
that are unacceptable for the OAA. 
b) Access to contraceptives or facilitated access (e.g. subsidies) to contraceptives in 
conjunction with sexual education. Conly (2016, 107, 109) shares “education about the climate 
change is becoming widespread, and education about the effects of population could be easily 
included. (…) The more we know about contraception, so that we may control the effects of 
sex, the better.” It is easier to allow people to have sexual relations and prevent pregnancy than 
to try that people not have sexual relations because “life, uh, finds a way”. More (2004) also 
suggests this measure: “If we want to reduce births, we might voluntarily fund programs to 
                                                 
91 It is true that we could envision campaigns advocating suicide. But the problem is that such measure does not 
guarantee that sustainability is achieved since it relies on voluntary action. In fact, it is expected not to work 
forever because of what is stated in P1A1A1A1. 
92 Note that this is not negative eugenics, in technical terms. It is irrelevant if we target people only of a certain 
group, or of all groups, for the purposes of decreasing P. It is best to assume that individuals are selected at random. 
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provide contraceptives and family planning to couples in poorer countries.” And Conly (2016, 
115, 117) further adds that:93  
it is estimated that 215 to 220 million women globally have an unmet need for contraception 
– that is, there are that many women who would like to plan their pregnancies and have 
smaller families, but who cannot because they have no access to contraception. (…) It has 
been estimated that eliminating unwanted pregnancies through contraception would give us 
a population by 2100 that is three billion fewer than if we do not eliminate unwanted 
pregnancies and continue our present practices as usual. 
c) Women empowerment, economic development and other factors already mentioned 
in 3.1.1.4 – Counter 3: P Will Not Increase can contribute to decrease P, although as stated 
before this might not be enough. More (2004) also supports this measure: “Women should also 
be encouraged to join the modern world by gaining the ability to pursue vocations other than 
child-raising.” 
d) Economic incentives can be used. At the moment most fiscal systems favour 
increases in P. For example, the municipality where I am writing this from, Sever do Vouga, 
is giving a lump sum of 500€ per birth, and the main opposition leader of the country I am 
writing this from, Portugal, is promising subsidies totalling 10 000€ per newborn. 94 Income 
tax also discriminates if a child is involved. If P is to be reduced at least these incentives (or 
discriminations) should go away. More (2004) seems to agree: 
Many of the same people who have decried population growth have supported policies 
guaranteed to boost childbirths. (…). If we want to encourage people to have more children, 
we should make it cheaper for them to do so. If we want to discourage fertility, or at least 
refrain from pushing it up, we should stop subsidizing it. 
Ideally, the subsidies should not only stop but be reverted to benefit those without children, 
e.g. childlessness subsidies, subsidies for voluntary sterilization, subsidized abortions, or 
alternatively taxes for those who have children. Any policy of this type must also consider the 
well-being of the child. Conly (2016, 119) tells us that  
the childless already subsidize those who have children through shared costs for schools and 
public services in general. It seems reasonable that rather than childless people having an 
extra tax burden relative to others, they should have less of a burden. And in addition to 
simple fairness, the tax break (for the childless, or for those who have only one child) could 
encourage people to have fewer children. 
                                                 
93 Upon consulting the reference provided by Conly (Corey and Brook, 2014) for the 3B figure, I concluded that 
the number is a misguided inference on the part of Conly. The study merely replicated the rate of unwanted 
pregnancies but did not compensate for cases were a wanted pregnancy would happen had the unwanted 
pregnancy not occurred. 3B is an overestimation. Nevertheless I still believe the real number to be significant. 
94 For comparison, at the time of writing the minimum wage before taxes was at 8120€ (12 months = 677€ per 
month). 
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However, one must be aware of pundits who will use this to advocate a libertarian agenda, not 
understanding the concept of externality95 (except when it comes to security and defence) and 
thus believing the free market to be our lord and saviour. Here is an example by More (2004):  
Subsidies include free education (free to the parents, not to the tax-payers), free child health 
care, and additional welfare payments to women for each child they bear. If parents must 
personally bear the costs of having children, rather than everyone else paying, people will 
tend to have just the number of children for whom they can assume financial responsibility. 
(…) Most effective at spurring the positive changes are markets – price signals creating 
incentives for moves in the right direction.  
Although it is true that contributions to the childrearing made by everyone (even childless 
persons) through taxation pay for services that the child can use, such as the health services 
and the educational system, such services provide positive externalities. Letting the free market 
make the resource allocation will result in suboptimal quantities of these services. 
e) Quotas for reproductive rights can be achieved by a licencing system. Hugh 
LaFolette (2010) presents arguments for a parenting licencing system. According to him, 
parenting is a potentially harmful activity, both for the children and for society, and as such it 
should be regulated96. He says that 80% of incarcerated criminals were abused as a child. 
Having to prove that one is capable of rearing children is not an infringement in anyone’s rights 
in the same way that a driving licence is not an infringement on anyone’s right to drive, or a 
certification for the practice of medicine is an infringement in the right of anyone to be a 
physician. And licencing criteria already exist and are demanded in the case of adopted 
children. It is surprising why biological children are not held to the same standards considering 
that Lafolette claims that adopted children are five times less likely to suffer parental abuse. 
f) Direct quotas can also be implemented. Conly (2016), for example, advocates for 
one-child policy. She starts her book by stating that: “I am going to argue here that we do not 
have a right to more than one biological child.” Conly (2016, 46) argues that reproductive rights 
are not unlimited: “the right to food is not the right to caviar and champagne, the right to 
education is not the right to go to the best university but to an adequate education, and any right 
to pass one’s genes is met by one child.” She also argues that (2016, 75) “having children is 
not essential to the rational agency that makes us persons” and cites Amartya Sen (2016, 89): 
“Despite the importance of reproductive rights, if their exercise were to generate disasters such 
                                                 
95 An externality is a cost or benefit that affects a third party. For example pollution made by companies imposes 
health burdens on society, a negative externality. They are not captured by the market system, unless regulated. 
Thus a negative externality if left to market forces will result in overproduction, while a positive externality will 
result in underproduction. For example if we internalize the negative externality of pollution companies will tend 
to pollute less. 
96 The parallel with driving is immediate. Driving is also a potentially harmful activity and as such it is regulated 
by requiring a licence as proof of competence. 
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as massive misery and hunger, then we would have to question whether they deserve full 
protection.” Even the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has exceptions, as 
Conly (2016, 79) shows: 
The ECHR provides a right to respect for one’s “private and family life”, but then goes on 
to say, “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except … in the interest of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
community, for the prevention of disorder and crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
The right to reproduce is not an individual action. Every child that is born creates a burden for 
everyone else by decreasing C. It also has the potential to make D unsustainable, so it checks 
several boxes of the exception provided in the ECHR. As Conly (2016, 230) concludes: “we 
need to realize that having children is not a private matter anymore.”  
g) Perhaps a more interesting idea is that of a market for reproductive rights or birth 
credits. It would work along the following lines: everyone is entitled by birth to one (or 
more/less, adjusted according to some sustainability criteria) birth credit. A birth credit gives 
the right to have one child. The market system allows for the exchange of these credits (perhaps 
in pieces of 1/100). If someone does not want to have children, they can sell their birth credit 
and increase their C with the proceedings. Alternatively, if someone wants to have a child and 
has no birth credits they must acquire some. There is no limit to the number of children a person 
can have, provided that it can acquire enough birth credits. The birth credit, when used, passes 
onto the children who will be the new owner. The great advantage of this system is that it 
allows consequences to be tied to personal choice, and that translates into fairness. It is unfair 
to those who do not want to have children to bear the burden of reduction in their consumption 
(in addition to the institutionalized discrimination referred above), so that others have the 
privilege of childbearing. Increasing P must reduce C, if D is to be equal. I remember hearing 
a pregnant woman during an ethics seminar stating vigorously that we ought to reduce our 
consumption. She wanted to have the cake and eat it too! Why should I have to reduce my 
consumption if it is her that is having the child? Does she not realize the amount of D that her 
child, that she caused, will bring forth? With this system there is a transfer of C from those who 
want extra children to those who want none, compensating the dilution of C that everyone 
suffers caused by increases in P. Although this system works with our current death rate, 
supposing that the death rate goes to nearly zero UI, will make this system stale (which is not 
a problem given the amount of time that immortals have), i.e. the default credits per person at 
birth will be extremely low as to not increase P97. 
                                                 
97 There might be leeway with the increase in T. This is discussed in the next section. 
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h) If P is to remain constant UI, and the death rate goes to zero98, an option is imposing 
a trade-off between immortality and reproduction. As Sethe and de Magalhães (2013) point 
out: “some suggest a scheme where those who have become ‘immortalized’ could agree not to 
reproduce (Harris 2000).”99 Those who decide to have children will stop immortality treatments 
some time after having the child. This is no different than the situation we have today where 
people have children and after a few decades they die. The difference is for those who do not 
want to have children since they will have the option to be alive forever (see 2.4.1 – 
Optionality). This guarantees a constant population and effectively solves the problem posited 
by the OAA in a satisfactory manner. Those who want to have children will not be worse off 
in comparison with today, and those who do not will have a new option: immortality. It can be 
argued that this suffers from the same issue pointed out in 3.1.1.7 – Counter 6: Reducing D via 
P: The Death Rate where available medical treatment is being denied, in this case to those who 
have children. Although it is true that medical treatment will be denied to those who have 
children, there is a very important difference: agency. On one case medical treatment is being 
denied against the will of the individual, and in the other is being denied because the individual 
consented by deciding to have a child. Voluntary death is allowed under immortality.  
There are two more concerns that I want to dismiss when it comes to regulating P. The 
first is how should the enforcement of these measures be done without putting a burden on the 
child? Well, in no different way than if a pregnant woman or her partner, or a recent mom or 
her partner, or… committed any other crime or infraction. Having a child does not equate to a 
get out of jail free card, neither to the ability to dismiss the payment of fines, taxes and so forth. 
The second is an argument that states than no individual child is the cause of unsustainability. 
Conly (2016, 96) answers swiftly: 
When it comes to overpopulation, it is a joint enterprise. No one set of parents is wrecking 
the environment all by themselves (…) If I and my nine cousins all plot to poison Grandma, 
we cannot avoid responsibility by each giving her only 1/10th of a lethal dose. Even though 
each of us can truly say that his dose alone would not have killed her, we are responsible for 
her death, and no one would dispute this. 
-- 
Verdict: SUCCESS 
 I do believe there is a satisfactory solution to tackle the overpopulation concerns that 
does not involve mass murder, forced sterilization, negative eugenics and other projects 
deemed unacceptable by a large majority of people of the developed world. It requires acting 
                                                 
98 The best case scenario for the overpopulation argument to obtain. 
99 The authors add that “one could regard this arrangement as troubling where it might lead to social stagnation.” 
Their concerns will be explored in section 3.1.3 – Stagnation Argument. 
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on both C and P. Acting on C does not seem problematic as I have discussed. When it comes 
to acting on P the simple solution of offering a trade-off between reproduction and immortality 
is successful. The reason for my evaluation is that no one will be in a worse position than today: 
those who do want children will be, at least, in the same scenario as today, while those who do 
not will have an extra option. Even if one eventually wants children, it could be after many 
years of immortality have been enjoyed beforehand. Or even if one wants children in the same 
fashion as today it will still benefit from a perfect compression of morbidity UI. Thus everyone 
becomes better off UI, even under the strictest of assumptions (death rate equal to zero and no 
changes in T). 
 
3.1.1.9 – Concluding Remarks 
 The overpopulation argument should be taken seriously, since it has a strong 
foundation: increasing P, ceteris paribus, will increase D, and immortality is expected to 
increase P via death rate reduction. Against this concern I presented the following counters: 
1 – Increasing D is not bad – HIGH PROBABILITY OF FAILURE 
2 – Rhetoric counter - UNKNOWN 
3 – P will not increase – FAILURE 
4 – T will compensate - FAILURE 
5 – Configuration of the population – WEAK SUCCESS 
6 – Reducing P via death rates – WEAK SUCCESS 
7 – Reducing P (and C) via birth rates – SUCCESS 
-- 
 There is no doubt that we are currently in unsustainable territory. Anything that 
aggravates this state compromises even further our ability to achieve what it is that people want 
to achieve. As Overall states (2003, 135): 
If immortals remained young in physiological terms, they might reproduce forever, thus 
exacerbating indefinitely the resource burden that they already constitute. A culture of 
immortals could simply permit the population to increase “with the certain consequence that 
the general life support system would fail (…) simply letting the population increase seems 
to be an implausible choice for an immortal population, who of necessity would have to 
eschew any short-term points of view. Unrestricted population growth would be self-
defeating: no one or almost no one would survive. 
 The reason counter 1 does not obtain a complete failure is because there might be utility 
functions that value the destruction of society or of our planet, or something similar. But 
because increasing D when already in an unsustainability state is deleterious to various 
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instrumental convergent goals, we can safely say that it is most likely bad, i.e. an unsustainable 
state will be detrimental for the large majority of goals that people have. 
 Counters 3 and 4, are clear failures. They rely on population to stop growing by itself 
or increases in resource use efficiency via technological progress, respectively. Note that I am 
not advocating against these outcomes. If they happen the OAA has its concerns dealt with. 
The problem is exactly because we do not know if they will happen. Or even if they do, as is 
expected, we do not know if they will happen in time (T increases) or at suitable level (P 
stabilization). It is the highest gamble humanity can make. Not only that but the mere act of 
using these counters can be self-deceiving if they create some sort of bystander effect. Given 
the disastrous consequences of throwing ecosystems out of balance people should proceed with 
the assumption that the suggestions of counters 2 and 3 will not work and put in place extra 
policies. If, in the future, P does stabilize at sustainable levels, and/or T continues to increase 
at a great rate to put us at a sustainable level, then and only then should we relax our 
precautionary measures. Meanwhile counters 3 and 4 can only offer so much: either 
immortality is postponed until sustainability is achieved, or if immortality is not postponed 
additional measures should be taken to deal with the overpopulation problem (counters 6 and/or 
7). The conclusion is that both these counters (3 and 4), at the moment, do not alleviate the 
overpopulation concern. 
 Counter 2 consists in a rhetorical strategy since there is suspicion that the OAA is also 
employing one. By making an equivalence between our case today and that UI, the strategy 
tries to show that the solutions we apply now will also be valid UI. Since we are not UI today 
and have a problem of sustainability, the solution must not include cancelling immortality 
because there is nothing to cancel yet. Whatever the chosen solution is to tackle the problems 
of the present, it is likely that it will be available UI.  
The equivalence between the present and the scenario UI is explored in counter 5. The 
goal of this counter is to make clear hidden assumptions regarding the overpopulation 
argument, namely that there is an implicit assumption about the configuration of the population. 
This assumption is the anchor of the claim of overpopulation. But what is usually and falsely 
argued, is that overpopulation is anchored in a sustainability claim. Unsustainability is 
necessary but not sufficient for overpopulation. Counter 5 was graded as a weak success 
because it showed that the overpopulation is a conditional argument. It is conditioned to value 
claims about the configuration of the population. However, even after it is brought to light that 
the overpopulation argument relies on a claim of value masquerading as fact, that in itself is 
not enough to do away with the sustainability problem. If there is no overpopulation problem, 
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then certainly there is one of overconsumption. All we need to know is that we are currently in 
unsustainable territory and immortality has the potential to aggravate the situation. Therefore 
although overpopulation claims require more justification, sustainability claims do not. Hence 
the attribution of a weak success. 
Counters 6 and 7 adopt a different strategy. They do not rely on uncertainty, like 
counters 3 and 4. They are the precautionary measures that we should be taking to not rely on 
counters 3 and 4. In counter 6 the main mechanism of adjustment is through the death rate, 
while in counter 7 the main mechanism of adjustment is the birth rate (and C). 
Counter 6 offers a solution to sustainability by increasing the death rate and one way of 
doing it is not pursuing immortality. But this opens a pandora box, since if killing people (or 
in another language, letting people die) is acceptable to solve overpopulation by denying them 
immortality (or in another language, medical treatment), then it will follow that other measures 
that allow people to die quicker will be useful tools too to achieve sustainability: from 
eliminating modern medicine, to safety features in devices we use (i.e. seatbelt), or even 
security. By outlawing the access to these goods we achieve the same effect that the OAA 
wants when it advocates against the pursuit of immortality. Afterall (More, 2004) “extending 
the human life span would worsen the problem no more than would improving automobile 
safety or worker safety or reducing violent crime”. So the OAA cannot claim that it is trying to 
avoid overpopulation because there will be no acceptable means of reducing it. By the very 
nature of the overpopulation argument it implicitly states that there are, i.e. letting people die 
by refusing medical treatment. Some authors do indeed see this problem with the 
overpopulation argument (Sethe and de Magalhães, 2013; and Overall, 2003, 136, 54; 
respectively): 
Relying on death is not a very creative way to tackle such [sustainability] problems (More 
2004). 
It might be argued that the social costs incurred by the potential absence of death for part or 
all of a population would necessitate desperate measures, including ultimately the 
imposition of limits on the right to continue living. according to Woods, is to set “some 
definite upper limit on the duration of one’s right to live. (…) I do not find it self-evident 
that we must let people die for the sake of alleviating overpopulation. 
 I granted a weak success status to counter 6 since it will most likely require more 
thought by the OAA. Advocating mass murder is not an easy task.  
   Counter 7 seems to be the way to go. Note that I defend that both C and P be regulated. 
As such I present several measures to regulate C. And when it comes to P, regulating births 
seems, to me, much more tractable than mass murder. More (2004) seems to share the same 
feeling claiming that “if we want to slow population growth, we should focus on reducing 
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births, not on raising or maintaining deaths.” Overall (2003, 138) also seems to agree: “I cannot 
see why the putative rights of merely possible beings should trump the actual rights of already-
existing beings. Nor is it clear why the right to reproduce would trump the right to go on living.” 
 I present several alternatives for regulating births, from quotas to licencing systems. 
However Overall (2003, 138) seems to not be convinced because 
it would be better to argue against the outlawing of reproduction on the basis I mentioned 
earlier of the loss, occasioned by the immortality of some individuals, to existing people, 
who would no longer possess an exercisable right to reproduce and would no longer benefit 
from the arrival of and experience of being with new human beings. 
 But at the same time she says and concludes (138, 140, 153): 
But even if reproduction ought not to be outlawed, it is hard to see that the adoption of the 
alternative, limiting the amount of time that people are permitted to live, is justified. (…) 
The potential population burdens and resource costs of immortality, themselves possibly 
infinite in nature, may be sufficient to rule immortality out as in any way a tenable goal for 
a society. (…) The resource limits of the planet provide a definitive argument against making 
immortality a tenable social goal. 
Overall, not wanting to regulate P, decided to refuse immortality. Not only that is 
clearly misguided, it also does not solve the problem of unsustainability, since P can continue 
to increase and cannibalize any gains of C and T. Overall prefers to let people die against their 
will than to limit births. The position of Overall is more striking when it is discovered she had 
access to the solution I provide and chose to ignore it (135):  
Harris (2000, 59) remarks that “society might be tempted to offer people life-prolonging 
therapies only on condition that they did not reproduce, except perhaps posthumously, or 
that they agreed if they did reproduce to forfeit their right to subsequent therapies. 
 This is the solution responsible for the successful status of the counter 7. It does not 
infringe on the rights of others as Overall claims, since an individual’s decision to become 
immortal would not take away reproductive rights of those that did not choose to become 
immortal. And those who choose to reproduce would be in no worse position than today’s. 
Most likely they will also benefit. Worst case scenario they will benefit of a perfect 
compression of morbidity, but perhaps they decide to live immortal lives for several millennia 
before deciding to produce offspring. And that is under the assumption that T is static, because 
if it is not, people could have children and continue to enjoy immortality. 
 Off course that T will not be static, it is just that my analysis was made under the 
strictest of assumptions. And it is clear that even working with the strictest assumptions of the 
overpopulation argument (death equal to zero, and T does not increase), there is still an option. 
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In a more realistic scenario as T changes, increases in P and/or C will become possible.100 
Lastly, immortality is reversible, so we can always resort to denying treatment if things get 
murky, bringing people back to the mortal realm, or making them hibernate until T catches up. 
-- 
Overall Verdict: FAIL (with caveats) 
 I do not think the overpopulation argument is enough to reject immortality. However, 
unlike other arguments, the overpopulation argument requires us to take a pro-active stance in 
order to regulate P and C. Although many alternatives are available to achieve control over P 
and/or C, the trade-off between reproduction and immortality provides a definitive answer 
where no one is worse off than today’s. Nevertheless, I want to re-emphasize that the limits (to 
P and C) are not fixed. If, for example, increases in T give us some slack between what we 
demand from the universe and what it can provide then the trade-off reproduction and 
immortality might be alleviated since there will be room for extra persons (or consumption). 
 
3.1.2 – Inequality Argument 
P*53: Increasing inequality is bad. 
P54: Immortality will increase inequality. 
C55 (P*53+P54): Immortality is bad. 
P56: The badness of eliminating involuntary death cannot be mitigated by direct 
replacement.101 
C57 (C55+P56+PCBA): Immortality is not desirable. 
P*53: This premise states that inequality is bad. The key here is the word inequality. It seems 
that using the concept without at least saying something about what it is, is a recipe for 
confusion. Immortality will surely trigger many kinds of inequalities but only some of them 
will have the property of being bad (e.g. the lifespan of immortals will be unequal to individuals 
that lived in the past in the same sense that today our lives are longer than the average individual 
during the middle ages – this being bad is at least questionable given current western values).  
This premise requires specific kinds of inequalities to obtain. Not every inequality will do. And 
perhaps there are even different inequality arguments each corresponding to a different kind of 
                                                 
100 But not without limit, since, for each value of T there is a limit to how much D we can have. Therefore, we 
should never do away with limits on both P and C, they merely require to be readjusted constantly. Each increment 
in T produces some leeway in D to be allocated to either C or P. The configuration of the population is still 
important. 
101 See footnote 45. 
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inequality. I will not evaluate all of them here. Instead I will tackle the general kind of 
inequality that I believe it is present in the arguments found in the literature. To do that I will 
have to assume a few things about the kind of inequality in consideration. (1) The first 
assumption is that for inequality to be bad it must have to be about something that is desired, 
that individuals, through their own agency, want. Suppose that person A has access to double 
the amount of rocks that person B has, for the same amount of resources (time, money, energy, 
goodwill, etc). If no one cares about rocks, then this inequality seems to be irrelevant for moral 
considerations. There seems to be no reason to worry about an unequal distribution of 
something that no one cares about. (2) The second assumption considers some limitations to 
the first assumption. Note that the first assumption is a necessary condition, not a sufficient 
one. Something must be desired for the relevant inequality to obtain, but that in itself is not 
sufficient. This second assumption shows cases were the first assumptions obtains but the 
relevant kind of inequality does not. If, given the scarcity of resources, individuals choose to 
spend their allotted part on different activities then the inequality that results from it seems to 
be not worthy of moral consideration. Here is an example: suppose that every resource was 
divided according to the justest principle, whatever that may be. Suppose further that person 
W spends their resources on acquiring X, and person Z on acquiring Y, through their own 
agency because it is their preferences. If W had more resources, it would acquire Y next but 
given the scarcity inherent in the universe, that was not possible without moving to a less just 
distribution (remember that the resources that W had were the result of the justest distribution 
possible). Then we have a case where W still desires Y but cannot acquire it. Because W desires 
X more, all resources W commanded were spent on acquiring X, leaving none to acquire Y. W 
had the opportunity to acquire Y, but it chose instead to acquire X. The resulting state is that 
while W has no quantity of Y, Z has plenty of it, so there is inequality. This seems to be off 
limits to the kind of inequality under consideration. Simply put, if I chose to have a red car, 
and my neighbour chose to have a blue one, and if I knew I could either have the red one or the 
blue one (because of the inherent scarcity of the universe under a just distribution of resources), 
then it seems that me claiming having no blue car while my neighbour has one (because I chose 
the red one) is bad, is more a case of me being spoiled and unable to deal with scarcity and 
choice, than it is some case of inequality being morally bad. I had the opportunity to have the 
blue car, but I chose instead to have it red. Having the blue car means sacrificing having the 
red one. Having one blue car and one red one means moving to a less just distribution since I 
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will have more resources available than it is fair. This seems the sort of consideration that 
Overall (2003, 196-7), a paradigmatic inequality-worried author, makes when she states that:102 
If people want to live longer, they have to be willing to take steps to make it happen and not 
rely on medical engineering to ensure their longevity (…) The hope of living a longer life 
appears to require the sacrifice of immediate gratification from smoking, excessive alcohol 
consumption, dangerous driving, and inactivity. Not everyone may want to make this 
sacrifice, if that is what it is, but people need to know that genuine choices have to be made 
and what their outcomes are likely to be. 
(3) A third assumption is that the moral importance (badness) of inequality is greater as we 
move from luxury goods to basic goods. Basic goods are those which are considered 
fundamental to the individual and are usually considered agency enablers.103 Consider, for the 
sake of argument, the outdated Maslow pyramid as a framework for this assumption. Inequality 
at the top of the pyramid does not trigger the same badness as inequality at the base of the 
pyramid. It seems that people would consider someone to not have access to basic food and 
housing while others do, and while there are enough resources to provide for those who do not, 
to be morally suspect. On the other hand, if the inequality is about eating caviar every day, or 
about having an expensive art collection, the worries about the moral cost of inequality seem 
to be less dire, or perhaps even non-existent.104 
Let us then apply these assumptions to immortality. To proceed with the inequality argument, 
immortality must be something people attribute value to (assumption 1). The inequality 
argument will leave out inequalities created by the agency of the individual. People through 
their own choices might sacrifice immortality to obtain something else (assumption 2). As 
already stated immortality allows for voluntary death, so choosing an alternative use of the 
resources that could have been employed in obtaining immortality is a voluntary choice to die 
(see P43A1A1A1). And lastly, the inequality argument gets stronger as one considers 
immortality (or what it entails) closer to a fundamental good (assumption 3). The strongest 
possible interpretation considers immortality the most fundamental good. When it comes to 
                                                 
102 She later states that it is undesirable to remove “all comfort and convenience”. However it remains a fact that 
if life extension requires some resource (and most likely it will), no matter how just the initial distribution of 
resources is, some trade-off will be unavoidable, and people will have to make choices. 
103 Here I do not want to enter into the debate about the specifics of these basic goods. That is, the debate between 
the Rawlsian primary goods, the capability approach of Nussbaum and Sen, or whatever alternative other 
philosophers may fancy. The assumption only requires that there is a group of goods which seem to have a higher 
degree of sensitivity to the link between inequality and badness. 
104 I do consider the possibility that inequality is applied to the lowest unmet level of the pyramid. In this sense 
once food and basic housing necessities are met to every individual, the inequality worries will jump to the next 
level and those will be the new intense issues. There might be a point where the inequality in the ability to eat 
caviar every day will indeed be seen with great concern, in the same sense as we today might see the lack of 
education to children as a concern while a few centuries ago it was not. When it comes to the assumption in 
consideration, I only require that at a particular point in time there is indeed a group of things that are ranked 
higher in the list of inequality concerns. 
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specimens of this argument in the literature, it is common to find dramatic approaches. Perhaps 
inspired by the Gattaca argument105, these authors envision two different classes/species of 
humans inhabiting side to side. The division is created because one group was left behind not 
being able to acquire immortality.  
Post (2004): An early anti-posthumanist, Oxford's Lewis wrote The Abolition of Man in 1944 (Lewis, 
1944/1966). Lewis defended a natural law tradition: what is good, and we should live within our God-given limits 
(…) He cautioned against a world in which one class of enhanced human beings would dominate and oppress the 
other. We might ask, then, if those freed from the decline of aging would become the superior and elite humans, 
while those who age would be deemed inferior. (…) Will we see, on the one hand, a world of wealthy youthful 
people living radically extended lives and enjoying the world's longest beach parties and, on the other hand, the 
frail poor subjected to the natural ravages of aging, looked down upon as an inferior subspecies? 
Harris (2013): A feature of life-extending treatments, which seldom has been thought through, is the fact that 
as treatments become available we will face the prospect of parallel populations, of ‘mortals’, and ‘immortals’, 
existing alongside one another (Silver 1999).  
Kass (2004): Other critics worry that technology's gift of long or immortal life will not be granted to everyone, 
especially if, as is likely, the treatments turn out to be expensive. Would it not be the ultimate injustice if only 
some people could afford a deathless existence, if the world were divided not only into rich and poor but into 
mortal and immortal? 
P*53A1: The first counter can be aimed directly at assumption 1. If it is argued that immortality 
lacks any sort of value, then inequality is a non-problem. Ehni (2013) identifies this argument: 
Regarding the goods and not the distribution itself, (…) [an] argument could be that these 
goods are not relevant from the perspective of justice, as they represent no important gains. 
(…) it could be argued that the achievement of a happy and fulfilling life does not depend 
on its length beyond a certain period of time. Seen from this perspective, living past the 
current life expectancy would not be a substantial gain, and therefore it would not matter if 
some could not afford it (…) Daniel Callahan has used his concept of a “natural lifespan” in 
this way, which he has put forward against lifespan extension (Callahan 1977). 
P*53A1A1 – What follows will not be an objection to the parent object, but a note regarding 
the use of it. Note that P*53A1, instead of recognizing the inequality problem, states that it 
does not even exist. There is no inequality with the property of bad, because the first assumption 
about inequality does not obtain. As such one cannot argue that immortality is void of value 
and, simultaneously, worry about its distribution among people (inequality). But, despite how 
incoherent this position is, there are still cases in the literature employing this misguided 
strategy, perhaps thinking that by collecting a great amount of arguments against immortality, 
                                                 
105 The name of this argument is a reference to a movie of the same name (referenced under DeVito et al. in the 
reference list) where society is divided between valids and invalids according to each individual’s genetic material. 
Valids were genetically curated/enhanced (designer babies as we call them today) while invalids were left to 
nature’s lottery. 
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their case is made stronger, never minding the emergent incompatibilities. An example can be 
found on in Binstock (2004a): 
Even biogerontologist Leonard Hayflick, regarded by many in the field as having laid the 
groundwork for contemporary research advances in molecular mechanisms of aging (Shay 
and Wright, 2000), sees "no value to society or to the individual in seeking to slow or stop 
the aging process or to achieve immortality" (Hayflick, 1994, p. 341). Among his concerns 
are that issues of distributional justice will arise if access to life-extending technologies were 
limited. To whom would they be available and on what terms. 
Either immortality has some value and worrying about its distribution is warranted, or it has 
no value and it does not matter who has access to it. If someone desires to have both, combining 
<worrying about its distribution is warranted> with <it has no value>, I am afraid what must 
be given away is logical soundness. 
P*53A1A2 – Arguing that immortality has no value seems to be quite unlikely and perhaps 
even false. Such position has to deal at least with the three pro immortality arguments presented 
here: 2.4.1 – Optionality, 3.2.1 – Life as a Pre-Condition Argument, and 3.2.2 – Ability to do 
More and/or Different. It is easy to produce cases where having the option to live longer periods 
of time seems valuable. For example, the ability to travel to far away star systems and live in 
them, and the ability to learn multiple sciences/trades/crafts/skills, or all of them.106 A different 
way of creating examples can be, instead of fetching examples that go into the future, 
performing a similar exercise but going from the past to the present. Should we say that for 
someone living in ancient Egypt there was no value in living all the way until today, witnessing 
history unfold in real time? Is it devoid of value, for that person, living in the present? Many 
historians, anthropologists and archaeologists would like to have such an opportunity. And if 
we conceive periods of time much greater than 3000 years, we can add geologists, evolutionary 
biologists and astronomers to that group. Thus Ehni (2013) asks: 
Would all reasonable people really choose in the same way? Many people are willing to 
make substantial sacrifices to reach a very old age, e.g. undergoing caloric restriction. 
P*53A1A2A1 – ⸸ 
P*53A1A3 – Arguing that immortality has no value depends on what argument is used to 
support the claim. Such an argument will be an argument against immortality, and from its 
conclusion it can be derived that ‘Immortality has no value’. As such, this counter, by itself, 
does not offer anything substantive – it only points out that the claim that immortality has no 
value is a shell of some other argument and not the argument in itself. The reasons why 
immortality has no value are what should be under analysis. The natural lifespan argument, 
                                                 
106 Note that this is valid even if boredoom obtains. See P39A1.  
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which I have dealt with in 2.3.1.2 – Human Nature Version is an example (see the quote of 
Ehni in P*53A1). It is statistically improbable that anyone has nailed down what the natural 
lifespan is, if there is one. 
P*53A1A4 – Ehni (2013) also offers a possible answer: 
Contemporary theories of justice do not focus on well-being or fulfilment but rather on the 
opportunities to achieve them. Ascetic people, such as monks, could forego certain 
opportunities because they believe they are irrelevant for them. However, what is important 
is that they have these opportunities in the first place. 
P*53A1A4A1 – It seems that what Ehni is stating is that for some people immortality can have 
value, and as such he is already accepting assumption 1 of my framework. Then he applies 
assumption 2: some people according to their preferences can forego immortality. So he 
concludes that what is important is to have the choice. But when someone claims that 
immortality has no value in the context of the desirability of immortality it should not be taken 
as the expression of a personal preference, since that says nothing about the general desirability 
of what is under consideration. Someone can say that there is no value in homosexual marriage 
for himself but at the same time recognize that there is some value in its legal recognition, that 
its inequality concerns are warranted. Having the choice is important because for some people 
there is value in choosing the option. But if the issue is about something that lacks value for 
everyone107 then does it really matter if anyone has the same opportunity to attain it? A further 
clarification can be made. When someone says that immortality has no value, I take it to mean 
<immortality has no positive net value>. So the question can be restated: if the issue is about 
something that has no positive net value then does it really matter if anyone has the same 
opportunity to attain it? Suppose that suffering is something that has no positive net value. Is 
there a concern that, all else equal, person X has double the opportunities to attain suffering 
than person Y? Someone could say that person X ought to not have that many opportunities in 
order to eliminate such inequality, but this destroys the claim that “what is important is that 
they have these opportunities in the first place.” Then should we increase person’s Y 
opportunities of suffering to eliminate inequality? Or perhaps the better solution, as I suggest 
(assumption 1), is that inequality concerns are unwarranted when what is under consideration 
has no value. If this is the case, as I believe that it is, then Ehni answer misses the point. He 
does not tackle the claim that immortality has no value. He assumes it has, at least for someone, 
which allows him to defend that what is important is having the choice. The choice being the 
important bit is argued for because it allows to perfectly distribute the good: those who want it 
                                                 
107 This still allows room to both objective and subjective conceptions of value. 
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can choose it, and those who do not can chose not to have it.108 But if something has no value 
to everyone, then having the choice seems irrelevant. 
P*53A2 – Another counter is targeted at assumption 2. The move is to argue that whatever 
inequalities would result UI do not have the property of bad because they are direct 
consequences of trade-offs. That is, people, through their choices, choose to allocate the 
resources needed for immortality treatments in the satisfaction of other preferences. It is only 
fair that they do not get to have the cake and eat it too (just as me having both a blue car and a 
red car was not possible without being unfair). It is not that people do not have the option to 
become immortal – they do. They just choose not to, by spending the resources under their 
control elsewhere. Perhaps for some it is more important to go to space, have a garage full of 
cars, a packet with always refilling cigarettes, or travelling, instead of being immortal. But this 
argument goes deeper. We can frame these trade-offs more generally, for example, by 
identifying a trade-off between non-working hours and income; between instant gratification 
or delayed benefits, etc. As such, inequality concerns are unwarranted because they result 
solely from the choices made through individual agency.  As Ehni (2013), states: 
The distribution itself is just because it results from a principle of justice, merit. The (…) 
argument could be considered to be a libertarian one. Being able to afford these technologies 
and medical interventions and benefit from them would just be another well-deserved 
reward and incentive for social and economic success and a rational and disciplined lifestyle. 
P*53A2A1 – This argument seems extremely naïve since it assumes some kind of perfectly 
equal starting point for individuals. The reason for this seems straightforward. The starting 
point does not hinge on agency, but instead on lottery. As such, fairness seems to require an 
equal starting point for everyone, since there seems to be no available criteria to justify different 
starting points. This is so because there is no information about the individual before its own 
starting point, and no individual, as far as we know, has yet exercised any agency since it will 
only exist at a later time109. By starting point I mean the moment an individual starts to exist110. 
For some the starting point is a slum with a single mother and a diseased body while luckier 
individuals might receive great health and affluent caring parents. The question is not that every 
starting point is unique. It seems it cannot be otherwise. The question is if the differences in 
                                                 
108 If there was no choice and some people desired the good while others did not, then some of them would 
inevitably be forced to endure an unwanted state of affairs. 
109 I say, as far as we know, because it is entirely possible that scenarios such as karma, or us being a simulation 
inside a pay to win MMORPG be true. In that case a criteria for different starting points is available. 
110 Not being an expert in psychology and biology, I will not pronounce myself over when a bunch of cells 
becomes an individual agent. I recognize the question might be more complicated than that. Perhaps spermatozoa 
can be described as an agent. It is not, however, the kind of individual agent people consider when discussing the 
morally relevant inequalities that result from immortality. 
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the various starting points impact the distribution of resources. In other words, if the argument 
envisioned in in the parent object can still hold given the differences in the starting points. And 
it seems the differences in the starting points that nature’s lottery determined do indeed 
influence the range of options available to individuals. According to Reeves and Sawhill (2014) 
social mobility in the United States111 
suffers from a high degree of intergenerational income “stickiness,” especially at the top and 
the bottom of the income distribution children born to families at the bottom of the income 
distribution (i.e., whose parents’ income falls in the bottom quintile) have a 36 percent 
probability of remaining stuck there in adulthood—far more than the ‘ideal’ 20 percent. 
Likewise, children on the opposite end of the spectrum have a 30 percent chance of 
remaining in the highest income quintile. There is more than a two-fold difference in the 
odds of a child born in the top quintile remaining in the top income quintiles (the 
‘comfortable middle class’), compared to one born in the bottom quintile (56% versus 23%). 
Note that if starting points did not matter and merit was the only cause of inequalities, then the 
probability of an individual (regardless of whom their parents might be) ending up in any one 
quintile would be 20%. Instead we find that different starting points yield biased outcomes. 
Another study pointed that there seems to be no trend in recent years regarding the values 
measured for social mobility indicators, which coupled with increased (economic) inequality 
has aggravated the impact of different starting points, (Chetty et al., 2014): 
We find that all of these rank-based measures of intergenerational mobility have not changed 
significantly over time. For example, the probability that a child reaches the top fifth of the 
income distribution given parents in the bottom fifth of the income distribution is 8.4% for 
children born in 1971, compared with 9.0% for those born in 1986. Children born to the 
highest-income families in 1984 were 74.5 percentage points more likely to attend college 
than those from the lowest-income families. The corresponding gap for children born in 
1993 is 69.2 percentage points, suggesting that if anything intergenerational mobility may 
have increased slightly in recent cohorts. Moreover, intergenerational mobility is fairly 
stable over time in each of the nine census divisions of the U.S. even though they have very 
different levels of mobility. Although rank-based measures of mobility remained stable, 
income inequality increased over time in our sample, consistent with prior work. Hence, the 
consequences of the “birth lottery” – the parents to whom a child is born – are larger today 
than in the past. 
Given the evidence it seems reasonable that some people might not be able to afford 
immortality treatments for no fault of their own. Ehni (2013) seems to agree with this answer: 
Serious doubts can be raised as to whether this is based on correct assumptions. 
Responsibility for bad health choices and outcomes play a major role in this line of 
argument. But, research on influences that date back to early phases of life and on social 
determinants of health points to the limitations of personal responsibility in this field. 
P*53A3 - This counter argues that the kind of inequality under consideration is ambiguous 
when it relates to time-periods. It seems that proponents of this argument have in mind a 
                                                 
111 The US were chosen because data is more readily available. Furthermore there is a great probability that this 
country will be at the forefront of actualizing immortality treatments, so discussing the situation there for the 
purposes of inequality seems advantageous. 
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specific duration under which inequality obtains in order for the property of bad to also obtain. 
This means that for any kind of conceived inequality that has the property of badness, if we 
reduce the time period during which it obtains, there is a point where the property of badness 
goes away. Let us look at the following case. There is a line of persons waiting to receive a 
certain good Z (assume all of them want the good, or have a claim, or a right, etc). Let us 
designate each person by Yi where i=place in line.  Assume it takes an X amount of time to 
deliver the good to the person in front of the line, before proceeding to the next person. It is 
clear that there is an amount of time X where Yi has the good Z and Yi+2 does not, or in other 
words inequality obtains. The issue is the following: what is the value of X, above which, 
inequality receives the property of bad? If X=30seconds is P*53 relevant? What about 
X=5years? Suppose that a pill that cures diabetes, cancer, heart issues, and mental diseases in 
one sitting is developed and is the good Z – this seems a good candidate for P*53 to clearly 
obtain.112 If X=1 second, then it is almost certainly impossible to avoid inequality because it 
seems extremely hard to synchronize to the second, planet wide, the action of swallowing the 
pill. What about if X=1 day? In that case, what would need to happen would be a concentrated 
effort to have a world pill day. Because it would be impossible to deliver the pill to everyone 
on the same day, this means some people would need to hang on to the pill until the due date. 
If they take the pill before the arranged date, they will force X to be greater than one day, and 
consequently create morally bad inequality. This raises some questions: suppose two persons 
are suffering with some disease that can be cured with our magic pill. One has already received 
the pill, but another is waiting another week until it gets it, as per usual with international 
deliveries. Does it make sense for that person to wait for everyone else to also receive the pill 
before taking it? It does not seem so. Once a person has received the pill, it makes no difference 
to those who did not receive it yet, if they113 consume it. Withholding taking the pill will not 
make others receive theirs faster. This case is curious, because it seems on one hand that 
inequality is good: it does not make sense to deliberately prolong unwanted and unnecessary 
suffering by withholding the consumption of the pill, but on the other hand X>1 day is territory 
of morally bad inequality according to model’s assumptions. What if instead we define the 
limit as X=1 month. Perhaps we avoid the issues of the previous example, since there will be 
no problem regarding delivery methods114. But most likely there will be a bottleneck in the 
                                                 
112 If the reader does not consider any health treatment as something that would warrant inequality concerns then 
another good can be used for this counter, be it justice, security, defence, etc. 
113 <They> refers to those who already have the pill. 
114 Assume we can get to the ISS and similar locations in time. Once we develop civilizations on celestial bodies 
like the moon and mars, X=1month might be too short. 
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production stage. 1 month seems too short to be able to produce and deliver pills for everyone. 
Again, some pills will need to be withhold in warehouses, or in people’s houses, so that the 
time between the first consumption of the pill and the last is no more than one month. The same 
issue appears. Now let us transit from thought experiment to real world. What if the pill is 
extremely expensive in the beginning, so that for morally relevant inequality to not obtain X 
needs to be at least a few years? Immortality treatments are not that different from the case of 
the magic pill offered above, instead they are indeed a better version of it. It seems that either 
X has a value big enough for inequality to not be a concern, or X is defined as a value low 
enough for inequality to obtain. In the second case (even when the best efforts of humanity are 
applied) to avoid inequality we would need to force some people to endure suffering so that 
everyone could access the medicine within the time period defined by X, that is, we would 
have to force some people to not engage with immortality treatments, despite the fact that this 
will create unnecessary suffering. Some authors do indeed use this argument to counter 
inequality, for example Sethe and de Magalhães (2013) and Harris (2013), respectively: 
While the argument is usually put more eloquently (Pijnenburg and Leget 2007), it seems 
subject to distillation into the statement: ‘Healthcare in rich countries should not advance 
until the poorer countries have caught up’. Not only does this argument neglect the 
considerable burden of age-associated diseases already threatening to crush poor country 
economies (Smith and Mensah 2003), the underlying ideology would call for the cessation 
of any number of activities other than those directly aimed at improving life expectancy in 
poor nations (which are, it has been argued, not predominantly scientific but political 
barriers). 
If immortality or increased life expectancy is a good, it is doubtful ethics to deny palpable 
goods to some people because we cannot provide them for all. (…) There will always be 
circumstances in which we cannot prevent harm or do good to everyone, but surely no one 
thinks that this affords us a reason to decline to prevent harm to anyone in particular. If twins 
suffer from cancer and one is incurable and the other not, we do not conclude that we should 
not treat the curable cancer because this would in some sense be unjust to the incurable twin. 
We do not refuse kidney transplants to some patients unless and until we can provide them 
for all with renal failure. 
P*53A3A1 – Perhaps one could relax the inequality argument and defend that it is not so much 
inequality that is the problem, it is how the limited goods are distributed that matters. With this 
move inequality per se stops being the issue, and concerns shift to which people will have 
access to immortality and why. The criteria that will create the inequality is what matters, not 
that inequality exists. Some authors seem to have a quarry with the ability to pay as a 
mechanism to allocate immortality treatments, e.g. Post (2004) and Ehni (2013), respectively:  
The future will be complicated by the libertarian and entrepreneurial interests that would 
make such enhancement available according to one's ability to pay. 
In a first step, an analysis of new interventions into aging from a perspective of justice could 
hold that access to these interventions will create benefits or goods that will be distributed 
in an unequal way across society, presumably according to the socio-economic status of its 
members. 
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P*53A3A1A1 – It does not seem that defending P*53A3 implies defending a specific criterion 
for allocation of goods that are not available to all, i.e., where inequality obtains. Certainly it 
does not require that allocation be made through the ability to pay, aka, the market system. 
Although the market is useful in a great deal of instances it is not in all of them. No doubt the 
market is perhaps the most powerful tool we have to allocate resources115, but it is not perfect, 
and some situations require different tools. Usually in these cases people feel strongly about 
some ethical properties of what is under consideration, enough that society regulates how much 
the market can allocate these goods. One could say that societies have a long history of setting 
the boundaries of the market. For example, no matter one’s ability to pay, owning another 
person is not allowed (according to the law) – what once was a marketable good is no longer. 
Another example concerns owning firearms. In many countries ability to pay is not enough, 
one also needs to obtain the adequate licencing. The right to vote in a democracy is another 
example. The number of votes each person has is one, regardless of the ability to pay. Waiting 
lines are another system of allocating scarce resources that do not follow market mechanisms. 
Every example provided is an instance of setting the boundaries of the market. There is no 
reason to suppose that if immortality is a good that people feel ethically strong about, it will 
not be regulated in some sort. This view does not contradict P*53A3. On the contrary, both 
Sethe and de Magalhães (2013), and Harris (2013), respectively, support it: 
In transplantation medicine, for example, the availability of organs is a very real factor of 
life extension: Those lucky enough to be allotted an organ, survive much longer. Generally, 
society has been able to agree on laws that regulate the allocation of these special resources. 
We have not chosen to destroy all organs as they become available in order to preserve 
equality in despair. Similarly, if life extension treatments would turn out to be irrevocably 
scarce, this must not mean that only the ability to pay will be decisive. (…) Treatment could 
be allotted randomly (Broome 1984), as a social reward (Vance 1956), according to 
imminent need (Harris 1987), within a general utilitarian framework (Miller and Sethe 
2005), or even as “affirmative prolongevitism” (Overall 2003). There is no intrinsic reason 
why such arrangements must be morally flawed if instituted in a society that can agree on 
an equitable system of apportionment 
We do, however, have a clear ethical responsibility to ensure that the question of which of 
those who could benefit receives the treatment should be decided according to some just 
principle of distribution (…) The solution, however, is certainly not to say that we will 
outlaw transplantation unless and until equitable distribution on some agreed principles can 
be guaranteed. The introduction of any new complex and/or expensive technology raises 
these problems (…) The principle requires that strenuous and realistic efforts be made to 
provide the benefits of the technology justly and as widely as possible, not that the benefits 
be denied because of the impossibility of ensuring adequate justice of provision. 
There are 3 points I would like to make before finishing this thread. (1) If the problem of 
immortality is how to allocate it, then it seems that immortality is already considered a good 
                                                 
115 As of today, it seems this is true. It might not be in the future, when artificial intelligence processes the 
information carried by price signalling more efficiently than the market system, thus solving the great issue of 
central planning. 
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extremely important and desirable, so much so that market allocation seems to be too crude. In 
this case, as the authors above state, it does not make any sense outlawing or postponing 
immortality. That would be a worse state of affairs116 than allocating it via the market system. 
Instead, regulation seems to be the way to go, combining the good of immortality with a 
distribution deemed just. (2) A second point concerns rewards to innovation. If the allocation 
system does not provide rewards for innovation, society risks signalling inventors to not pursue 
innovative projects, which may put us in a worse off situation in the long run. The market 
allocation system with the usual addition of intellectual property laws ensures inventors are 
rewarded through temporary exclusive profit. If another system is to be put in place to allocate 
immortality treatments, inventors should continue to be rewarded. For example: a market 
system modified with a price ceiling law might ensure that in the short term a particular 
innovation spreads to a wide section of the population (thus decreasing inequality), but at the 
same time signals inventors to not invest so much in providing new inventions (because the 
reward is smaller), jeopardizing innovations in the future. Such concern is shared by Garber 
and Goldman (2004): 
The net effect is that, at least until the innovations become available at low cost, they will 
go unused by some Americans who might benefit from them. Yet policies intended to reduce 
the prices of innovations have the potential to discourage the introduction of the innovations 
at all. The challenge for policy will be to encourage the rapid development and widespread 
dissemination of medical innovation; uneven rates of diffusion may be an unavoidable price 
of rapid technological innovation in health care. 
Different allocation systems are presented and discussed in the analysis of P54. (3) Lastly, 
some suggested allocation systems present in the literature seem to have an implicit racist and 
misandrous feeling to them. I am a white male for no fault of my own, and I would consider it 
to be extremely unfair if an allocation system would exclude me based on those properties. 
Such case seems to be implicitly defended by Overall (2003) by what she calls affirmative 
prolongevitism:  
p.22 - I advocate a stance that I call affirmative prolongevitism, which takes a life-course 
approach to the social support of elderly people and entails the adoption of social policies 
directed toward increasing average life expectancy and compressing morbidity, particularly 
for those groups, such as native people, black people, and poor people, who have not so far 
benefited, or benefited enough, from the sort of increased longevity enjoyed by members of 
more privileged white cohorts. 
p.200 - A specific prolongevist focus on persons who have been disadvantaged would 
mandate both the promotion of increased research into conditions and diseases that affect 
women and the deliberate inclusion of women in investigations of medications and 
                                                 
116
 Garber and Goldman (2004): “While new treatments may seem expensive in nominal dollars, they often lower 
the quality-adjusted price of health care. A novel treatment for a previously untreatable disease provides the 
extreme example. This treatment makes available at a certain cost a health improvement that was previously 
unavailable at any price. Essentially, it has reduced what was previously an infinite price to something that, while 
expensive, is affordable to some.” 
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treatments that have previously been confined to men (Nelson and Nelson 1996, 359). It 
would also include the direction of research, enhanced health care, and health promotion to 
populations of native people, people of color, queer people (including sex workers), and 
poor people of any race or sexual orientation. These research targets would help to 
compensate for the history of disparities between the provision of treatments and research 
that benefit middle-class white men and both the medical treatment of members of oppressed 
groups and the research into conditions that affect them, and it would ensure that 
disadvantaged persons begin to receive the medical care they need. 
It is curious that Overall, considers women to be the disadvantaged group in the quote above, 
since she states that women have a higher life expectancy: 
p.200 - The particular focus, at least in the short run, of measures to increase average life 
expectancy must be on members of groups that historically have been disadvantaged and 
that currently have low life expectancy. 
p.61 - Plenty of evidence indicates that women are both more likely than men to need 
extended care late in life (because women live longer). 
p.111 - Policy of reducing access for elderly people to high-technology medicine will 
disproportionately affect women because women live longer and also suffer more chronic 
diseases and disabilities. 
Fortunately, she seems to notice the cognitive dissonance before it is too late. 
p.201 - This policy prescription for special attention to disadvantaged groups raises the 
interesting question of whether the lower life expectancy of men should be regarded as a 
problem and hence as a potential focus for affirmative prolongevitism. If men do indeed 
suffer an “inherent” disadvantage, it is morally objectionable to disadvantage them further 
by refusing to compensate for it. But men’s relatively low life expectancy is not just 
“natural,” for it is substantially shaped by social practices. 
p.204 - On the one hand I am critical of health-care policies that favor men’s physical needs 
and men’s diseases to the exclusion or neglect of women’s physical needs and diseases. But 
on the other hand I argue that by investigating the influence of gender prescriptions and 
deliberately altering them, where appropriate, through education and changing parenting 
practices, a social policy of affirmative prolongevitism can legitimately encompass 
increases to men’s life expectancy. 
Overall was quick to prioritize women in her allocation system, but has doubts about doing the 
same for men, even when according to her own criteria men should have priority.117 At other 
times she seems to defend a system that does not discriminate by race and/or sex: 
p.200 - I am advocating a qualified prolongevitism—one that will genuinely be for all. As a 
general principle, support for increased longevity should not be limited by gender, 
socioeconomic class, sexual orientation, race, or ability. 
Since it is not clear what exactly is Overall proposing, and that at times her work seems to 
punish people like myself, who for no fault of my own am a white male, I urge caution about 
defending such a system. To her credit, another property that people are for no fault of their 
own – to be of a certain age – is well argued against being a criterion for an allocation system 
of immortality. 
                                                 
117 I think that classifies as a microaggression. 
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P*53A4 – This counter tries to show that some cases of morally relevant inequality are caused 
by unwarranted expectations. Unequal access to immortality treatments is such a case.118 What 
do I mean by unwarranted expectations? I mean that people have unrealistic concepts regarding 
product development. Let us use an example. Suppose some scientist discovers some kind of 
novel technique and decides to test it on herself. Let us assume she developed a new type of 
prosthesis that she uses to walk around instead of being bound to a wheel chair. At that moment 
in time she is the only person using this technology and so there is inequality when it comes to 
having access to it. The scientist tests and uses the prosthesis so that she can develop it further. 
But at this point in the process of product development, the inequalities caused by the scientist 
having access to the technology while the general Joe in a wheelchair does not, seem to offer 
no problem, morally speaking. After all, the product is not fully developed yet and thus not 
available to the public. The same seems to happen when some new medicine goes through the 
trial phase. There will be a selected few who will have access to a certain medicine while the 
general public does not. Again, this inequality seems to not be morally relevant because people 
recognize that human trials are a part of product development that needs to be done before the 
general public can access the drug. The conclusion seems to be that if the inequalities are found 
while the product is being developed, they lose their moral significance. So, this counter tries 
to argue that early adopters of some technology are in fact part of product development. They 
are financing the producers to be able to develop cheaper ways of manufacturing the product 
and thus reach a wider audience. When mobile phones were first introduced they were available 
at an exorbitant price. Those few who bought them were in fact financing the development of 
better and cheaper products so that the population at large could access the benefits of the 
technology. They were not only consumers, but more importantly developers themselves, 
contributing with the resources needed to decrease manufacturing costs. If these people had 
not bought the mobile phones (and in doing so financially support the industry), then probably 
we would not have had them today. Another example is space travel to Mars. SpaceX is 
currently developing the technology and its CEO Elon Musk recognizes that the first trips will 
be fairly expensive, but after that the price can decrease to 200K$ and perhaps even dip below 
100K$ (SpaceX, 2017a).  Access to immortality treatments works in the same vein. The first 
treatments, that only a few persons are able to acquire, are expensive in order for the producer 
be able to finance the development of cheaper (and better) manufacturing techniques. The 
                                                 
118 Using the same language as in P*53A3 this means the value of X beyond which morally relevant inequality 
obtains is unreasonably low.   
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inequality that appears when immortality treatments first come to market, should be no 
different, morally speaking, from those inequalities that appear in drug test trials or in the case 
of the scientist’s prothesis. The early adopters are taking an active role in the development of 
the product. The unwarranted expectation is to consider these early adopters, who pay a lot of 
money for the novel and expensive immortality treatments, to be on the same footing as the 
normal consumers. If we consider early adopters as developers, then immortality treatments 
being expensive in the beginning and causing inequality is morally insignificant – it is a part 
of product development that needs to be done before the general public accesses the treatment. 
The options are either to have the product with inequalities in the beginning or have no product 
at all. The option of having a cheap product from the let go does not exist and having that 
expectation is unwarranted. 
P*53A4A1 – A change can be made to accommodate warranted expectations regarding product 
development when using the inequality argument. The move is arguing that many people want 
to be early adopters but cannot. In this case it is argued that the distribution of money, which 
allows those who wish, to become early adopters, has the property of being morally bad.  
P*53A4A1A1 – Again we see the same issues regarding the distribution of immortality 
treatments that were pointed out in P*53A3A1 and answered in P*53A3A1A1. However an 
important note can be made. Afterall it seems that it is not immortality that is causing the 
relevant inequalities to obtain. They seem to be positioned at a societal level. By that I mean: 
i) it is not as if not pursuing immortality will end the morally relevant inequalities and ii) 
solving the morally relevant inequalities outside of the immortality context, makes the 
inequality argument in the context of immortality moot – this is discussed in P54A5. 
P54 – This claim states that the event of immortality being actualized will increase inequality. 
The meaning of the word inequality as used in this argument is explored in P*53. For inequality 
to obtain it suffices to say that the treatments that constitute immortality will need some scarce 
resource in order to be enjoyed by some individual. The most common is money119. Thus, 
immortality will be confined only to those well-off. Because in this scenario there is only one 
group that benefits from the treatment, inequality will obtain, in this case inequality in 
accessing healthcare. Moreover, the group that benefits from the treatment is said to be already 
at the good end of (economic) inequality, thus immortality will not be seen as compensating 
existing inequalities, instead it will aggravate them. The reason immortality might be accessible 
only to those with a higher ability to pay can be because the treatments will be expensive, just 
                                                 
119 The case for time is presented in P54A1A1. 
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as is usual the case with any other state of the art extensive medical treatment. Sethe and de 
Magalhães (2013) state that “while it is difficult to foresee the costs of a hypothetical cure for 
aging, it has been assumed that such treatments will be expensive.” The argument seems to be 
straight forward: immortality will be an expensive treatment and therefore increase (existing)120 
inequalities by widening the health/longevity gap since those with a higher ability to pay 
already live longer. Curiously this argument is, to an extent, exclusive with the overpopulation 
argument since the assumptions about the uptake rate of immortality treatments go in opposite 
directions. Here are some examples of this premise from the literature: 
Post (2004): Another leading anti-posthumanist, Francis Fukuyama, has also served as a member of President 
Bush's Council on Bioethics (…) He argues powerfully that the anti-aging technologies of the future will disrupt 
all the delicate demographic balances between the young and the old, and exacerbate the gap between the haves 
and the have nots. 
Hermerén (2013): Not everyone will benefit from interventions in order to prevent, slow down or reverse the 
biological aging process (…) these interventions, if and when they are available, will improve the situation of the 
best off. 
Ehni (2013): Scepticism about whether everybody will benefit from the longevity dividend in the same way or 
even how widespread such benefits will in fact be seems to be appropriate. (…) . Limited access to new 
interventions into aging and limited potential to contribute to the longevity dividend or enjoy its benefits could 
increase already existing inequalities in healthy life expectancy. At the same time, the situation of those best off 
is likely to further improve. 
Harris (2013): One thing we do know is that the technology required to produce such results will be expensive. 
For existing people with multiple interventions probably required, the costs will be substantial. (…) Even in 
technologically advanced countries therefore, ‘immortality’, or increased life expectancy is likely to be confined 
to a minority of the population. 
P54A1 – As with many other technologies, the expensive price of immortality treatments is 
expected to go down. Off course how long that will take is uncertain and its relevance is tied 
to the value of X discussed in P*53A3. To put things into perspective, an average worker from 
the US needed to work 260 hours in 1895 to buy a bicycle but only 7,2 in 1997, for a dozen of 
oranges the values were 2 hours and 6 minutes respectively, and for a Steinway piano the values 
were 2400 and 1107,6 respectively (Figueiredo et al., 2008, 21). A more recent comparison 
concerns computers, once very expensive are now ubiquitous and several orders of magnitude 
more powerful (e.g. Sanders & Bostrom, 2008, Appendix B). For a mere 5$ today a whole 
computer can be bought with more computing power than supercomputers of the past.121 
                                                 
120 Pinxten (2013):  “Social factors, such as the educational level, creates longevity gaps of up to 7 years.” 
121 The Raspberry Pi Zero (RPz), with its launch price of 5$, had the same CPU as the Raspberry Pi 1 (RP1), but 
slightly overclocked, from 700Mhz to 1Ghz.  Using FLOPS as a unit of comparison, and an overclocked RP1 to 
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Genome sequencing, a process most likely necessary for immortality treatments, also seems to 
be following the same pattern, with costs decreasing greatly as time marches forward. A full 
genome costed ~100M$ to be sequenced in 2001, but only ~1K$ in 2017 (Wetterstrand, n.d.). 
There is no reason to suppose that immortality treatments will not follow the general pattern of 
decreasing cost (and thus price) as time passes. Sethe and de Magalhães (2013) seem to follow 
this line of reasoning:  
Moreover, it could be suggested that even if curing aging is initially expensive, its universal 
desirability will help to recoup costs of investment relatively quickly, allow for low profit 
margins, create political and competition pressure to drive prices down, facilitate e.g. mass 
production and service infrastructures etc. as has happened in similar cases (Lucke et al. 
2009). 
Thus, the premise that immortality treatments are expensive, for inequality to obtain, seems to 
be a temporary issue, which in the context of immortal beings is insignificant. 
P54A1A1 – This reason can be countered by appealing to other resource that is not money in 
order to make the same argument. For example, it can be argued that immortality treatments 
will require time and thus put poor people at a disadvantage. Such is argued by Ehni (2013): 
If the price of these new technologies fall, as is predicted for whole personal genome scans, 
it remains that such regular visits and extensive consultations on personal habits and lifestyle 
choices are time-consuming and therefore also a medical service that could be costly for the 
less well-off. 
P54A1A1A1 – It is possible that in the same way price is expected to decrease, engineering 
the streamlining of immortality treatments so they are evermore less of a hassle in our lives is 
also expected, thus bringing time costs down. For example, nanorobots could autonomously 
take care of whatever process needs to be done to actualize immortality treatments. de 
Magalhães (2004) states:  
A man-made molecular assembler capable of building molecule-scale machines to guide 
specific chemical reactions would allow the construction of devices with atomic precision 
capable of a myriad of functions.  In theory, nanostructures can be built to drive chemical 
reactions capable of reversing aging by reversing chemical reactions and damage that occur 
as we age. 
For more discussion on nanobots see Freitas (2004). 
P54A1A1A2 – It seems that the argument is upside down. Those who have a high income will 
have the higher opportunity costs for every minute spent receiving the treatment.  
                                                 
equivalent RPz clock speeds as a proxy for RPz performance we obtain a value of ~60MFLOPS (Rpi Performance, 
eLinux Wiki, n.d.). For comparison a supercomputer from the 70’s, the CDC 7600, had a performance of roughly 
36MFLOPS with a price tag of 5.1M$ (Computer History Museum, n.d.) which I believe referred to current prices. 
In today’s prices that would be more than 25M$ (I used GDP deflators for the US economy to actualize the price). 
MFLOPS per dollar increased approximately 500 000 000 %. 
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P54A1A1A2A1 – If the claim is given its due charity it will mean that either the time it takes 
for immortality treatments is so much and/or poor people have it so bad, that enrolling in such 
a treatment will have extremely high OCs, such as not being able to satisfy basic necessities 
(food, housing, …) because of the foregone income. 
P54A1A1A2A1A1 – This is the typical case where borrowing serves its purpose. See P54A2.  
P54A1A1A2A1A2 – It can also be argued that other solutions that deal with inequality 
simpliciter will also solve this case. See P54A5. 
P54A2 – This counter deals with the case where the service is provided via some intellectual 
property mechanism. The expensive prices due to monopoly power will only be available 
during the patent term, usually a period of 20 years. Even during the patent term, if the pricing 
is high enough it can create incentives for competitors to enter the market with alternative 
treatments. For example, the ongoing kerfuffle over the Cas9122 patent (e.g. Cohen, 2018, for 
the US and Servick, 2018, for the EU) shows how important and potentially profitable CRISPR 
technology will be in the future. This technology will most likely play a cornerstone role in 
immortality treatments. The interest in the technology has provided the correct incentives for 
innovators to seek alternatives. An example is the Mad7123 enzyme by the company Inscripta 
(Inscripta, n.d.). This further strengthens the claim that treatments will become affordable with 
the passage of time and thus inequality only obtains temporarily. As Garber and Goldman 
(2004) say: 
The well-off and the well-insured will be the first to benefit from the new technologies. As 
time passes after the introduction of the technologies, other forces will moderate prices. The 
introduction of effective substitutes will promote competition and, potentially, lower prices. 
Monopoly pricing will end when patents expire. As the technologies mature, the challenge 
of finding appropriate financing will diminish. 
Furthermore some have called into question the benefits of the patent system itself (e.g. The 
Economist, 2015) and some economists, like Stiglitz, propose alternative systems. For 
example, a prize system as a reward to inventors (Stiglitz, 2007), instead of the temporary 
monopoly that results from the patent. He states that “the type of prize system I have in mind 
would rely on competitive markets to lower prices and make the fruits of the knowledge 
available as widely as possible.” Alternative systems to the current patent system have the 
potential to greatly weaken P54. Lastly, even if we get intellectual property laws out of the 
equation, some economists such as Schumpeter, still see monopolies as an expected side effect 
                                                 
122 A famous enzyme associated with the CRISPR system used to edit DNA. 
123 An alternative to Cas9. There is another known alternative to Cas9, by the name Cpf1. 
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of innovation, and as such are not inherently bad. Such monopolies are temporary and cease 
once competition gets ahold of the innovation. 
P54A3 – A different strategy for arguing against P54 can be made by appealing to borrowing. 
In this case this counter does not rely on trying to show that the treatments will not be expensive 
sometime down the line like the previous two counters, but that even if they are forever 
expensive people less well-off can still have an opportunity to afford them.  To understand this, 
we must see through the point of view of a lender. Suppose a cure for all cancers is discovered 
and is very expensive. Is there any incentive to finance this treatment to individuals, if the 
treatment is expensive? Most likely not. Curing cancer will yield only 3 more years of life 
expectancy124, according to Miller (2004): 
In 1985, for example, the typical 50-year-old American woman could look forward to 
another 32 years of life, with a mean age at death of about 82 years. The elimination of all 
forms of cancer - that is, the hypothetical adjustment of cancer mortality risks to zero at all 
ages above 50 - would increase this woman's life expectancy by only 2.7 years, with death 
expected, on average, at about age 85. In fact, complete elimination of all deaths due to 
cancer, heart diseases, stroke, and diabetes would produce a mean life span of about 96 
years, or a change in mean age of death of only 17% (i.e., from 82 to 96 years). 
Three years will be gained within a context of frailty and advanced senescence. With this in 
mind any financier will hardly see a chance of getting paid back. The borrower will only live 
a few more years in a not so productive state likely to be incapable of generating the necessary 
income.125 As such there is no incentive to finance these treatments. But when it comes to 
immortality things are different. First, we are talking about living with (or above) the peak 
capacity of current human beings as noted in 1.3 – Illness and Frailty, senescence and frailty 
would not obtain. And secondly, we are considering extending the lifespan various orders of 
magnitude, not just a few years. There is no reason that any accumulated debt from those not 
so well off will not be paid back, no matter how bad their situation is today. Worst case scenario 
we could see someone having to work for several centuries or millennia to pay back all debt 
from immortality treatments which is not a problem in the grand scheme of things. It will still 
amount to an insignificant number of years when considering that the individual has the ability 
to live forever. 
P54A4 – Another way that may make P54 not obtain is the option of state intervention. This 
can mean, for example, providing immortality treatments through public funding. The 
                                                 
124 On another discussion (see P54A4A1A2.4)  this is used to argue that research on specific diseases has a very 
low yield on health when compared to research on the aging process itself. Curing cancer (or any other late life 
diseases) will only mean that another complication will fill its place sooner than later. Curing aging does not have 
this issue. 
125 I am assuming there is insufficient wealth saved, since the case under consideration is for those less well-off. 
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treatments will be provided by the national health system or through an equivalent system such 
as state provided health insurance. 
P54A4A1 – One objection is based on countering the third assumption made in P*53. In this 
case immortality can still provide value, but it is considered a luxury and/or not urgent. As such 
it is not suited for being publicly provided. For example, Ehni (2013): 
[An] argument could be based on the assumption that these goods could have some 
relevance, but not a very high priority (…). From this perspective, access to new 
interventions into aging may be of importance but of less importance than other aspects of 
healthcare. 
The argument can be divided in two steps. The first step claims that immortality is not even 
close to a fundamental good, so concerns of inequality per se are not very important. The 
second part is what really gives strength to the argument. Because immortality is not that 
important, then every resource invested in its endeavour bears a high opportunity cost (also see 
4.2.1 – Opportunity Costs: How much desirable?). In other words, why should the state finance 
this immortality thing when there are far more important and urgent options available? Many 
times when someone employs the inequality argument, they mean this particular version that 
incorporates opportunity costs. Chapman (2004) provides a paradigmatic example of the 
argument: 
Problems of distributive justice typically arise under conditions of scarcity and competition 
when resources are insufficient and/or trade-offs are required. The development and 
dissemination of prospective technologies to reduce the effects of aging or extend the life 
span would raise such justice issues. (…) If such efforts are financed with public funds to 
ensure proper regulatory oversight, the resources invested will most likely come at the 
expense of other social investments, including research to produce other types of medical 
innovations (…) Would a major public investment in these efforts be wise, fair, or equitable 
from a societal perspective? Therapeutic needs should be the primary criterion for public 
investments. The human aging process is not a disease or a serious health problem that 
requires elimination. Efforts to engineer longer life cannot be justified as a potential 
contribution to improving health status or relieving suffering. Instead such initiatives would 
be akin to other types of prospective enhancements, that is, non-disease-related interventions 
intended to improve normal human characteristics. (…) Investing in new and very expensive 
high technologies for enhancement interventions while people in our own country lack 
access to basic health care and millions of people die prematurely of preventable diseases in 
poor countries would be yet another step toward moral bankruptcy. 
P54A4A1A1 – This object is not an answer to P54A4A1, but a note regarding the application 
of the argument to the private sector. The result would be an extremely radical claim. Engaging 
in <behaviour X, considered not important> bears a great opportunity cost due to <state of 
affairs Y>. Almost every behaviour can be classified as the behaviour X: going to the cinema, 
enjoying a hobby, playing games, having a fancy dinner, etc., because these resources can 
instead be used to change state of affairs Y: people dying of hunger or preventable diseases to 
use the example Chapman provided. This argument brings into question what exactly private 
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property and agency mean. I will not engage this argument here. Instead section 4.3.4 – The 
Ultimate Argument for Immortality (and Ethics) will provide enough information to deduce 
my answer to such claims. 
P54A4A1A2.1 – The obvious counter is to show that investments in immortality, regardless if 
one considers it a cure for a disease (aging) or an enhancement, are not exclusive with other 
aspects of healthcare, and they might even prove to be a better solution. The mistake made is 
in the first part of the argument (see P54A4A1), thinking that immortality is something 
superfluous and not close to a fundamental good. If this fails, then the second part of the 
argument related to trade-offs does not obtain. So the question is <how much should 
immortality be valued?> Not wanting to go off on a discussion about what constitutes value126, 
I will take it as granted that healthcare and health treatments provide some value since these 
seem to be the main candidates presented as a trade-off to immortality in P54A4A1. Then I 
will try to show that immortality is another aspect of healthcare and thus should provide an 
amount of value equivalent to those aspects of healthcare authors identified as trade-offs. In 
some cases, immortality treatments can be numerically identical to those under traditional 
healthcare (e.g. a cure for cancer). Here are three reasons why immortality does not have the 
sort of trade-offs the mentioned in the parent object.  
P54A4A1A2.2 – The first is related to the capability meaning of aging: being immortal implies 
being in a forever healthy state. Immortality has at least the same value that having a healthy 
condition has, since it implies that all diseases that affect people be cured, from cancer, to 
diabetes. This alone shows that it makes no sense to say that immortality will have opportunity 
costs regarding curing those diseases. In addition to that, immortality also provides people with 
peak physical and mental capacity allowing 90-year-olds of today to be no different than a 25-
year-old. They could be competitive in the same marathon and look both forward to earn a 
Nobel prize (or several). Being immortal implies being in this nearly perfect health state, being 
able to perform tasks that require mental and/or physical acuity without age related 
complications. There seems to be a universal consensus that if senescence can be postponed, it 
should, and that amounts to a great deal of justification of why people go to the hospital. If 
health is not a luxury, the same applies to immortality and so Chapman is wrong when he states 
that “efforts to engineer longer life cannot be justified as a potential contribution to improving 
health status or relieving suffering.”  
                                                 
126 I will touch on this in 4.2.1 – Opportunity Costs: How much desirable?. 
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P54A4A1A2.3 – The second candidate is related with the chronological meaning of aging. In 
this sense immortality implies having the ability to live forever. As long as people want to do 
things, they need to be alive if they want to achieve them127. In short, the bigger opportunity 
cost seems to be if immortality is not pursued, since the trade-off will be letting people die 
against their will. In the same vein that people at 30 years old today procure health treatments 
for lethal maladies to live a few more decades, people at 100-years-old in the future might do 
same to live out a few more centuries. 
P54A4A1A2.4 – A third aspect of immortality concerns healthcare costs in the long run. For 
what follows consider only age-related diseases128. Curing any one disease only increases life 
expectancy for a few years before other disease takes its place. Immortality tries to tackle all 
diseases at once, by targeting the underlying cause, the aging process itself. I guess an analogy 
can be made with a roof. One approach tries to fix every hole as they come along, and the other 
tries to improve the structure of the roof so it does not have any more holes appearing. On this 
analogy Chapman’s argument could be described as: if we invest resources on improving the 
structure of the roof, and thus solving the hole problem once and for all, then we will not have 
resources to fix some particular holes that exist now. In the future Chapman’s might still be 
dealing with the hole problem, while going the other route would yield no such outcome. This 
means that it might actually be cheaper, in the long run, to invest in immortality than go about 
curing each disease one by one, even if in the short run it turns out to be more expensive. 
P54A4A1A2.4A1.1 – Some authors take issue with this argument. For example Capitaine and 
Pennings (2013): 
A more recent proposal (see, for example, Micans 2005; Dorshkind et al. 2009; Olshansky 
et al. 2006) is to invest more in biogerontology. The idea is that such research will enable 
us to tackle age-related diseases simultaneously, thereby ensuring that the elderly enjoy an 
increased healthspan (i.e. that they enjoy an increase in the number of years spent in a 
disease-free state). This, in turn, it is believed, will reduce the pressure on the healthcare 
system. (…) To date, this argument has received no attention, which is surprising given the 
highly recognised need for cost containment in healthcare 
In their paper they present 4 counters to the claim that there will be cost reduction in the health 
sector by using life extending technologies. I will analyse here 3 of those arguments. The fourth 
is the overpopulation argument that I have already discussed.  
                                                 
127 I understand that someone might say that perhaps there is still the possibility of the person remaining, along 
with its agency, after what we call death. However, what happens after death is unknown, while before death we 
have an idea of how things are supposed to work. If someone continues to insist that people do not need to be 
alive to achieve things I might suggest they go about collecting empirical evidence, and if their agency allows, to 
report back. This is explored in 3.2.1 – Life as a Pre-Condition Argument. 
128 Immortality would also require tackling non age related diseases, but his argument is made using only age 
related ones. Curing aging will likely increase the average strength of people’s immune systems and as such have 
an impact on non-age related diseases, but this is not enough to tackle all non-age-related maladies. 
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P54A4A1A2.4A1.2 – Their first argument is as follows:  
Proponents of the cost containment argument support their reasoning by reference to the 
ability of anti-aging interventions to prolong healthspan. However, what is required for 
financial gains to be conceivable is not so much increases in healthspan as absolute 
reductions in frailspan (i.e. the period of age-related frailty). 
So they conclude that merely increasing healthspan will not do the trick. 
P54A4A1A2.4A1.2A1 – Their claim is false and easily demonstrable. I understand frailspan 
as the difference between lifespan and healthspan. It is not frailspan in absolute terms that 
matters but in relative terms, that is, in % of the lifespan. Frailspan can even increase in absolute 
terms and healthcare costs go down. Suppose the average person has 100 years of lifespan and 
a 20-year frail span. Some changes allowed for the average person to have a life span of 1000 
years and a frail span of 50 years. The frailspan increased, but, assuming a constant real cost 
per year of frailspan per person, the cost per person per year decreased substantially. On a 
constant lifespan, increasing the healthspan must necessarily decrease the frailspan. The only 
way the concerns of the authors are actualized is the case where Y = ZX, where Y represents 
the relative increase in frailspan, X represents the relative increase in healthspan, and Z is a 
constant greater than one. In other words increases in the lifespan more than proportionately 
increase the frailspan. However, biogerontology research seems to posit the opposite (see the 
quotes by de Magalhães at the end of 1.3 – Illness and Frailty). 
P54A4A1A2.4A1.2A2 – The concept of immortality excludes the existence of a frailspan, 
except when so is desired by the person (agency allowance). As such the argument the authors 
put forward does not work for immortality. 
P54A4A1A2.4A1.3 – The second argument presented by Capitaine and Pennings (2013) is:  
The prospect of considerable savings presupposes a sizeable amount of people using life 
extending, anti-aging technologies. However, this is, as we argue below, a problematic 
presupposition. The little available research concerning community attitudes towards life 
extending technologies points towards a rather low uptake rate.  
P54A4A1A2.4A1.3A1 – The results of the studies (see 4.1 – Dealing with PCBA: Is 
Immortality Desirable?) seem off when compared to what happens in reality. Do more than 
half of cancer patients refuse their treatment because it is a life extending technology? What 
about those who need urgent blood transfusions, or surgery? Do more than half of the people 
in that situation refuse treatment just because the treatment for them is a life extending 
technology? Perhaps when the people that participated in the study are put in a real-life 
situation their attitude changes, or perhaps the study considered immortality with senescence.  
  150/201 
P54A4A1A2.4A1.3A1A1 – I do not find these reasons convincing. The evidence provided by 
study is better than any opinion on the matter. Notwithstanding potential mistakes, if people 
answer they will not partake in immortality treatments we should not assume otherwise. 
P54A4A1A2.4A1.3A2 – A different argument could be related with the boundaries of the 
public health system. If a patient voluntarily refuses a treatment for a condition, after being 
informed of the consequences of his decision, and then consequently starts suffering from said 
condition as a consequence of not receiving the treatment, should the state have the 
responsibility to pay more than the value of the initial treatment? Say someone refuses to take 
a vaccine (e.g. influenza vaccine), and then ends up with the disease. Should the state pay the 
treatment of that person fully, or only a value equivalent to the cost of the vaccine, and the 
remainder supported by the patient? If someone refuses immortality and then starts getting all 
sorts of diseases such as cancer, should the state pay those treatments fully? Note that I am not 
suggesting the state refuse the treatment, I am only suggesting the state charge for the services 
that were in excess of what was needed. Should not persons bear responsibility for their choices 
when fully informed of the consequences? If this line of thinking is followed, then the rate of 
uptake of immortality being low would not destroy savings of the system. If this line of thinking 
is not followed then the system seems to be unfair for those who put their best efforts in 
remaining healthy, often at the expense of some pleasurable activity. 
P54A4A1A2.4A1.3A3 – This object is a note regarding the low uptake approach, and should 
not be considered a counter. Suppose the anti-vax movement gains traction and the uptake rate 
of vaccines decreases. As a consequence, diseases for which people refused vaccination start 
to increase their incidence rate. This means that the savings that vaccines created is being 
chipped away by the anti-vaxers each time they go to the hospital to get cured of that particular 
disease.129 This in itself does not seem to be enough to stop providing vaccines to the public. 
P54A4A1A2.4A1.3A4 – Lastly it can be argued that the argument in the parent object only 
obtains temporarily due to P1A1A1A1. 
P54A4A1A2.4A1.4 – The third argument put forward by Capitaine and Pennings (2013) is: 
Past spending trends, however, suggest that population aging, by itself, has been only a 
minor driver of the annual growth in healthcare expenditures. (…) Medical technology is 
the prime determinant of the increase in healthcare costs. New technologies and the 
intensified use of old ones are responsible for about 50 % of the annual growth in health 
spending (Callahan 2009). Thus, it seems that life extension, by relying on technology, 
would be part of the problem, rather than the solution, when it comes to keeping healthcare 
costs in check. 
                                                 
129 I assume the cost of vaccination is insignificant compared to a full treatment. 
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P54A4A1A2.4A1.4A1 – First, this argument completely ignores all effects from the expansion 
of the healthspan. The compression of morbidity model provides the tools to understand why. 
If people only increase their life expectancy a few years, but medical costs increase greatly, 
then that is enough for the argument of the parent object to obtain. However, it completely 
ignores the changes that such investment yielded in the quality of life of the patients, i.e. 
improvements in healthspan. Average people at 70 years old could have completely different 
health statuses after the introduction of the so-called expensive technologies. The problem is 
that this makes both situations, after and before the implementation of the expensive 
technologies, incomparable. Immortality not only requires removing involuntary barriers to the 
lifespan, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to the healthspan. When someone claims that 
curing aging directly is less expensive than the one disease at a time approach, the assumption 
implied is that expensive is to be understood in relative terms130 and not in absolute terms. If 
there are increases in the healthspan, then that should be accounted for when considering claims 
regarding how expensive a strategy is. For example, if there are two options: (X) 10 units at 
price 100, and (Y) 100 units at price 750; Y is more expensive in absolute terms, but less 
expensive in relative terms (price per unit). The mistake that the authors make is to just account 
for the change in price from 100 to 750 (which represent increasing cost of technology use), 
ignoring the change from 10 to 100 (which represents added benefits to the healthspan).  
P54A4A1A2.4A1.4A2 – Another reason authors might reach their conclusion is because the 
current strategy of solving senescence is the one disease at a time model. This suffers from 
extreme decreasing marginal returns, since once one disease is solved another immediately fills 
its place. Evermore expensive technology is required to gain a smaller fraction of lifespan. But 
proponents of tackling aging directly are arguing for a different approach. In other words, the 
authors are saying: <with our current strategy we verify that X happens>. This is an irrelevant 
observation to judge the claim that with a different strategy, Y would happen instead of X. The 
authors should not have drawn inferences from the current strategy to the new strategy, since 
the whole point of changing strategies is to change the underlying assumptions about how 
things are going to work out. 
P54A4A1A3 – A different approach from arguing that immortality will provide healthcare cost 
reductions (see the thread starting in P54A4A1A2.4) is to take an overall view of the economy. 
This argument works even if there is an increase in healthcare costs. What needs to be 
accounted for are other benefits, such as increased productivity, increased tax revenue, etc, that 
                                                 
130 Having a better return for the same investment, or the same return for a smaller investment. 
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come with immortality. If after accounting all effects there is a net positive value, then investing 
in immortality is a sound public investment, much like education is. At the societal level it will 
have positive externalities, and at the individual level it will provide important agency enabling 
tools (knowledge in the case of education, health in the case of immortality). It seems highly 
likely that immortality will have a large net positive value from the point of view of state 
finances. For one the expenses associated with the growing up period of childhood and 
adolescence will be diluted when considering longer lifespans. Thus, the costs of providing 
education and other services for this group will have a higher return on investment. Secondly, 
if people are at the peak of their physical and mental capacity because they do not age we could 
expect gains of productivity. And lastly there will be an effect on retirement. Perhaps the whole 
concept will radically change, since if people do not age they will never be in the fragile state 
typical of the older people of today. They will be able to maintain their independence and 
provide for themselves all their lives which will ease pressures on pay as you go social security 
systems, freeing up resources that could be used elsewhere. This argument seems even stronger 
because immortality is not a required threshold for the benefits to be realized. As the healthspan 
increases a proportionate part of the listed benefits will be actualized. It is easy to picture that 
a society with a short lifespan and low overall health will benefit from increases in overall 
health and lifespan. The case still stands even after removing the qualifiers “short” and “low”. 
Sethe and de Magalhães (2013) seem to defend this line of thinking: 
Any economic cost calculation also needs to take account of the economic benefit. Curing 
aging and extending healthy lifespan would be profitable for nations. Historically, the 
economic value of increased longevity from 1970–2000 was estimated at $3.2 trillion per 
year for the US alone through increased productivity and significantly decreased healthcare 
costs, with economic gains from future health improvements also estimated to be large 
(Murphy and Topel 2006). In fact, effective anti-aging interventions are likely required to 
avert significant economic burdens associated with the current demographic situation 
(Aaron and Schwartz 2004). 
P54A5 – Lastly, there are some options that structurally eliminate most forms of relevant 
inequalities. An example of such strategies is the Universal Basic Income (UBI) or the Negative 
Income Tax (NTI)131. Although the idea of an UBI/NIT has gained popularity recently due to 
advances in automation (e.g. CGP Grey, 2014), a social welfare program based around it has 
                                                 
131 UBI is a term usually employed by left leaning individuals and organizations while NTI is the term of choice 
of right leaning individuals and organizations. Both proposals are pragmatically equivalent – this can be shown 
by plotting a graph with gross income in one axis (let us say the x axis), and net income (after state transfers: taxes 
and subsidies) on the other (let us say the y axis). Plotting a line that results from an UBI can also be obtained 
through a NTI and vice-versa, by adjusting income tax rates. The main idea of an UBI/NTI is to make the graph 
line be above y=x for low values of x – to represent a positive net transfer from the state to the individual. A 
second idea is that transfers are liquid (e.g. they are not in food stamp form, but in cash). A third idea is that such 
systems are created in such a way that avoid the current welfare traps (UBI has a psychological advantage here). 
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other potential benefits (for a general overview see e.g. Arnold, 2018). Under this scenario the 
less well-off could still be provided with enough funds to afford immortality treatments. 
Although one could consider this argument as a specific instance of the more broader state 
intervention argument made in P54A4 there is a fundamental difference. While in P54A4 the 
measures were focused on showing that the inequality that stemmed from immortality 
treatments does not need to obtain, here it is argued that if the underlying inequalities are 
solved, then P50 is false. Inequality is not something intrinsically caused by immortality, as 
noted in P*53A4A1A1. Immortality treatments only have the potential to increase whatever 
inequalities already exist (even if only temporarily). In other words immortality does not create 
new sources of inequality. If everyone has access to immortality treatments no inequality is 
actualized. This leads to the conclusion that immortality creating inequality is exclusively 
dependent on the state of affairs before immortality is actualized and not on immortality itself. 
Thus, changing that state of affairs, for example through an UBI/NTI program can destroy P50.  
C55 – It seems both premises, P*53 and P54, fail. P*53A2 fails to destroy P*53, since it is not 
supported by empirical evidence. P*53A1 does not fare any better, as stated in P*53A1A3 it 
needs more substance. However P*53A3 (and P*53A4, via P*53A4A1A1) presents good 
counters to P*53, since several alternatives to the ability to pay are discussed in P54. When it 
comes to P54, I present five plausible reasons showing inequality needs not occur: P54A1 
states than inequalities will be temporary under market mechanisms, P54A2 deals with 
intellectual property, P54A3 shows that borrowing will be available, P54A4 explores the 
possibility of publicly funding immortality treatments, and lastly P54A5 suggest a strategy to 
deal with inequalities at the root of the problem.  
P56 - This premise states that there is nothing capable of replacing what was in place in the 
older state of affairs (not UI)  that did not allow the badness of immortality to be actualized. 
P56A1 – As stated before (e.g. P48A1), immortality is reversible.  
PCBA – Ceteris paribus. 
C57 - P56A1 allows for the dismissal of P56, so C57 does not obtain. 
-- 
Verdict: FAIL 
Overall, inequality concerns seem to not be directed at immortality as a technology, but 
solely at whom shall have priority. The question about its desirability is already answered: it 
needs to be desirable, otherwise there would be no inequality concerns to speak of. In the end 
the best solution is to be able to develop immortality as fast as possible in order to minimize 
whatever inequalities one can conceive of. The solution is not to ditch immortality development 
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efforts. The same can be said of a cure to any disease, e.g. cancer. One would want cancer cures 
to be developed as fast as possible, so they become affordable to all quickly, instead of ditching 
efforts to cure cancer because it will cause inequality. With immortality, which is a cure for all 
diseases, the same happens. As such, worrying about inequality when it comes to immortality 
should come attached to an anti-anti-immortality position. The less obstacles to its development 
the less inequalities it will cause. 
 
3.1.3 – Stagnation Argument 
P58: Eliminating involuntary death will lead to stagnation. 
P*59: Stagnation is bad. 
C60 (P58+P*59): Eliminating involuntary death is bad. 
P61: Immortality eliminates involuntary death. 
C62 (C60+P61): Immortality is bad. 
P63: The badness of eliminating involuntary death cannot be mitigated by direct 
replacement.132 
C64 (C62+P63+PCBA): Immortality is not desirable. 
This argument is different from the boredom argument, because it is possible to achieve 
stagnation without boredoom. Boredoom without stagnation also seems possible depending on 
what we allow to enter the definition of boredoom. 
P58: This argument tries to show that if people do not die, then society will have trouble with 
coming up with new and fresh ideas, challenging the status quo and innovate on all spheres of 
life, from technology to morality. Perhaps the most well-known expression of this argument is 
the famous quote from Max Planck, for example in Sethe and de Magalhães (2013): 
Still, those who have spent a ‘lifetime’ developing a theory, following a creed, or hating an 
enemy are presumably less likely to change their mind than those younger and less 
encumbered by their past. As Max Plank suggests “A new scientific truth does not triumph 
by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents 
eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with the idea from the 
beginning” (Planck 1950). 
Or for short: science advances one funeral at a time. The argument takes this rationale and 
expands it to other spheres of life beyond the scientific ones. Society would, in the end, 
crystalize. For example, we see this in Overall (2003,50): “Callahan (1998, 131) expresses it: 
The coming and going of the generations creates genetic and cultural vigor in human life.” And 
                                                 
132 See footnote 45. 
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in Vincent (2013) 133: “Immortalist technology would undermine a human cultural process—
the succession of generations – and hence compassion and social solidarity.” 
P58A1 – An easy objection is to tie our inability to adapt, change, and learn in old age, when 
compared to young people, to the ageing process itself. Since UI aging would not happen, then 
the worries about stagnation would also not obtain. There seems to be empirical evidence about 
this, meaning this argument should not be taken seriously. As Sethe and de Magalhães state: 
There are good reasons to believe that some—if not the majority—of our decreasing ability 
to learn and adapt as we age is an artefact of brain aging (Lockett 2010) and may thus be 
subject to remedy of anti-aging treatments (Lynch 2011). 
Even if it is not directly related to the ageing process that does not mean it cannot be solved. 
We can enhance ourselves to overcome these issues. 
P58A2 – A second objection argues that the problem is not so much grounded on individuals 
but on their connections – network science has a say on the matter. For what follows see Case 
(2018). If our social connections are a certain way, they can lead to groupthink which will 
result in stagnation. Complex contagion of ideas requires that a critical mass of adopters be 
reached before it expands, and a highly connected network might not allow that to happen. On 
the other hand, if groups live in isolation ideas cannot spread either. There must be the right 
amount of bonding within groups and bridging between groups to avoid both isolation and 
groupthink. Small world networks seem to be the sweet spot. The problem of stagnation seems 
to be aggravated by reductions in the death rate, since death provides an external force for 
networks to change. Without death they will crystalize leading to stagnation. Or will they? 
Death does not seem necessary to avoid stagnation – we only need to require that networks be 
a certain way and/or that they do not stabilize. This can be achieved by incentivizing (and as 
last resort mandating) people to form the right type of networks. For example, internet filter 
bubbles seem to be something that do not help stopping stagnation, since they can lead to 
groupthink via the illusion of the majority. Immortality needs not to result in stagnation 
therefore P58 does not hold. 
P58A3 – When we look at the empirical evidence to support Planck’s claim we see that there 
seems to be a positive effect of death on the advancement of science (Azoulay et al., 2015):  
                                                 
133 Although I will not discuss these two claims here at length (that immortality would undermine compassion and 
social solidarity), Vincent seems to be committing fallacious reasoning. The argument he presents is simplified in 
the following form: P1: Individualism → Immortality. P2: Individualism → ~ (Compassion or Social Solidarity). 
C: Immortality → ~ (Compassion or Social Solidarity). Even granting P1 and P2 (which are doubtful), C does not 
follow because P1 is not bidirectional: there might causes to immortality other than individualism, or not- 
individualist persons can also be immortal. (Geddes, 2004): “Immortality as a fundamental moral imperative need 
not be interpreted in a purely egotist sense.” 
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Consistent with previous research, the flow of articles by collaborators into affected fields 
decreases precipitously after the death of a star scientist (relative to control fields). In 
contrast, we find that the flow of articles by non-collaborators increases by 8% on average. 
(…) In particular, this increase in contributions by outsiders appears to tackle the 
mainstream questions within the field but by leveraging newer ideas that arise in other 
domains. This intellectual arbitrage is quite successful—the new articles represent 
substantial contributions, at least as measured by long-run citation impact. (…) The loss of 
an elite scientist central to the field appears to signal to those on the outside that the 
cost/benefit calculations on the avant-garde ideas they might bring to the table has changed, 
thus encouraging them to engage. 
Are we doomed to not have this engagement in UI? The problem seems to be twofold: no new 
persons to bring ideas onto the table, and no death of old persons to leave space for new ideas. 
However, an obvious solution looms around. UI people would have multiple careers. This will 
not only create room for new ideas, when people leave their fields of expertise, but also 
contribute to new ideas in the new field that people choose to pursue. The rate of innovation 
and progress will be greater not lower, since UI we will be able to afford people with expertise 
in several different fields and allow them to bring all this knowledge together to tackle the 
complicated questions of the moment.  UI people will have careers that span, for example, from 
20 years to 70 years and then change to another area of study, bringing with them their 
knowledge and know-how. At some point all immortals will be polymaths. And this needs not 
be confined to scientific research. The same principles can be applied to all kinds of jobs, and 
even to morality – if people change their principles in order to try new ones.134 The problem of 
stagnation is just a problem of lack of creativity on the part of those who advocate it. The 
solution is quite accessible, only requiring turnover of occupations at some point in time. Sethe 
and de Magalhães (2013) state that “similar considerations have inspired legislators to limit the 
term any one individual can spend in a position of power.” Ultimately, actively leaving people 
to die against their will as a result of not actualizing immortality, seems to be, at minimum, an 
ethically questionable to solution to stagnation, since alternatives are available. As Sethe and 
de Magalhães (2013) put it: “to rely on death as a driver of change is to take a very resigned 
view about our moral responsibility and capacity.” 
P*59 – Here it is argued that stagnation is bad. Most arguments found in the literature usually 
argue that stagnation is bad indirectly. I mean that authors argue that not having new 
generations to replace new ones is bad. The rotation of generations is an argument in itself, and 
I will only touch on it briefly in P*59A2. Here I will consider the rotation of generations 
                                                 
134 Some people might argue that changing moral values is not the same thing as changing jobs. Well, not with 
that attitude, clearly. On a more serious note: people can live in different cultures, in different jurisdictions, in 
different communities and these experiences will allow them to gradually update their moral values, instead of 
fixing them in place, as stagnation suggests. 
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argument insofar as the badness tied to stopping this process is linked to stagnation. In other 
words, the authors cited here seem to argue that stopping the rotation of generations is bad 
because it results in stagnation and thus I infer that stagnation is considered bad. There might 
be reasons, other than stagnation, to support the rotation of generations argument.135 Some 
examples of the stagnation argument in the literature: 
Harry (2013) 136: Should we assume the necessity for, or desirability of, the creation of future generations? 
(…) The second set of reasons has to do with the advantages of fresh people, fresh ideas, and the possibility of 
continued human development. If these reasons are powerful, and I believe they are, and if the generational 
turnover proved too slow for regeneration of youth and ideas (…), we might face a future in which the fairest and 
the most ethical course might be to contemplate a sort of ‘generational cleansing’. 
Overall (2003, 53): Nuland writes, “There is vanity in all this, and it demeans us. At the very least, it brings 
us no honor. Far from being irreplaceable, we should be replaced. Fantasies of staying the hand of mortality are 
incompatible with the best interests of our species and the continuity of humankind’s progress. More directly, 
they are incompatible with the best interests of our very own children” (1994, 86, his emphasis). 
Others, perhaps as a strategy to drive away thoughtful critique, write in a cryptic manner, 
perhaps inspired by new age gibberish (Kass, 2004): 
For the desire to prolong youthfulness is not only a childish desire to eat one's life and keep 
it; it is also an expression of a childish and narcissistic wish incompatible with devotion to 
posterity. (…) It seeks an endless present, isolated from anything truly eternal, and severed 
from any true continuity with past and future. It is in principle hostile to children, because 
children, those who come after, are those who will take one's place; they are life's answer to 
mortality, and their presence in one's house is a constant reminder that one no longer belongs 
to the frontier generation. One cannot pursue agelessness for oneself and remain faithful to 
the spirit and meaning of perpetuation. 
P*59A1 – Is it that bad that society evolves at a slower pace? UI time seems to be of a lesser 
concern. The same amount of progress can be achieved at a lower rate, given enough time, 
something that immortals would have in abundance. It seems that our current paradigm is being 
wrongly used UI to drive the conclusion that a slower rate of progress is bad. Besides it is not 
a stretch to suppose that for millennia our ancestors lived in what we can call stagnated 
societies, where, from the point of view of the individual and its lifespan, there was essentially 
no progress to technology and social practices.137 Should we consider all those societies of the 
past bad because today our rate of change is greater? 
                                                 
135 Certainly those pertaining to it being natural, normal, or the case until now, will suffer from much the same 
critiques as those made in 2.3.1 – Death is Normal/Natural Argument, mutatis mutandis. Those pertaining to 
making room for new people are dealt with in footnote 78.  
136 The author later clarifies the use of <generational cleansing>: “for the record, I think it would be unjustifiable, 
and therefore it is difficult to see how we could resist death-postponing therapies.”  
137 Off course some progress had to happen, but it was distributed throughout a long period of time. The result is 
an extremely slow rate of progress. We can infer this from the rate of technological change. When it comes to 
social costumes and practices we can only guess. Still it does not seem to be a stretch to suppose that social norms 
and practices were static from the point of view of the average human. 
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P*59A1A1 – ⸸ 
P*59A2 – The claim that appears in Nuland (cited by Overall) and in Kass that immortality is 
hostile to children seems to be unwarranted. (1) I do not seem to follow why any individual 
who becomes immortal starts hating children. And if many individuals become immortal I also 
do not seem to follow why their position on children will be negatively impacted. If anything 
children being rarer per unit of time will only increase their value, and the corresponding 
attention and care given to them. But there seems to be other ways to interpret the claims that 
immortality will be hostile to children. (2) Perhaps they are claiming that people, by existing, 
are stealing the room for children to exist. But in that case, those who kill themselves at 25 love 
children more than those that die at 90. The more you live, the more you are hostile to children, 
so the best way to minimize hostility against children is to kill yourself after you stop being a 
child. This seems an absurd claim and neither of those authors followed through with a 
relatively early suicide so they either do not care about being hostile to children (perhaps 
because it is not that important), or their claim is not to be interpreted this way. (3) A third way 
of interpreting the claim might be because children will be the future persons that will inhabit 
the planet. By living forever we are taking away from them. On this claim, children mean the 
potential persons that are yet born. There are some problems with this interpretation. It seems 
that people that do not exist and never yet existed are being given some kind of status that 
allows one to be hostile against them: this seems nonsense. How can one be hostile to 
something that does not exist? The answer can be because these non-existent persons will exist 
in the future – so we are locking our hostility not on non-existent beings but on real future 
beings. However, this does not seem right. There seems to be a confusion with what the 
following expressions refer to: <unborn persons>, and <persons who will inhabit the earth in 
the future>. While in our current state of affairs these are co-extensive, if future is to be defined 
as 150 years or more, they need not be UI. Immortals can still care about the <persons who will 
inhabit the earth in the future>. It is just that these persons do not need to be children anymore. 
These persons can be the immortals themselves. In fact, immortals will have a stronger 
connection to the <persons who will inhabit the earth in the future> than current persons, whose 
connection is only through offspring or to some other connection to humanity as a whole. Those 
who believe today that they will become immortal see a bigger threat on any humanity level 
existential risk (e.g. climate change) than others, because it will affect them directly and not 
some distant person that does not yet exist. None of the three interpretations presented offers a 
reasonable claim to suppose that immortals will be hostile to children by virtue of their 
immortality. 
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C60 – Although P*59A1 questions P*59, it seems to not be enough to dismiss it, and P*59A2 
was to address a tangential point. However I do consider that P58 can be discarded. P58A3, 
the strongest of the objections, offers a satisfactory solution. In fact a solution our society 
already uses in occupations where stagnation is deemed undesirable. Only a lack of creativity 
allows the stagnation argument to hold. P58A1 and P58A2, are both based on theories, medical 
and social respectively, that seem to have solid ground to be the case UI. If so, under P58A1 
the problem of stagnation would not exist or be extremely alleviated, and under P58A2 
measures at the network level to not allow stagnation to sink in would also solve the problem 
or at least alleviate its effects. 
P61 – This premise is true according to 1.2 – What is Immortality? 
C62 – Given C60 and P61, C62 obtains. 
P63 – This premise states that there is nothing capable of replacing what was in place in the 
older state of affairs (not UI)  that did not allow the badness of immortality to be actualized. 
P63A1 – As stated before (e.g. P56A1), immortality is reversible.  
PCBA – Ceteris paribus. 
C64 – P63A1 allows for the dismissal of P63, so C64 does not obtain. 
-- 
Verdict: FAIL 
 The whole argument fails because P58 does not seem to provide a good foundation. If 
the possibility of stagnation is real, it can be easily mitigated. The argument is no more 
important than someone arguing that accelerating a car will inevitably lead to an accident 
simply because it did not consider that the car can steer and/or brake, and thus does not need 
to go straight forever. As such C60 fails. And as a backup P63 also provides a last line of 
defence against the argument. 
 
3.2 – Arguments in Support of Immortality 
3.2.1 – Life as a Pre-Condition Argument 
P65: Immortality guarantees the ability to be alive. 
P66: Being alive is sufficient for the capacity for agency. 
P*67: Having the capacity for agency is necessary to do good. 
C68 (P65+P66+P*67):  Immortality guarantees the ability to do good. 
The argument is simpler than it looks. Overall (2003, 184) and Ehni (2003), respectively 
summed it up neatly: 
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It is rational to want a longer life because life itself is the precondition for all else that we 
might want.  
Time as such could be considered a necessary precondition for activities and achievements 
and thus be a relevant aspect beyond mere physical or mental capabilities or resources 
I decided to divide the argument in those particular premises to highlight two counters. 
P65 – There is no controversy here. Immortality eliminates all involuntary death, so it allows 
the individual to live for as long as desired.  
P66 – This premise requires two clarifications. The first is regarding the agency that is usually 
approached by theories of justice. It seems weird that by the act of merely being alive one is 
granted agency. Certainly, many would like to argue that it is not so, for example if one is a 
slave, suffers from lock-in-syndrome, or finds oneself in the lowest economic class of society. 
I do not want to dispute such statements. Instead I want to use agency with a slightly different 
meaning and that is the reason for the expression <capacity for agency>. Being alive is to be 
interpreted in contrast to not being alive. We know that human beings (that are alive), can 
display agency, but we do not know if after death such capacity exists. Alive beings that do not 
have agency in the sense used by theories of justice, still retain the capacity for agency even 
though it is not being instantiated at that moment, much like gravity is operating even though 
the pencil that I am holding is not falling into the center of mass of the earth. It is as if agency 
is the default mode of alive humans but can be opposed by external forces and what remains is 
just the capacity for agency. Contrast this state of affairs with the state of affairs of someone 
who died. It is a mystery if the capacity for agency is retained after death. In this sense being 
alive is sufficient to have the capacity for agency, while the same cannot be said regarding the 
state of not being alive (or after-death, or after life). The second clarification is in regard to the 
use of agency within the free will - determinism debate. That debate is largely irrelevant for 
what I am proposing here. Agency is not to be associated with free will but instead with agents, 
and agents can be deterministic. For example, a thermostat can be described as an agent and at 
the same time be described without free will. As long as there are inputs, goals and an action 
space, there is an agent. This framework will be developed in 4.3 – Two Birds, One Stone. 
P66A1 – The obvious counter is then to argue that capacity for agency still obtains after death. 
This makes the value of immortality insignificant, since it does not matter if one is alive or not 
for the purposes of having the capacity for agency. 
P66A1A1 – The counter does not work because P66 claims only sufficiency, not necessity. 
Claiming necessity would require arguing that the capacity for agency is lost after death, but 
we have no idea if that is the case.  By only claiming sufficiency, it might be the case that after 
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death there is a capacity for agency (or not), but that does not detract the fact that while alive 
there is indeed a capacity for agency. The strength of the argument comes from the uncertainty 
that clouds the afterlife. While alive we have capacity for agency, after death we do not have a 
clue, so it is still the case that being alive is superior from a risk management perspective, if 
one wants to have capacity for agency. 
P*67 – What this premise really means is that to accomplish anything one must have the 
capacity for agency. Say someone wants to enjoy hiking in the nearby mountains. If the 
capacity for agency does not exist it seems to be impossible to do so. Because it is uncertain 
that this capacity exists after death, it is uncertain that hiking in the mountains is a possibility. 
Behaving morally or doing good, whatever that is, seems to require capacity for agency. For 
example if good is serving some god’s will, one needs to be able the decide and act according 
to what behaviour this task requires. The same can be said of saving lives, ending poverty, 
planning terrorist attacks, procreation, etc. It seems that no matter the conception of good, 
capacity for agency is required. A rock does not seem to be capable of achieving anything 
because it lacks capacity for agency.138 
C68 – The argument seems to obtain without problems. If we die it is uncertain that we will be 
able to achieve anything, including whatever is considered good. Therefore immortality, by 
doing away with involuntary death provides full control of how much humans can achieve. 
Being alive seems a pre-requisite (in the sense of a guarantee) for anything else. 
C68A1 - There is one exception, and that is if the concept of good requires suicide. If the best 
possible state of affairs is that we all commit suicide, then it seems that the argument does not 
obtain.  More precisely, capacity for agency is necessary to carry out with the suicide, but then 
this means that immortality is unnecessary for achieving good. People just need to kill 
themselves before immortality treatments are needed. 
C68A1A1 – The conclusion of the argument is that immortality guarantees the ability to do 
good, not that it is required to do good. If indeed the concept of good involves something akin 
to mass suicide, then immortality, although useless, does not provide any barrier to its 
achievement. However, if the concept of good does not involve voluntary death prior to 
immortality treatments are needed to prolong life, then immortality is useful to achieve 
whatever good is.139 
                                                 
138 I exclude the case where rocks do indeed have capacity for agency, but an external force is acting upon them 
with the result of producing a state of affairs that looks like rocks do not have capacity for agency. 
139 It seems unclear what the concept of good is. This is not to be understood as a defence that no concept of good 
can be the correct one. What I mean is just that no particular concept of good is likely to be the correct one. An 
analogy might help clarify things. If there is a box with 100 balls numbered from 1 to 100, it is unlikely that a ball 
  162/201 
-- 
Verdict: OK with one caveat 
 The argument works. Being alive seems to be required to achieve whatever desires, 
goals, or behaviours one might have planned, including those deemed ethical. However if what 
is good requires suicide, then this argument does not provide support to immortality. 
 
3.2.2 – Ability to do More and/or Different Argument 
P69: Immortality allows being alive for longer periods of time. 
P70: Living for longer periods of time allows access to more and/or different activities. 
P*71: Having access to more and/or different activities is good.  
C72 (P69+P70+P*71): Immortality is good. 
Note that this argument builds on what was already developed by the 2.4.1 – Optionality 
Argument, but explores what these new options can contain. This makes this argument about 
something not intrinsic to immortality. Instead it is now a consequential argument. 
P69: This is a true premise because immortality provides control over death, thus allowing the 
individual to live for as long as it is desired. 
P70: This is also a true premise. Living longer is having access to more units of time to allocate. 
These extra units of time increase the overall time one has available to allocate throughout their 
life (see also Urban, 2014). There are two different reasons in support of this premise. (1) The 
most obvious  states that we will be able to access activities that we already have access to but 
for some reason or another never got around to participate in them. As Overall (2004) puts it: 
“An increased life span gives human beings the chance for activities and experiences that they 
would not otherwise have enjoyed.” Some examples can be the ability to read every book 
published until now, to visit every place where a medieval battle occurred, to get dozens of 
PhDs140, to build a large family, and so on. Because our current state only grants us a limited 
life expectancy, even if people would like to participate in a great deal of activities, they can 
only do so much. With immortality they would be able to overcome the current limits to 
lifespan and participate in every desired activity. (2) The less obvious argument is that we will 
be able to access new activities that we could not before due to current lifespans being too 
short. It is hard to imagine what can be considered an example, since these activities would be 
                                                 
with the specific number X is drawn in any one draw: the probability is just 1%. But that does not mean that no 
ball is going to be drawn. This will be developed further in 4.3.2 – Ethics and Choice. 
140 This option attracts me greatly. (Upon reading this a professional academic told me I must be out of my mind). 
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different from what we are used to. My attempt at providing examples: traveling to other star 
systems, selective breeding of long lived trees or even creating novel animal species, having 
non-hierarchical genealogical trees141, and so on. Perhaps the experience of having lived 1000y 
would be something of note, in the same way that people who have lived 60y seem to have 
something that those who are only in their 30’s have not. 
P*71: Whatever the concept of good involves it seems that being able to do more of the same 
activities represent an improvement on one’s overall position (but see C68A1). And having the 
option to do different activities might as well increase our efficacy in doing good things, 
whatever good is. Geddes (2004) seems to agree with the argument: 
Time is no ordinary commodity! A person with more time can plan further into the future. 
They have more choices available to them in the present because some of the things a person 
could do in the present would only pay off over the longer-term. A person with more choices 
has, by definition, more freedom, and has an increased range of goals to choose from. Thus 
the longer a person has to live, the greater the potential value of each moment. 
C72 – P69 and P70 are true premises. P*71 seems to be relevant to most conceptions of good, 
the only exception being C68A1. But because what is good seems to not be clear (this will be 
developed further in 4.3.2 – Ethics and Choice), then access to more and/or different activities 
increase the options that are available to achieve what is good. Thus C72 seems to obtain. 
-- 
Verdict: OK with one caveat 
 This is related to the previous two arguments presented in support of immortality: 2.4.1 
– Optionality Argument and 3.2.1 – Life as a Pre-Condition Argument. Having the option to 
continue go on living being constantly instantiated allows one to do more and/or different 
activities. And to do more and/or different requires being alive in the first place. This argument 
brings to the table what was missing from the previous two: uses for immortality. The caveat 
is C68A1.  
                                                 
141 Consider that subject X and Y produce offspring and at the same time X is a 10th degree lineal descendent of 
Y. Although a similar arrangement is already possible with our current lifespan, the variability in the genetic 
material to allow for this procreation to be without complications is not there. 
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Section 4 – Conclusion 
4.1 – Dealing with PCBA: Is Immortality Desirable? 
 Now, finally comes the time to answer the important question. Is immortality desirable? 
So far, I only discussed one argument at a time. Now is the moment to aggregate their effects. 
To get an overall picture of immortality both pros and cons need to be considered, i.e. it is time 
for the cost-benefit analysis. The arguments presented in this project and their verdicts are 
listed in the table below. 
Argument Position Verdict 
2.3.1.1 – Normal Version Against FAIL 
2.3.1.2 – Human Nature Version Against FAIL 
2.3.1.3 – God Version Against FAIL 
2.3.1.4 – Artificial Version Against FAIL 
2.3.1.5 – Function Version Against FAIL 
2.3.2 – Boredoom Argument Against FAIL 
2.3.3 – Deadline Argument Against FAIL 
3.1.1 – Overpopulation Argument Against FAIL (with caveats) 
3.1.2 – Inequality Argument Against FAIL 
3.1.3 – Stagnation Argument Against FAIL 
2.4.1 – Optionality Argument Pro OK 
3.2.1 – Life as a Pre-Condition Argument Pro OK (with caveats) 
3.2.2 – Ability to do More and/or Different Argument Pro OK (with caveats) 
 From the table above it becomes clear that arguments against immortality fail, while 
arguments in favour of immortality do mostly ok. With this information the answer is clear, 
immortality is desirable.  
 An immediate objection might be raised against this conclusion, and that is that I did 
not consider all arguments available. That is a true statement. The reason they were not 
included was already alluded to in the very beginning. It would be an insurmountable task 
given the time allotted for the development of this project. However, from my readings of the 
literature the arguments that were not included do not fare any better and thus would not change 
the conclusion. All arguments that I have found against immortality fail, while arguments pro 
immortality fail most of the time, the exception being the ones I have decided to include here.
 Another question the reader might have is about the uneven distribution between pro 
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immortality arguments and arguments against immortality. It was intentional. Despite the 
conclusion that immortality is desirable the general opinion of the public is the opposite.  
A study in 2007 in Capitain and Pennings (2013):  Interesting results have also emerged from a study 
conducted by Lang et al. (2007) Participants were randomly assigned to one of 3 conditions. Whereas those in the 
first condition were informed that research on aging offered hopeful prospects with respect to the physical, mental, 
and psychological fitness in old age, participants in the second condition were told the opposite. The control group 
received no information concerning research on aging. Participants in each group were asked which age they 
would like to reach. Surprisingly, the answers did not vary significantly across the 3 conditions. In each of the 3 
conditions, the average desired lifetime was approximately 86 years—well below the current maximum lifespan. 
Fewer than 10 % of the respondents wanted to live to 120 or beyond.  
A study in 2011 (ibid.): In a recent study (Partridge et al. 2011), for instance, only 35 % of the respondents 
answered affirmatively when asked whether they would use a life extending technology. 
Another study in 2011 in Vincent (2013): In response to the question: “How old would you like to be 
when you die?” posed in a 2011 UK national survey by ComRes only 15 % replied that they would like to live 
for ever. Men in the survey were slightly more likely to tick the ‘live for ever box’ (17 % as opposed to 13 % for 
women). Or to put it another way, offered the chance to indicate a preference for of living for ever, 85 % of 
respondents chose not to. There was a systematic relationship to class with those with high status occupations less 
likely to want to live for ever. A further finding was related to age, where there was a progressive relationship, 
the older the respondent the less likely they were to indicate they wished to live for ever.  
More recently a study from the Pew Research Center (2013), inquired US citizens about their 
thoughts on life extension. The results are telling. 
• 51% say treatments that extend life by decades would be bad for society, compared 
with only 41% that say they would be good for society. 
• When the participants were asked if they personally wanted the treatment, 56% said 
they would not want, compared with only 38% stating they would want.142  
• The median age people say they want to live to is 90 years. Only 4% of participants 
state they would like to live more than 120 years.  
• Being older, having more education, having more income, or knowing less about life 
extension therapies was correlated with an unfavourable view of life extension 
therapies, in line with the previous mentioned study. Curiously, people who believed in 
the afterlife were more likely to state that life extension treatments would be good than 
those who did not.  
                                                 
142 This is closely related to participants’ views on the moral status of such treatments: 71% of those who want 
the treatments believe the treatment would be good for society, and 83% of those who do not want the treatments 
stated the treatments would be bad for society. 
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It is now easier to see that my choice of focusing on arguments against immortality, by 
featuring them in greater numbers, is an attempt to address the misguided public opinion on 
the matter. E.g., a more recent study from the Pew Research Center (2016) revealed that more 
than 50% of those who attributed moral value to <gene editing in babies that reduce the risk of 
serious diseases> considered the practice morally unacceptable. The justification presented was 
a version of the Normal/Natural argument in 65% of the cases. By providing information about 
the weaknesses of the most common arguments against immortality, I hope to help people re-
evaluate their positions. I share much of the same frustrations of Overall (2003, 187): 
More generally, however, it is fair to say that in both historical and contemporary times, and 
despite protestations to the contrary (e.g., Callahan 1995, 24), there have been more 
suspicion and criticism of prolongevitism than attempts to argue in its support.  
Contemporary biomedical ethicists are inclined to castigate both the desire of some people 
to cling to life and the desperate attempts by some of the relatives of dying people to prolong 
their lives. Lawyers, sometimes unintentionally abetted by members of the Roman Catholic 
clergy, urge people to make living wills in which they reject “heroic measures” when 
seriously ill. And as Momeyer points out, there is a pervasive accompanying tendency to 
romanticize death through concepts such as “death with dignity,” “natural death” (1988, 15), 
and “meaningful death” (Hardwig 1997a, 40–42). It is puzzling, and perhaps even a reason 
for cultural suspicion, to find apologism so popular and prolongevitism nearly universally 
rejected by ethicists, physicians, and intellectuals who speak out in public on end-of-life 
issues. 
 
4.2 – Two Problems with the Conclusion 
There are two issues with the conclusion. More precisely, one directly related with the 
pragmatic application of the conclusion and another related to how the analysis of the 
arguments was executed. 
 
4.2.1 – Opportunity Costs: How much desirable? 
 First, I would like to discuss the link between immortality being desirable and its 
pragmatic realization. Just because something is desirable, i.e. is good, it does not mean that it 
ought to be acted upon. Although this might sound counterintuitive the reason is simple: 
opportunity costs. In other words, there might be other things also considered desirable that are 
competing for the same resources: time, money, space, etc. If one wants to argue that 
immortality should be acted upon it is not enough to show that it is desirable. It needs to be 
shown that it is more desirable than the best alternative use of the resources that it requires (see 
footnote 35). For example, suppose that the use of available resources results in a trade-off 
between two desirable things (one of them being immortality). Which of them should one 
pursue? To answer that we must know the answer to the question of how much desirable 
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immortality is in relation to alternatives. And to know how much desirable immortality is in 
relation to alternatives we must have some idea of the desirability of said alternatives. Such a 
task would be impossible if we try to list and evaluate every possibility, since they are 
countless. However, by grouping alternatives in big chunks according to some common 
properties we can make progress. In other words one needs a normative ethical system to 
provide a source of value. This should not come as a surprise since exercises in applied ethics 
require the assumption of some normative ethical system. Which leads me to the second point 
I want to make. 
 
4.2.2 – ⸸ and the Burden of Proof 
 Throughout the discussion of the arguments I tried not to assume any normative ethical 
system. I argued against intrinsic arguments by discovering contradictions, discussing 
assumptions about facts, by showing that immortality is reversible and so on. I argued against 
consequential arguments by employing instrumental concepts of value, showing that the 
consequences are not necessary, that mitigation solutions might be pursued, and so on. 
However sometimes that was not possible, sometimes the disagreement was really about 
values. At those times I used the symbol ⸸ to put an end to the thread and proceed with the 
maximum amount of charity to the argument in question. 
 In section 2.2 – Notes of Interest I defined the ⸸ symbol to mean <incredulity, 
disgustingness, the number of supporters/contrarians, is not enough to dismiss a claim of value, 
since other cultures, individuals, or systems of value could accommodate what is being argued 
against>. That allowed me to escape the discussion of normative ethical systems, with an 
answer that could be summed up with <well, you could be wrong>.143 But that created another 
problem. Whenever some statement about value was claimed, it could be defended against any 
critique by exploiting charity through the use of ⸸ without limit. For example:  
A: Killing children is good. 
B: No it is not because <insert some value disagreement>. 
A: ⸸ 
This would inevitably lead to a situation of first come first served. Whoever claims things first 
gets the best defence by exploiting charity: 
B: Killing children is bad. 
A: No it is not because <insert some value disagreement>. 
B: ⸸ 
                                                 
143 I believe that being able to show that arguments have flaws and at the same not engaging in value discussions 
was beneficial if the goal is to change people’s minds. This means that the points I made obtain regardless of the 
normative ethical system the person who employs the arguments has. 
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What is missing here is that the burden of proof is not being employed and is instead 
being substituted by a duty of charitable interpretation, so much so, that the initial claimant is 
not required to engage in value discussions. That seems to be an unpardonable flaw in a project 
that is purported to be an ethical analysis. After all what is ethics for if not for discussions of 
value?  The reason I did not employ the burden of proof and tried to come up with a justification 
for some normative ethical system is because I think no justification is known. We do not know 
of anything in the universe that could empirically justify a claim of value, at least not at the 
moment. We also do not know of any mathematical proofs that can justify a claim of value. 
And claims of instrumentality when it comes to value are not much of a help either because 
something is instrumentally good/bad only in relation to some predetermined value. I 
remember in a conversation with a peer in my first year of formal education in philosophy144 
where he said something along those lines: “when people are arguing about normative ethics, 
their disagreements stem from different starting positions”. I agree with him. Disagreements 
about values are ultimately disagreements about assumptions, and there seems to be no criteria 
to prefer between them that does not appeal to further values: 
A: Killing women is bad because killing is bad. 
B: Killing women is good because killing is good. 
A: You are wrong because killing is bad. 
B: No, you are wrong because killing is good. 
A: Why do you say killing is good? 
B: Well… [thinks a little] … I assume it is.145 What is your justification then? 
A: I also assume it is wrong. 
Described this way normative ethical discussions are mere exercises in stubbornness, 
which quickly descend into sophisticated insults, screaming competitions and implicit appeals 
to mob mentality. If any progress is to be made in a normative ethical disagreement then it 
must be by clearly define the meaning of moral statements, and what is special about them (if 
anything). In other words, a meta-ethical position must be explicit before any engagement in a 
discussion about normative values occurs. This will be my starting point to present what I like 
to call the ultimate argument for immortality (UAI). 
 
4.3 – Two Birds, One Stone 
 I will now present the UAI, but first two considerations about what follows: 
                                                 
144 Which was one year ago. 
145 Note that appealing to something to justify a normative position on killing does not solve the issue, it just 
moves the goalposts. Now a justification is required for what was appealed to. 
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(1) With the UAI I attempt to solve the two identified issues with the conclusion. The 
first issue will be solved by arguing that the process of actualizing immortality is 
one of the few desirable behaviours. The second issue is dealt with by appealing to 
a skeptical meta-ethics that entails a temporary normative ethical system. 
(2) The UAI should not be considered in its final form. Instead, the UAI should be seen 
as the next step of the project started with this work.146  
 
4.3.1 – The Necessity of Choice 
The first step of the UAI is the beginning. Although that sentence looks like a tautology, 
it is not easy to decide were the beginning is when what is under consideration is thinking about 
the world. The beginning is, in my sincere opinion, choice. Choice is to be understood as 
different possibilities of resource allocation. For example, the choice between using a barrel of 
oil to produce plastic or to produce car fuel. By resources I do not mean solely physical 
resources, but also other things that are scarce, like time. In fact, time is a crucial resource to 
understand choice. Every activity has a time cost, that is, it takes an X amount of time to execute 
it. And time is in constant consumption, one cannot accumulate it or stop its consumption as 
one can with money. Time is always being spent at the rate of one second per second147. The 
only thing we can do with time is it to allocate it. Allocating enough time to an activity allows 
us its execution. Put more simply, I can choose how to allocate the next minute148 between 
several options/alternatives. After that minute has passed, that amount of time is spent and I 
cannot recoup that resource anymore. I can, however, choose how to allocate the next minute. 
More clearly, there are two properties that support the idea that choice should be 
considered the beginning: 
(1) Property of completeness – Say that I want to watch a movie at home and go to the 
bar to amuse myself observing people getting intoxicated. Perhaps I can do both, I 
watch the movie and then go out. But I cannot do both with the same resources. For 
a particular unit of time I can either allocate it to watch the movie or to go out. 
These activities are exclusive when considering the allocation of a particular unit 
                                                 
146 I believe a full PhD program can be dedicated to exploring, developing and refining the UAI. 
147 One can imagine the analogue with money. Someone is given 10€ per minute, every minute, but the catch is 
that the money cannot be accumulated. At the start of the next minute the balance resets to 10€. People can only 
choose how to allocate that money, and they must do it in small chunks. Buying a car would require multiple 
payments, in the same sense that a master’s program requires the allocation of great deal of units of time. 
148 The unit of time is not of importance. One could think as small or as big chunks one desires, according to what 
convenience dictates. 
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of time. Choosing to allocate the next unit of time to watching a movie requires that 
I forego using it to go out. There is a trade-off, an opportunity cost, something that 
I will need to give up for every allocation of time. Let us describe a choice as the 
option of allocating time (or other resource) to either X or Y149. If we make Y =~X, 
we arrive at the property of completeness. For each unit of time one can allocate it 
to either X or ~X. Doing both is not possible because they are mutually exclusive 
and they both require the same unit of time. The property of completeness 
guarantees that, for the allocation of each unit of time, there will always be a 
choice, i.e. alternative uses (or in other words options), because it will be impossible 
to act upon every option. Choosing requires a selection of which option is going to 
be acted upon and which options are going to not be acted upon. 
(2) Property of necessity – The property of necessity guarantees that one of the options 
will be acted upon, i.e. choice is necessary. That stems from the fact that X and ~X 
are complementary exhaustive plus the fact that time is being constantly spent. 
Suppose that I can decide to go to the cinema or not, and not contempt with the 
universe I refuse to make a choice. The universe does not seem to care since it will 
continue to provide me with units of time to allocate regardless if I want to actively 
allocate them. I cannot refuse to choose, since either X or ~X will be actualized. I 
will either go to the cinema or not. What I can do instead is to put my hands in front 
of my eyes and say that I am invisible, or in other words, not engage my agency in 
the choice, thus letting the unit of time be allocated to whatever option. Usually it 
results in a status quo maintenance. If I was at home when I refused to engage my 
agency in the choice I will most likely remain at home. If I was at the movies and I 
decided the same, I would most likely remain at the movies. Refusing to engage is 
also a choice, no different than throwing a coin to make a decision. 
From these two properties I can conclude that choice always obtains for any resource, 
and some option will be acted upon. Thus the problem of choosing between X and Y is the 
correct starting point. To see this let us assume another starting point, e.g. the problem of what 
are moral judgements, or the problem of what is the curvature of space, or the problem of the 
existence of souls, etc. Any of these supposed starting points requires that a choice had been 
made to select them as starting points instead of an alternative. However, no such choice exists 
                                                 
149 In reality there are certainly more than two options. I will however only use examples and demonstrations with 
two options since they are enough to make my point. I suggest that the second option be the best alternative option, 
as that is the default approach when calculating opportunity costs.  
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when we consider the problem of choice as the starting point, because we cannot refuse choice 
(property of necessity). In other words what differentiates the problem of choice as a starting 
point from an alternative is that it does not result from a previous choice, it is just how the 
world is. Any other claimed starting point requires that the problem of choice be solved in order 
to allow for the selection of that supposed starting point. This only reinforces the problem of 
choice as the starting point, since it predates any other claimed starting point. Thus the problem 
of choosing between X and Y is the first problem that needs to be solved. 
Perhaps someone might say I am assuming too much about time. In fact I am not 
required to take a stance on many philosophical issues about time to uphold that the problem 
of choice has the properties I argued for. I only need the concept of opportunity costs, which 
are a fundamental concept regarding choice, and that time is passing in a fixed direction as if 
there is an arrow of time. Even considering relativity laws or timeconsciousness scaling, the 
problem of choice still stands. It matters not that time passes at different speeds for different 
agents, it is still in constant consumption from their point of view. I will concede that I am 
wrong if someone can eliminate opportunity costs, or stop time or revert its direction.150 
 
4.3.2 – Ethics and Choice 
 In this section I suggest how one can engage with the problem of choosing between X 
and Y. It seems that at least 3 components are required to be able to select one option. This tri-
partite framework is inspired by the concept of an agent in the economic sense, and also by the 
work of Bratman (1987). To make matters simpler I will use the word agent to refer to the 
entity making the choice. Let us start with an example of a choice being made to see how the 
three components interact with each other.  
 An agent wants to go to Rome as fast as possible (1). He recognizes that there are 
several paths in different directions, each with a certain length and difficult of travel (2). He 
then employs the Djikstra’s algorithm to choose which of the alternative paths he is going to 
pursue to achieve the goal (3). The agent solved the problem of choosing between X and Y. 
Allow me to dive down on each of the 3 components: 
(1) – The Utility Function: This represents the goals the agent wants to achieve. This 
is a crucial component, because without it, it becomes impossible to solve the problem of 
choice. There is an instance of such a case in the famous novel of L. Carrol (1865), Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland: 
                                                 
150 That would also be cause for excitement! Afterall, that seems to be a better version of immortality. 
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Alice asked the Cheshire Cat, who was sitting in a tree, “What road do I take?”  
The cat asked, “Where do you want to go?”  
“I do not know,” Alice answered.  
“Then,” said the cat, “it really does not matter, does it?”  
Because Alice lacks a goal151 she cannot solve the problem of choice. It seems that no 
option is more relevant that the other and she will be indefinitely indifferent to take a path. The 
universe however does not care and continues to provide Alice with time to allocate, but Alice 
does not know what to do with it.  
People have several goals (or desires) in their daily lives that they use to solve the 
problem of choice. However, the relevant goals here are those that are not a means to a further 
goal. Someone can decide to go with path X instead of path Y because they want to go to work. 
They want to go to work because they want money. And they want money to buy a house. They 
want the house… The goals we are interested here are those that will be at the end of the chain, 
since all others can be derived from those. To designate that I employ the term <utility 
function> instead of merely the word goals. The concept of a utility function was borrowed 
from the fields of economics and artificial intelligence and it represents a function that 
attributes value to world states. In other words, we input a world state and it produces a value. 
The utility function of an agent thus shows us what world states are valued and which are not. 
By definition the agent wants to maximize his utility function, that is, to bring about those 
world states which are more valuable.  
(2) – Information: This component includes all the options and facts about the options 
the agent has access to. It is related to beliefs, but not quite the same thing. In the example, it 
corresponds to the knowledge of the several paths and their characteristics. Without this 
component the agent does not know that options exist at all and will behave as if there is no 
choice to be made. Most of the time the agent works with imperfect information (there is a 
degree of uncertainty), when performing the choice, and this explains why sometimes agents 
fail to achieve their goals. In our example this could mean the agent underestimated the travel 
difficulty of some paths, or that he believed Rome to be in Africa. 
(3) – The Selection Criteria: The third component provides the link between the 
previous two components. Both the utility function and the information the agent has enter as 
inputs in a process that outputs one option to be acted upon. This process that I call selection 
criteria152 is instrumental to maximize the utility function. The most effective selection criteria 
                                                 
151 This might not be completely true since she seems to have the goal of not remaining where she is. I believe, 
this detail notwithstanding, the example to still be enough to make my case. 
152 Other names can be used to denote this component: heuristics, decision, intention, action, algorithms, rules, 
criteria, etc 
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would be one that considers every option against the utility function and selects the best one, 
that is, the one which provides world states with the highest value according to the utility 
function.153 However, once we consider that the selection criteria process also needs units of 
time to run, it might be beneficial for the agent to sacrifice some effectiveness to gain some 
efficiency. After all, time is a scarce resource [see P43A6], and the agent wants to maximize 
its utility function over several choice problems, not just over one of them. Although this might 
be an interesting discussion involving concepts such as rationality, I will not enter into details 
about this component (see Miguens (2004), for a discussion on the matter). 
Summing up, the agent chooses between X and Y, using a (3) selection criteria that 
accounts for the (2) information that he has about the options (and the world), with the goal of 
maximizing his (1) utility function. 
Before I proceed I need to address an issue related with free will and determinism. 
Perhaps someone might think that I am taking a position on that discussion, but that is not the 
case. As I briefly stated in P66, a thermostat also faces the problem of choice and by most 
accounts it does not have free will. A thermostat has a utility function (it values world states 
that contain room temperature close to X temperature more than those who are further away 
from that temperature), it has information about the current room temperature (most likely a 
thermometer) and it has a selection criteria in the form of software that allows it to maximize 
its utility function considering the information that it has. A thermostat is, for all intents and 
purposes of the framework that I presented, an agent. The problem is perhaps with my use of 
words such as <choice> and <options> that seem to imply some sort of free-will. But they can 
also be used in the sense that a chess computer program makes choices about what moves it 
will make. The problem is that the available language seems to imply free-will, and it is very 
difficult to find a substitute language to describe what I call the choice problem with a neutral 
tone regarding the free-will - determinism debate. 
Let us now (finally) bring ethics into the picture. What is the meaning of a moral claim, 
an ethical judgement, an ought statement, a value proposition, sentences which attribute the 
property of good or bad to something? They mean that whatever world state is described should 
have a certain value in the utility function of the agent. Stating that X is bad, or that one ought 
not to do X, means that the utility function of the agent, ceteris paribus, should value those 
behaviours below others that do not have the property of bad, or below those that do not have 
descriptions of the kind <ought not to do that>. Utility functions can not only accommodate 
                                                 
153 This is usually more complex since it includes forward planning and other considerations. 
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system of value, e.g. a hedonist’s utility function values world states which contain pleasure 
higher than those who do not; but also accommodate normative ethical systems154, e.g. virtue 
ethics can be described as <the utility function of the agent should mimic the utility function 
of the virtuous agent>.  
Moral claims are extremely imprecise and vague descriptions about utility functions. 
One notices that moral claims as currently conceived are not much of a help for the agent. What 
about two different things that have the property of bad? Is one of them worse? If so in what 
ratio? And is the marginal value of them constant, or does it follow a certain shape?155 What 
about an option that involves a mix of ought to’s and ought not to’s? Progress in moral 
discussion would advance greatly if the language of utility functions was used instead, in 
conjunction with mathematical formulas, since it would make moral claims precise, greatly 
improving today’s unclear moral language. 
 Now, perhaps someone might object by claiming that the meaning of the normative 
judgements or claims of value is nothing of the sort I suggest, that it has nothing to do with 
utility functions. I do not wish to disagree. The issue that I am solving is the problem of choice, 
not the nature of moral claims. I intend to start from the beginning not from the middle156. The 
main reason I made a meta-ethical claim regarding the meaning of normative statements is 
because the language of moral judgements seems adequate to talk about what utility functions 
should contain, without the need to reinvent the wheel. If someone objects to my meta-ethical 
claim about the meaning of normative statements, then I ask for an alternative language to 
speak about utility functions and move on. I am not territorial about languages and will use 
whatever is available to refer to what I intend.  
 
4.3.3 – Recursive Issues? 
A curious effect happens with this framework. It seems that the agent also suffers from 
the problem of choice when it comes to choosing between alternatives in each component: 
utility function, information, and selection criteria. This can create recursive problems. 
How to choose between different selection criteria? This is a choice problem inside a 
choice problem, and there is no reason to stop there. The problem seems to be a never-ending 
recursion. Fortunately, there is an objective criterion to choose between alternative selection 
                                                 
154 Henceforth I will not make a distinction between systems of value and normative ethical systems. They are 
both captured by the utility function and a distinction would provide unnecessary complexity. 
155 Shape of a mathematical function, e.g. an <S> shaped function, a log function, etc. 
156 The burden of proof to justify why start on the problem of <what are moral claims> would be a concern to 
those people since they are required to have already solved the problem of choice. 
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criteria, and that is the maximization of the utility function.157 One chooses the selection 
criteria in an instrumental way, since the goal of the agent is the maximization of the utility 
function. At least when it comes to this component the recursion problem does not exist. 
What about information? According to which criteria should one accept information 
about the world? An extremely similar question, that perhaps has a co-extensive answer is 
<according to which criteria should one form/accept a belief about something?>. Perhaps some 
might suggest that our beliefs ought to be aimed at truth158, but I digress. Here I defend what 
Kelly (2003) calls <epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality>. The author argues against 
the concept, but I found the arguments he presented not convincing in the slightest. I will not 
explore them here. I suggest that one should believe something, in the sense to be used as 
information in the problem of choice, if it is instrumentally useful. In other words, if it works 
to help the agent maximize its utility function then that proposition should be believed over 
another that does not fare so good in utility function maximization. And this obtains even if the 
propositions to be believed are known to be false. I have this position largely due to the 
influence of a famous text by Milton Friedman (1953) where he claims: 
The relevant question to ask about the "assumptions" of a theory is not whether they are 
descriptively "realistic," for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good 
approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only by seeing 
whether the theory works, which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions.  
What Friedman calls a theory working, I call information being instrumentally useful 
to the principle at hand, that is, yielding accurate predictions regarding the properties of the 
options in order to maximize the utility function. A clarification must be made - I am not talking 
about wishful thinking. One might want to get rich but believing that one will hit the lottery is 
not a good strategy to maximize the utility function. I also do not go as far as Friedman in 
suggesting that “to be important, therefore, a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its 
assumptions.” If the information is true, then we know it will be instrumentally useful in the 
sense that it will yield accurate predictions, but if the information is false that does not mean it 
will yield bad predictions – it can yield the same predictions as true information. Friedman 
exemplifies: 
Consider the density of leaves around a tree. I suggest the hypothesis that the leaves are 
positioned as if each leaf deliberately sought to maximize the amount of sunlight it receives, 
given the position of its neighbours, as if it knew the physical laws determining the amount 
of sunlight that would be received in various positions and could move rapidly or 
instantaneously from any one position to any other desired and unoccupied position. Now 
some of the more obvious implications of this hypothesis are clearly consistent with 
                                                 
157 An alternative to the selection criteria that maximizes the utility function could be a selection criteria that chose 
the first option that goes through the “mind” of the agent. 
158 For the sake of argument assume that a proposition is true if it corresponds to how the world is.  
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experience: for example, leaves are in general denser on the south than on the north side of 
trees but, as the hypothesis implies, less so or not at all on the northern slope of a hill or 
when the south side of the trees is shaded in some other way. Is the hypothesis rendered 
unacceptable or invalid because, so far as we know, leaves do not “deliberate” or 
consciously “seek,” have not been to school and learned the relevant laws of science or the 
mathematics required to calculate the “optimum” position, and cannot move from position 
to position? Clearly, none of these contradictions of the hypothesis is vitally relevant; the 
phenomena involved are not within the “class of phenomena the hypothesis is designed to 
explain”; the hypothesis does not assert that leaves do these things but only that their density 
is the same as if they did. Despite the apparent falsity of the “assumptions” of the hypothesis, 
it has great plausibility because of the conformity of its implications with observation.” 
 We see that the recursion problem does not seem to affect information since there is an 
objective criterion to choose between several alternatives. The better the information works, 
i.e., how helpful is in achieving the maximization of the utility function, the higher it gets in 
the pecking order of belief. One should always choose the information that works better, i.e. 
the most instrumentally useful. This means that I have no problem accepting things known to 
be false, like the example of Friedman, or things that are deemed invalid, like induction, as 
long as they work. I also have no problem with incoherent or contradictory beliefs if they 
represent the best information in two or more distinct problems of choice (e.g. in one choice 
the statement <X is white> is inputted and in another choice <X is not white> is inputted). 
 I avoided the problems of recursion in two of the components by defining their choice 
in terms of the third component: the utility function. One should choose the selection criteria 
that maximizes the utility function. The same applies to information. However, the same 
solution is off limits to the utility function itself. The following is nonsense: <choose the utility 
function that maximizes the utility function>. So there seems to be a problem. How to choose 
between utility functions? If this is another problem of choice, then it will descend into a 
recursion with no end. If we choose a utility function then whatever criteria we used to choose 
is the true utility function, and the same problem applies – what are the criteria to choose a 
criteria to choose between utility functions?  
People generally have no problem in coming up with a utility function (even if implicit), 
and many philosophers also seem to have no problem coming up with utility functions. I 
suspect that no one, given the current state of knowledge, has achieved a solution to this 
problem. In the end every normative ethical system relies on some assumption that cannot be 
justified further. I believe all moral claims from golden rules, to human rights, to justice issues, 
to divine commands to be unjustified. None have sway. I also do not find justified the claim 
that we will never improve our state of knowledge regarding a criterion to choose between 
utility functions. It is entirely possible that in the future, a satisfactory solution will be found 
that is able to deal with the problem of choosing a utility function and thus solve ethics. Frankly, 
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we do not know much in the grand scheme of things. We do not know what conscience is, we 
do not know what 95% of the matter in the universe is, and of the 5% that we know of, baryonic 
matter, a non-insignificant part is unaccounted for.159 We know so little about how the universe 
works that we do not even have a unified theory of physics. There is no shame in admitting 
that we also do not know how to choose utility functions without either presupposing the 
problem of choice is solved or delving into unbridled recursion. People who believe they have 
the right utility function are just fooling themselves, in the same way a lottery ticket buyer is.160 
The odds are stacked against them both. To be sure, I am not a relativist. Although both me 
and the relativist believe every utility function to be in equal footing the difference is that I 
believe, contrary to the relativist, that they are all unjustified given our current state of 
knowledge. I also believe the relativist to be unjustified in holding his position. 
 The problem with not knowing what utility function to choose is that we cannot refuse 
choice. I will be forced to have a utility function regardless if I want it or not. On the one hand 
I do not know what utility function to choose, and on the other I am forced to choose one. I 
like to think of this as the hard problem of ethics. 
 
4.3.4 – The Ultimate Argument for Immortality (and Ethics) 
 My proposal to the hard problem of ethics will result in the UAI.  
(1) Let us suppose that there is only one true set of compatible moral statements, i.e. 
there is one true utility function, because that is how the world is. If that is the case, then there 
is no hard problem of ethics – we just choose that utility function and move on with it. Truth 
provides the criteria to choose between utility functions. With this we can now solve every 
problem of choice. Now let us suppose that this is the case, but we have not discovered the 
relevant knowledge to understand which utility function is the true one. In that case we should 
look to improve our knowledge in order to gain access to the true utility function, and then start 
using it to solve the problem of choice. 
                                                 
159 The current hypothesis is that it is spread over the interstellar medium. 
160 Society at large seems, to my surprise, to think differently. Both philosophers and laymen alike take things for 
granted. Most notably in our present culture some things seem not to require justification as they are “obvious”. 
One example is that people ought to be happy. Another is that each individual has legitimacy to define its utility 
function. I find these claims completely unjustified. But unjustified they may be, people still cling to them. I had 
the opportunity to attend four different classes by invited speakers on the topic of recognition. In each class I 
asked the speaker what the justification for human rights is, because the need for recognition stemmed from an 
assumption of this kind. Three of them looked at me bamboozled as if I had committed some sort of sin by asking, 
and the fourth who took the question seriously scrambled to find an answer. To clarify I find most human rights 
instrumentally useful to most utility functions, including the ones that involve the UAI, but that is about it. There 
is nothing special about them and no special reason for their upholding. 
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 (2) Suppose however that all utility functions are false as the error theory suggests. The 
error theory does not solve the hard problem of ethics, since people are still forced to choose a 
utility function and no criterion has been provided. What the error theory suggests is that truth 
is not the criterion that allows us to choose between utility functions. This also applies if there 
are multiple true utility functions, or if utility functions do not have truth values. If there is an 
alternative criterion to truth, then, to solve the hard problem of ethics we need to know what 
this alternative criterion is, apply it and choose the corresponding utility function.  
 (3) But what if there is no such criterion that allows the hard problem of ethics to be 
solved? There might still be a criterion that eliminates some options, but that does not allow us 
to single out one utility function. In that case it is useful to know what that criterion is to avoid 
picking a utility function that does not fulfil it. However, if, after applying all available criteria 
and we know that no other exists, there are at least two utility functions to choose from, I still 
consider the hard problem of ethics to be solved. Although there are still two or more utility 
functions with no way of choosing between them, choosing one of them offers no problem, 
because we know that no additional criteria to choose between them exists. This encompasses 
the case where no criteria to choose between utility functions exists. On those cases, we must 
increase our knowledge until we know that no (further) criteria exists and then pick one of the 
(remaining) utility function(s). 
 (4) A last scenario occurs when the criteria to choose between utility functions, or the 
knowledge that no further criteria exists, are unknowable. In that case it is futile to attempt to 
get knowledge about the criteria to choose between utility functions. 
 Our current state of affairs is characterized by not knowing which of the above 
scenarios (1), (2), (3), or (4) is the case and at the same time characterized by having to deal 
with the hard problem of ethics. Again, I do not find any moral claim or meta-ethical claim to 
have a status higher than a proposal or of a hypothesis. Some might end up being the case, but 
at the present none seems to present rigorous evidence to be taken more seriously. Adopting 
any utility function because one believes it to be correct is unjustified. Our best bet to solve the 
hard problem of ethics is to search for criteria to choose between utility functions. Once we 
find everything there is to find about such criteria the problem is solved. And this is where the 
ingenious part kicks in. We can build a temporary utility function that aims to solve the hard 
problem of ethics. This temporary utility function is characterized by valuing world states that 
bring about discoveries about criteria to choose between utility functions – it is a suspension 
of judgment until we know better. It is temporary because once those criteria are discovered, 
the correct utility function replaces it. And it solves the hard problem of ethics because it 
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provides a temporary criterion to choose between utility functions, and thus allocate time. The 
possibility that these criteria are unknowable does not change this. The choice is between a 
possibility of solving the hard problem of ethics (by adopting the temporary utility function) 
or a certainty that it will remain unsolved.161  
 The first step of the UAI is to adopt the temporary utility function, in the hopes of 
finding out the relevant criteria that allows us to choose between utility functions. In the face 
of how little we know about stuff, as mentioned earlier, it seems only arrogant to posit that we 
will never be able to discover anything more than the hypotheses (i.e. ethical theories) that we 
have today. In any case, ethicists should rejoice, since the temporary utility function attributes 
the highest value to what they do – uncover criteria that allows us to choose between utility 
functions. Everything else is just a means to allow ethicists to work as effectively and 
efficiently as possible.  
I am not suggesting that everyone be a professional ethicist. After all people must eat, 
travel, perform scientific discoveries to inform ethicists, etc. A person should evaluate what 
kind of contribute might better increase the chances of maximizing the temporary utility 
function. Perhaps someone is a good cook and in allocating their units of time to cook to other 
people they will be contributing to the maximization of the temporary utility function, or 
perhaps they are a good engineer and their skills will be better suited to that type of task. The 
role of each agent in society is a mere question of optimization, and people ought to make 
choices that maximize the temporary utility function.162 
But, and there seems to be always a but, something is not right. Intuitively the best way 
to go about maximizing the temporary utility function is to perform ethics research, in order to 
uncover criteria that allows us to choose between utility functions. I disagree that such strategy 
is the way to go. The reasoning is simple. Let us suppose that in the midst of maximizing the 
temporary utility function an ethicist in their 30’s becomes sick. She goes to the doctor and is 
confronted with the following choice: either cease ethics research for a month to receive a 
                                                 
161 Perhaps certainty is too strong a word. Unexpected might be better suited, since even if we do not adopt the 
temporary utility function, some alien might descend on earth and share the solution to the hard problem of ethics. 
Such cases are, however, unwarranted and the information they are based on does not seem to yield good 
predictions. That is, they will not fare well against alternative information when evaluated by their instrumentality. 
They are nothing more than wishful thinking. If we want to achieve something, the best way is trying to get it, not 
hoping that some god serves it to us on a silver platter. 
162 The language might be confusing because each agent has the same utility function (the temporary one). To put 
it clearly each agent has its own utility function. There is not an overarching utility function that everyone is 
working towards. Each agent will consider the behaviour of others exogenous up to a point and adapt to it. Even 
if one is a good cook, but there is an extreme need of corporate managers, perhaps the utility function will be 
maximized by performing that role. Individual agents are also subject to path dependence (economic concept). 
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medical treatment to cure the disease, or alternatively continue business as usual and allow the 
disease to kill her in less than a year. It seems that the disease is a barrier to the maximization 
of the temporary utility function, and the best course of action is to rest for a month and then 
resume activity for a few more decades163. Refusing the treatment and continuing business as 
usual does not yield as good an outcome. After all it is way more likely that the ethicist achieves 
the maximization of her temporary utility function in a few decades than in less than a year. If 
we know something about the hard problem of ethics is that it is not easy to crack, and humans 
have been trying for millennia. If this example is clear it comes as no surprise that the current 
great single obstacle in the way of any of us maximizing the temporary utility function is death. 
It is highly unlikely that we will solve the hard problem of ethics before death knocks on our 
door. Thus, the priority should be on dealing with death in order to increase the chances of 
achieving the goals of the temporary utility function. Immortality embodies the removal of the 
barrier of death, in the same way that the medical treatment of our ethicist removes her 
disease164.  
Whereas the practice of ethics research in the context of the temporary utility function 
is the only moral behaviour, the same does not hold while death is not within out control. In 
the face of death, ethics research becomes an irrational165 behaviour due to the opportunity 
costs that it produces. Ethicists, like everyone else, maximize the temporary utility function by 
helping to solve death not by churning out hypothesis about the hard problem of ethics. Only 
once death is solved, i.e. immortality is actualized, should ethicists go back to their work, 
because at that moment it will be the single most important behaviour. Ethics research is not 
the only irrational behaviour we currently face but is used here as an example. A more 
concerning issue are those who act in immoral ways, that is, against the temporary utility 
function, such as many authors cited in the previous sections by advocating against 
immortality. The only reason people do not choose according to the temporary utility function 
is if they have an unjustified one or if they never thought about this issue seriously.  
                                                 
163 This is according to the current models of life expectancy, and thus ignores any potential radical technological 
development in life extension. 
164 Which, contrafactually, would have also resulted in her death. In both cases death is being removed to allow 
the continuation of life for the maximization of the utility function. 
165 It’s not immoral because it does not go against the temporary utility function, but it is not maximizing it either, 
hence the qualifier irrational. There are better strategies to go about it. 
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In more pragmatic terms the two most urgent issues that I have identified and need a 
solution are: climate change166 and aging. 167 Using resources elsewhere without being a means 
to provide solutions to these goals is most likely immoral and unjustified, or irrational.168  
Climate change - Although climate denial is on the rise (Worth, 2018, 
EurekAlert!), there is an unequivocal scientific consensus on the matter (Cook et al., 
2016) and the tiny fraction of papers who do not endorse anthropogenic global warming 
seem to be riddled with flaws (Benestad et al., 2015). People seem to talk the talk (e.g. 
Paris accords), but not so much walk the walk. Scientists are constantly warning us that 
we are unknowingly getting ever closer to a point of no return, where the consequences 
of climate change will linger for millennia, water levels will rise between 10 to 60 
meters (sic!) (Steffen et al., 2018), and massive loss of biodiversity will occur (see 
IPBAS reports). Worst case scenario the planet can become inhospitable to human life, 
and the time window for meaningful action is closing. Less worse scenarios will still 
cause serious disruption to our ability to maximize the temporary utility function. 
Generally, people recognize there is a problem, recognize that we need to change our 
habits of consumption, but are sometimes over reliant on technological progress and 
refuse to engage in serious discussion about population control. 
 Aging – Curing aging is one obvious step in dealing with death. It would solve 
a myriad of complications and causes of death. However, contrary to climate change 
there is not even a consensus that death is a problem, and thus many reject cures for 
aging and life extension therapies. Make no mistake, authors that argue against 
immortality commit the most damaging of immoral behaviours, and they must be 
stopped, because we only have so much time to make progress on the prolongation of 
life.  
 
 The UAI is now fully exposed. Immortality is something we must do to buy time in 
order to discover how to choose between utility functions, or in other words, to discover 
(instead of hypothesizing) what things are bad, if any, and what things are good, if any.  
                                                 
166 This is the reason of my differentiated approach to the overpopulation argument. By using free flowing text 
instead of the object based structure used in other arguments, I was able to present a framework to think about the 
issue. 
167 These two have a character of urgency due to the time windows we have for action, around 20y for the first 
and up to 60y for the second. Down the list there are other existential risks that we will need to tackle, both at a 
species level (e.g. superbugs, rogue asteroids, world wars) and at an individual level (e.g. deadly viruses, murders). 
168 I am prepared to defend extravagant positions such as: resources spent on animal rights, at the moment, are an 
immoral behaviour. It might not be once we solve the hard problem of ethics, or if investing in animal rights 
provides a good return on investment in the maximization of the temporary utility function. 
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4.3.5 – The Instrumentality of Egoism 
 One immediate objection to the UAI framework is that the death of the individual is not 
a barrier to the achievement of the temporary utility function. People can sacrifice (i.e. die) for 
the benefit of others. As long as there are humans, or other beings capable of pursuing a 
temporary utility function, we are safe. On this view, perhaps climate change would continue 
to be a concern, and the project of colonizing Mars to create a redundant civilization would 
also be high on the list. Immortality would, most likely, never be a priority. At its core, this 
view sees humanity as a whole unit that is fulfilling a single temporary utility function, and 
thus a specific individual or a group of individuals are not required to continue to exist. Ethics 
research would again be at the top of priorities as to maximize the temporary utility function 
and once a particular ethicist died there was nothing to worry about because there would be 
others. Humanity as a whole would continue to operate. 
 There is one big problem with this view, and that is solipsism. Allow me to clarify.  
Right: attitude 
Down: what is the case 
Selfish Non-Selfish 
Solipsism is 
true 
W X 
Solipsism is 
not true 
Y Z 
 Let us consider the 4 scenarios above. The non-selfish scenarios represent the view that 
immortality is not a priority since humanity could continue to maximize the temporary utility 
Urgent Problems
• Guarantee conditions to fulfil the temporary utility function according to their 
urgency. This level requires actualizing immortality. Pragmatically, two urgent 
problems are, at the moment, aging and climate change.
Temporary Utility Function
• In this phase the goal is to discover whatever there is to know about criteria to 
choose between utility functions. It will, most likely, require a deep or maybe 
even a complete understanding of life, the universe and everything.
Permanent Utility Function
• Once we know everything there is to know about criteria to choose between 
utility functions, we apply those and act according to the chosen utility function. 
The choice of this utility function is justified.
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function after any one individual died. The selfish scenarios represent the view of the UAI, i.e. 
that immortality is a priority and that one’s death is not acceptable because each agent has its 
own utility function. Solipsism means that I am the only individual in existence and others are 
mere fixtures of my mind – if I die everyone else also dies, because my mind encompasses the 
whole world. Let us break down the scenarios, but note that I will adopt a personal view, since 
it could not be otherwise when we add solipsism to the mix. 
Scenario W – In scenario W there is no problem, I can continue to maximize 
my temporary utility function. 
Scenario X – Scenario X is a complete disaster. There will be no guarantee that 
after my death, whatever that is left can continue to maximize the temporary utility 
function (see 3.2.1 – Life as a Pre-Condition Argument). This scenario has an extremely 
low value, due to its uncertainty. 
 Scenario Y – Under this scenario there is also no problem. However, this 
scenario will be less efficient than scenario Z. It will require that not only we guarantee 
that humanity exists, but also that I exist. 
 Scenario Z – Under this scenario there is no problem with my own death. 
We clearly see that a non-selfish attitude is a high stakes gamble. It gambles on a lot of 
uncertainty (Scenario X), for a mere pay-off of some efficiency (Scenario Y vs Scenario Z). 
From an instrumental perspective a selfish perspective is superior to a non-selfish perspective, 
thus UAI still obtains. Not only is important that the existence of humanity be safeguarded, but 
I also require that my existence be safeguarded.  
 
4.3.6 – Concluding Remarks 
 Let us recall the two issues that the UAI was proposed to resolve. The first was about 
opportunity costs. Immortality seems desirable, but by how much? According to the UAI 
immortality is one of the most, if not the most desirable thing at the time of writing, because 
death is the most urgent problem to solve. The second issue was related to the burden of proof, 
how to justify that something is good, bad, or something else? That something is valuable or 
not? The answer is simple: we do not know, but we ought to if we are to solve the hard problem 
of ethics. In the meantime, immortality is the necessary step for us to be able to investigate, 
learn about the world and ultimately conclude about what utility function to adopt. The 
temporary utility function is the only justified utility function at the moment since its 
justification can be traced to a feature of the world: the necessity of choice. 
  184/201 
 Arguing in this way to support immortality seems to be original. I have not found any 
argument in the literature that supported immortality because we do not know enough about 
the world. The closer that I have found was Geddes (2004), that argued: 
Since a truly immortal person would live an infinite time, it seems that immortality is in a 
sense an infinite good. It would be a reasonable conjecture then, that the quest for 
immortality is the ultimate moral imperative. Let us call this idea ‘immortalist morality’. 
The idea is that we base the whole of ethics on ‘affirmation of life’. Why not make 
immortalist morality the entire foundation of our value systems? 
But, the resemblances stop there. There are radical differences between Geddes’ 
proposal and mine. He seems to presuppose that we know what good and/or bad is, which I 
disagree, and then sees immortality as a means to actualize moral behaviour: 
The critical point is a person’s awareness that they have a future. People are more likely to 
be moral when they understand they will have to face the consequences of their actions in 
the future. It follows that the further into the future one plans for, the more moral one’s 
behavior should become. People that live a short time do not have to experience the future 
consequences of all their actions. Longer lives should reduce the tension between the 
individual and society (…) In the real-world kindness to strangers is only really to one’s 
advantage over the long run. In fact, morality would only be perfectly logical if we lived 
forever. People have to stick around long enough to reap all of the consequences of their 
actions. When humans act morally they are in a sense acting as if they are immortal!  
  Although it is an interesting take on immortality it is an argument that I reject for the 
simple reason that whatever he presented to us as the starting point of his moral claims is an 
unjustified assumption. He seems to recognize this when he says that “any theory of morality 
has to begin somewhere”. My suggestion is that we start from the beginning, i.e. the problem 
of choice. 
 -- 
As I have mentioned in the introductory section, I consider this work to be more than a 
mere thought experience. I hope it will help guide policy towards the most urgent problem we 
face today, and that is death, according to the temporary utility function (the only I believe to 
be justified at the moment). I also hope that it will provide the reader with tools to start engaging 
in discussions among friends and peers about the subject. We are currently in a race against 
time, and our success in actualizing immortality depends on how seriously, we as a society, 
recognize and tackle the problem. We will either eliminate death or death will eliminate us. 
 
 
 
I was taught in economics that people respond to incentives (Mankiw, N. G., and Taylor, M. P., 2006, 7). With that in mind there is one last 
reason to help convince the reader to join the fight against death. If you have read thus far I invite you to be present at my 1000th birthday to 
be celebrated on Mars. This is a binding promise on my part. Details to be announced! 
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Section 6 – Appendix 
 
  
C3 – Death is good. 
 
 
A1 
Normality is contextual.  
A2 
Timeframes weaken the 
concept of normality. 
A1 
UI death will be normal. 
A1 
UI death will not be 
normal. The will to die 
will be selected out. 
P
1
 –
 D
ea
th
 is
 N
o
rm
al
 
A3 
Specificity weakens the 
concept of normality. 
A1 
Normal for backward 
looking timeframes. 
A1 
Unlikely. 
A2 
Hindsight is a problem. 
A1 
Fact vs value. 
A1 
⸸ 
P
*2
 –
 N
o
rm
al
 is
 g
o
o
d
. 
A3 
It implies too much. 
A4 
Against common sense. 
More bad makes good. 
A6 
It leads to contradiction. 
Change is normal. 
A5 
P1A1, P1A2, P1A3 
A7 
There are normal 
events not considered 
good. 
A1 
Normal event + normal 
negative connotation. 
A1 
The saying and the 
event are not the same. 
A1 
No moral judgement is 
advanced regarding 
non-normal stuff. 
A1 
Changes in values cause 
normality, not the 
reverse. 
A1 
Values change. 
A2 
⸸ 
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
Death is not eliminated 
UI. There is suicide. 
A1 
UI the death that is 
eliminated is good. 
A1 
Adds the descriptor non 
voluntary. Loses 
normality. P*2A5 
P
4
 –
 Im
m
o
rt
al
it
y 
el
im
in
at
es
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ea
th
. 
A1 
Non voluntary-death is 
still normal. 
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d
. 
A1 
UI death is no longer 
normal. Nothing good 
was eliminated. 
A1 
P*2A2. Normality is 
time sensitive.  
A1 
Something that was 
good was eliminated. 
P
*9
.1
 –
 N
at
u
ra
l i
s 
go
o
d
 (
h
u
m
an
 n
at
u
re
).
 
A2 
Human nature 
encompasses death 
avoidance. P2A6 
A4 
(Western) Society 
doesn’t follow this 
norm. 
A3 
Aging is a disease. 
Diseases are contrary 
to human nature. 
A5 
Empirical testing is 
needed. 
A1 
Suicide is not natural, 
and UI is the only way 
to die. 
A1 
Dying is not required 
UI. 
A2 
Drop human nature. 
The present lifespan 
is good. P8A2A1 
A1 
Not everything needs 
proof of concept. 
A1 
“Natural” lifespans 
are based on 
expectations. P8A1 
A6 
This is a naturalistic 
fallacy. 
A7 
A perfect lifespan is 
relative to each 
person. 
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
In the case of natural 
lifespans other 
methods have always 
failed. 
A2 
If there is no turning 
back proof of concept 
is not an option. 
A1 
Immortality is 
reversible. 
A1 
Curing aging is 
an 
enhancement. 
A1 
Even if aging is 
not a disease, 
it causes them. 
A1 
Curing ageing 
as means is not 
desirable. 
A1 
Losing the 
human label is 
unimportant. 
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
We live longer and 
are better off than in 
the past. 
A1 
The same can be 
applied to the future. 
A2 
It is difficult to 
advance now, and it 
was not in the past. 
A3 
The parent takes the 
argument out of 
context. 
A1 
Feasibility vs 
desirability. 
A1 
Proxy discussions for 
immortality. 
A2 
The parent is 
insufficient. 
A2 
The future is 
uncertain. We don’t 
know. 
A2 
The attacked is aimed 
at the concept of 
natural lifespans. 
A3 
The argument of 
opportunity costs is 
discussed later. 
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C7 – Immortality is not desirable. 
 
 
C10 – Non-voluntary death is good (and eliminating is bad). 
P11 – Immortality eliminates involuntary death. 
C12 – Immortality eliminates something good (and creates something bad). 
 
C14 – Immortality is not desirable. 
C17 – Involuntary death is good. 
P18 – Immortality eliminates involuntary death. 
C19 – Immortality eliminates something good. 
 
  
A1 
Individuals can still 
emulate non-voluntary 
death. 
A1 
The good of non-
voluntary is not 
individualistic in scope. 
P
6
 –
  T
h
e 
go
o
d
 o
f 
d
ea
th
 
ca
n
n
o
t 
b
e 
re
p
la
ce
d
. 
A2 
Another thing will be 
the new normal. Perfect 
replacement. 
A1 
Hindsight makes this concept weird.  
A2 
No empirical evidence of human 
nature. 
A1 
Assume directly that the current 
lifespan is the good one. 
P
8
 –
 D
ea
th
 is
 n
at
u
ra
l 
(h
u
m
an
 n
at
u
re
).
 
A3 
Extension of P8A1 – an author 
contradicting himself. 
A1 
Arresting childhood 
is not equivalent to 
arresting aging. 
A1 
Perspective of those 
who have (not) 
undergone the 
changes. 
P
*9
.2
 –
  N
at
u
ra
l  
is
 g
o
o
d
 
(h
u
m
an
 n
at
u
re
).
 
A2 
Adults have seen 
more of life than 
teenagers. 
A1 
Adulthood is 
superior to both 
childhood and old 
age in capabilities. 
A1 
Adults have already 
lived enough to 
decide to stop aging. 
A1 
Old people have 
seen more of life 
than adults. 
A1 
Immortality is reversible. 
P
1
3
 –
 T
h
er
e 
is
 n
o
 
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t 
fo
r 
w
h
at
 is
 lo
st
 U
I.
 
  195/201 
 
 
A2 
We don’t know the 
intentions of the god/s, 
if they exist.  
A3 
Aging is a by-product of 
evolution. 
A1 
God had foresight to 
know evolution would 
lead to senescence. 
A1 
Then he also had 
foresight to humans 
wanting to cure aging. 
P
1
5
 –
 D
ea
th
 is
 n
at
u
ra
l (
go
d
 v
e
rs
io
n
) 
A4 
Abrahamic religions- Aging is not the 
will of god, but a result from sin. 
A1 
We don’t know if there 
are god/s.  
A1 
If free will, P15A3A1 is 
incompatible with 
P15A3A1A1A1. 
A1 
Go does not have 
foresight to free-willed 
decisions. 
A1 
Aging and death 
necessarily emerge 
from evolution. 
A1 
Wanting to cure aging 
necessarily emerges 
from evolution. 
A1 
P15A1, P15A2 
A2 
God(s) can have 
questionable intentions. 
A1 
Those are not intentions 
of some god.  
P
*1
6
 –
 N
at
u
ra
l i
s 
go
o
d
 (
go
d
 v
er
si
o
n
).
 
A3 
There are intentions of 
(some) god that people 
do not consider good. 
A1 
Then aging might also 
not be an intention of 
some god. 
A1 
Reincarnation can solve 
the issue of justice in 
aging. 
A1 
Then god(s) intentions 
are just what we want 
them to be. 
A1 
⸸ 
A2 
These are 
misinterpretations of 
some god’s intentions. 
A2 
⸸ 
A2 
God(s) works in 
mysterious ways. 
A3 
What (some) god 
intends is what is good.  
A4 
⸸ 
A1 
Then we don’t know the 
intentions of god(s). 
A1 
Abrahamic religions. 
Curing aging will result 
in a new God intention.  
A1 
God could do nothing 
and still intend death 
and aging. 
P
2
0
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  W
h
at
 is
 lo
st
 
ca
n
n
o
t 
b
e 
re
p
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d
 U
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A2 
We should not be 
played God. 
A1 
The only data point 
available does not 
support that. 
A2 
There are supporters of 
immortality among 
practitioners of religion. 
A1 
Those who are judging 
and punish are the ones 
playing God. 
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C21 – Immortality is not desirable. 
 
 
C24 – Death is good (and eliminating it is bad). 
P25 – Immortality eliminates death as we know it. 
C26 – Immortality eliminates something good (and creates something bad). 
P27 – The good that death provides cannot be replaced by something equivalent or better. 
C28 – Immortality is not desirable. 
 
 
A1 
Society rejects this.  
A2 
Following this premise 
requires us to live as 
Homo Habilis. 
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
Artificial is a type 
of natural, not an 
antonym. 
P
*2
2
 –
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at
u
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l i
s 
go
o
d
 (
ar
ti
fi
ci
al
).
 
A3 
Society rejects 
innovations at first. 
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
The problem lies in the use 
of the word natural in P23. 
A2 
Natural =/= fictional, 
paranormal, etc. 
A1 
But then natural 
is trivial. 
A1 
P*22A2A1A1 
P
2
3
 –
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ea
th
 is
 
n
at
u
ra
l (
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ci
al
).
 
A1 
Aging has no purpose. 
P
2
9
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ea
th
 is
 
n
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u
ra
l (
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n
).
 
A1 
Multilevel selection. 
A1 
Multilevel selection is 
not needed to explain 
aging. 
A2 
It presupposes a moral 
judgement about what 
is eliminated.  
A3 
Frame of reference 
makes this claim 
contradictory. 
P
*3
0
 –
 N
at
u
ra
l i
s 
b
ad
 (
fu
n
ct
io
n
).
 
A4 
What about two bad 
options? 
A1 
The consequences are 
what is bad, not 
eliminating aging.  
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
This might result the 
elimination of the 
human species. 
A1 
Follow causality to solve 
the problem. 
A1 
The example is a cherry 
picking. 
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C31 – Eliminating involuntary death is bad. 
P32 – Immortality eliminates involuntary death. 
C33 – Immortality instantiates something bad. 
 
C35 – Immortality is not desirable. 
P*37 – Boredom is bad. 
C38 – A long enough life will inevitably be bad. 
C40 – Immortality is bad.  
 
 
 
A1 
Redundancies.  
P
3
4
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  T
h
e 
b
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n
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o
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b
e 
m
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 U
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A2 
More people alive 
means more brains to 
solve problems. 
A1 
It needs empirical 
testing. Immortality 
should be developed. 
A2 
Boredom is relative to 
each individual. 
A1 
Old people show signs 
of boredom. 
P
3
6
 –
 B
o
re
d
o
m
 is
 in
ev
it
ab
le
. A3 
Even if it is more of the 
same people could still 
enjoy it. 
A4 
What there is to do is a 
matter of rates, not of 
stocks. 
A6 
Eliminate the feeling of 
boredoom. 
A5 
Modify humans to not 
be bored. 
A7 
Make some pauses 
(hibernation). 
A1 
Requires we dumb 
ourselves down. 
A1 
Not applicable because 
we do not have 
bounded time 
constraints. 
A1 
Ross-Littlewood 
paradox. 
A2 
Every world state will 
happen. 
A1 
It will only take longer 
to get boredoom. 
A1 
Age in the capability 
sense causes this, not 
age in the chrono sense. 
A1 
The feeling although 
not pleasurable is still 
useful. 
A1 
We can remove the 
unpleasurableness and 
retain the information. 
A1 
Boredoom would still 
obtain. 
A1 
Enters into personal 
identity territory. 
A1 
Heat-death of the 
universe. 
A1 
It is an event too much 
in the future to bear 
relevance. 
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
Immortality is 
reversible. 
P
4
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e 
b
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n
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s 
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n
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t 
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e 
m
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 U
I.
 
A1 
This results in killing 
persons. 
A1 
It is no different than 
disallowing life 
extension therapies. 
A1 
Immortality can, but 
needs not to cause long 
lifespans. 
P
3
9
 –
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m
o
rt
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w
ill
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n
g 
lif
e
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s 
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C42 – Immortality is not desirable. 
 
 
P46 - Immortality eliminates involuntary death. 
 
A1 
Reducing the lifespan 
increases meaning. 
A2 
Meaning does not come 
from death but from 
achievements. 
A1 
The difference is in 
having a limit vs no 
limit. 
P
4
3
 –
 D
ea
th
 g
iv
e
s 
m
ea
n
in
g 
to
 li
fe
. 
A3 
The deadline as 
motivation is relative to 
each individual. 
A4 
Not every activity needs 
this kind of motivation. 
A6 
Opportunity costs are 
misunderstood.  
A5 
Immortality as proof of 
concept. 
A7 
We can alter ourselves 
to bypass this 
motivation system. 
A1 
Even if there is more time 
to achievements there will 
not be the motivation. 
A1 
Empirical testing is 
needed. 
A1 
It is universal, even if 
one is not self-aware. 
A1 
Personal identity 
problems appear. 
A1 
If immortality is possible, 
then every death is a 
result of agency. 
A1 
Why does it matter 
postponing an activity 
in the face of eternity? 
A1 
Some activities require 
specific world states to 
be executed. 
A1 
This is alleviated 
because nature is 
cyclical. 
A2 
If it doesn’t need to be 
conscious, then we can 
trick our body. 
A8 
People who believe in 
eternal life after death 
do not suffer from this. 
A1 
Alleviated =/= 
eliminated. 
A1 
Confusion between 
meaning and stress.  
A1 
Ability to deal with 
scarcity seems a 
positive feature. 
P
*4
4
 –
  L
if
e 
w
it
h
o
u
t 
m
ea
n
in
g 
is
 b
ad
. 
A2 
⸸ 
A1 
That is only so because 
there is a deadline. 
A1 
There might be another 
source of meaning 
besides death. 
C
4
5
 –
 L
if
e 
w
it
h
o
u
t 
d
ea
th
 is
 b
ad
. 
A1 
Consider that death is 
the only source of 
meaning. 
A1 
P43A8. 
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C49 – Immortality is not desirable. 
P50 – Immortality increases the range of options 
P*51 – Having more options is good. 
C52 – Immortality is desirable. 
 
 
A1 
One person is enough 
to make this conclusion 
obtain. 
C
4
7
 –
 Im
m
o
rt
al
it
y 
is
 b
ad
. A1 
The deadline can still be 
set. There is freedom to 
maximize meaning. 
A1 
Immortality is reversible.  
P
4
8
 –
  T
h
er
e 
is
 n
o
 w
ay
 
o
f 
re
p
la
ci
n
g 
th
e 
m
ea
n
in
g 
o
f 
lif
e 
U
I.
 
A2 
The problem can be avoided with 
several deadlines (hibernation). 
A1 
Immortality lacks value. 
A1 
Note: inequality concerns 
are inconsistent with 
immortality lacking value. 
P
*5
3
 –
 In
eq
u
al
it
y 
is
 b
ad
. 
A3 
Inequality is ambiguous 
regarding time-periods. 
A2 
Inequalities are the 
result of choice not 
injustices. 
A4 
Inequality is caused by 
unwarranted 
expectations. 
A2 
Seems unlikely. 
A3 
It depends on the 
justification to support 
the claim. 
A4 
What matters is the 
opportunity to have 
immortality. 
A1 
The issue is not being 
able to be an earlier 
adopter. 
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
The issue is not 
inequality but who 
should be on each side. 
A1 
Several allocation 
criteria are available. 
A1 
Empirical evidence says 
otherwise. 
A1 
Misses the point by 
assuming that 
immortality has value. 
A1 
P*53A3A1 thread. 
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C55 – Immortality is bad. 
 
C57 – Immortality is not desirable. 
  
A1 
Prices will 
eventually go 
down. 
A2 
Intellectual 
property 
mechanisms. 
A1 
It’s not only 
about money but 
also time. 
P
5
4
 –
 Im
m
o
rt
al
it
y 
w
ill
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
eq
u
al
it
y.
 A3 
Access to 
borrowing. 
A4 
State 
intervention. 
A1 
Time costs are 
also expected to 
decrease. 
A2 
Rich people will 
have higher time 
costs. 
A5 
UBI/NTI. 
A1 
Not if time costs 
for the poor 
includes food. 
A1 
Borrowing. 
P54A2 
A2 
Other solutions. 
P54A5 
A1 
immortality is a 
luxury – costs of 
opportunity. 
A2.1 
Immortality is 
not exclusive 
with healthcare: 
A2.2 
-It improves 
health. 
A1 
Note: Application 
to private sector.  
A2.4 
-It is a cheaper 
alternative. 
A2.3 
-It allows people 
to be alive. 
A3 
Immortality will have many positive 
externalities, including increasing 
state revenue and decreasing state 
expenses. 
A1.1 
Disagreement: 
A1.3 
-Low uptake rate. 
A1.2 
-It requires 
reductions in 
frailspan. 
A1.4 
-Technologies 
are the cause of 
increases in 
costs. 
A1 
The claim is false. 
A2 
immortality 
reduces frailspan 
to zero. 
A1 
People behave 
different than they 
say they will. 
A3 
Note: not a reason 
to not provide 
treatment. 
A2 
Boundaries of 
public healthcare. 
A4 
Ii only obtains 
temporarily. 
A1 
It ignores 
improvements in 
healthspan. 
A1 
There is no reason to 
discard studies about 
people’s stance. 
A2 
Not comparable 
with the current 
strategy. 
A1 
Immortality is 
reversible. 
P
5
6
 –
 T
h
e 
b
ad
n
es
s 
ca
n
n
o
t 
b
e 
m
it
ig
at
ed
 U
I.
 
A1 
Time won’t be a 
problem.  
P
*5
9
 –
  S
ta
gn
at
io
n
 is
 
b
ad
. 
A2 
Immortals will not be 
hostile to children. 
A1 
⸸ 
A1 
Our inability to adapt is tied to 
the aging process.  
A2 
Our inability to change is not 
rooted in the individual but in 
the shape of our networks 
P
5
8
 –
 E
lim
in
at
in
g 
in
vo
lu
n
ta
ry
 
d
ea
th
 w
ill
 le
ad
 t
o
 s
ta
gn
at
io
n
. 
A3 
Regulation on turnover might be 
an option. 
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C60 – Eliminating involuntary death is bad. 
P61 – Immortality eliminates involuntary death. 
C62 – Immortality is bad. 
 
C64 – Immortality is not desirable 
P65 – Immortality guarantees the ability to be alive. 
 
P*67 – Having the capacity for agency is necessary to do good. 
 
P69 – Immortality allows being alive for longer periods of time. 
P70 – Living for longer periods of time allows access to more and/or different activities. 
P*71 – Having access to more and/or different activities is good.  
C72 – Immortality is good. 
 
A1 
Immortality is 
reversible. 
P
6
3
 –
 N
o
th
in
g 
ca
n
 
re
p
la
ce
 t
h
e 
b
ad
 o
f 
st
ag
n
at
io
n
 U
I.
 
A1 
Capacity for agency still 
obtains after death. 
P
6
6
 –
 B
ei
n
g 
al
iv
e 
is
 
su
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
ca
p
ac
it
y 
o
f 
ag
en
cy
. 
A1 
P66 claims sufficiency 
not necessity. 
A1 
The concept of good 
may require suicide. 
C
6
8
 –
 Im
m
o
rt
al
it
y 
gu
ar
an
te
es
 t
h
e 
ab
ili
ty
 
to
 d
o
 g
o
o
d
. 
A1 
Immortality guarantees 
the ability to do good, but 
it may not be required. 
